The “China School” faction within Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a rigid pyramid structure that seriously undermined Japan’s postwar diplomacy. Their lack of strategic thinking, pro-China bias, and personnel practices that rewarded Beijing-loyal officials created a long-lasting network of political–diplomatic collusion with China. Japan’s ¥3.6 trillion ODA ultimately strengthened China’s economy and military power. The interventionist remarks by Ambassador Niwa Uichirō over the Senkaku issue symbolize how deeply Japan’s foreign policy had been shaped by this pro-China framework.

The pyramid structure of the China School created not only significant harm to postwar Japanese diplomacy, but also the very framework of political “Japan–China collusion.”

August 12, 2020.

The following is an excerpt from the article “The Normalization of Japan–China Diplomatic Relations Was a Mistake,” written by Nakajima Mineo, President of Akita International University, published in Hanada Selection (originally in WiLL, October 2012 issue, edited by Hanada Noriyoshi).

This is a must-read article not only for the Japanese people but for all readers around the world.

Lack of diplomatic strategy.

Why did such a situation arise?

The first factors were the lack of historical awareness and ideological grounding among officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly those of the China School, and their lack of strategic thinking in diplomacy.

Especially after the normalization of diplomatic relations with China, there was almost no awareness or readiness regarding what diplomatic strategy Japan should adopt when facing China, which consistently possessed strong strategic intentions, and what negotiation skills Japan needed to develop.

Those who believed that “not provoking China” was the sole diplomatic principle could never develop the mindset or readiness required for “strategic thinking” toward China.

Nakae Yōsuke, who served two terms before Hashimoto as Director-General of the Asian Affairs Bureau and later as Ambassador to China, was more of a French School diplomat than a China School one, yet he displayed a pro-China stance in historical issues that rivaled that of the China School.

Kushida Kunihiko, who became Director of the China Division in 1985 and later Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, was a figure who strongly opposed the visit to Japan by former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui.

His predecessor as Director of the China Division was Asai Motofumi (appointed in 1983), who frequently published commentaries in Japanese Communist Party-affiliated media, arguing that “the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty is unnecessary.”

Noda Eijirō, who became Consul-General in Hong Kong in 1977 and had previously served as Deputy Director of the Cabinet Intelligence Office, was later appointed—on the recommendation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—as a member of the Ministry of Education’s textbook screening council.

It was reported in October 2000 that he attempted various forms of “maneuvering” to introduce China-leaning historical perspectives into the Japanese textbook screening process.

Among post-normalization Directors of the China Division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, those who were relatively balanced included Fujita Kōrō (appointed in 1974), Tajima Takashi (1976), Tanino Sakutarō (1978), and Ikeda Tasuku (1980).

Fujita Kōrō, the first official to undergo Chinese-language training in the narrow sense of the postwar China School, later served as head of JICA before becoming known for undertaking volunteer work in Samoa in the South Pacific.

Figures like Fujita, who should naturally have become Ambassador to China, were instead sidelined because they did not align with the China School line, while those loyal to Beijing rose to prominence.

Among Consuls-General in Hong Kong, Okada Akira—one of the ministry’s foremost China experts with a strong personality—Suma Michiaki, who possessed a Western sensibility, and the gentle Hara Fujio were all shunned by Hashimoto and other pro-China faction members because their views differed.

This distorted tradition of the China School can truly be described as a major error in postwar Japanese diplomacy.

One background factor behind the rise of figures like Hashimoto was the dominance of Hōgen Shinsaku, the ministry’s kingmaker, who, due to his innate anti-Soviet stance, shifted the ministry’s policy sharply from its traditional pro-Republic of China line to a pro-China line during the Tanaka–Ōhira era of Sino-Soviet confrontation.

The pyramid structure of the China School not only inflicted great harm on Japan’s postwar diplomacy but also created the political structure of “Japan–China collusion.”

With their backing, a succession of Liberal Democratic Party prime ministers—Tanaka, Miki, Ōhira, Takeshita, Miyazawa, and Hashimoto—continued the pro-China line.

Japan’s ¥3.6 trillion in cumulative ODA to China ultimately contributed not only to China’s economic development but also to the strengthening of its military power, and it became widely viewed as a bed of vested interests.

This, too, appeared to result largely from the influence of the China School, headed by pro-China ambassadors such as Nakae Yōsuke, Hashimoto Tsutomu, and Kunihiro Michihiko.

More recently, after the unmistakable China School ambassadors Anami Yoshiaki and Miyamoto Yūji, came Ambassador Niwa Uichirō, who issued a warning from China’s perspective against the Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s plan to purchase land in the Senkaku Islands from its private owner.

As is well known, Ambassador Niwa had served as the head of Itochu Corporation, a trading company with perhaps the strongest pro-China tendencies among Japan’s major corporations.

Combining this with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ China School tradition, one could say that this resulted in a “nationality-uncertain” ambassadorial statement such as the one made by Niwa.

To be continued.