This article examines how the sharp increase in crimes committed by Korean residents in postwar Japan was closely linked to the policies of the U.S. Military Government and the GHQ. From the notorious Naoetsu Station murder case to attacks on police stations over black-market rice crackdowns, the rise of illegal immigrants, and the flaws of the foreign registration system, the essay analyzes how structural ambiguity enabled widespread lawlessness. Drawing on historical documents and crime statistics, it reveals that the crime rate of Korean residents during the first decade after the war was 7.7 times that of Japanese nationals and significantly higher than that of Chinese residents.

Crimes are said to be born of poverty and ignorance, but in this era, the actions of the U.S. Military Government and the GHQ caused Korean residents in Japan to become indifferent to Japanese law.

The following is the continuation of a major study by Abe Nangyū, first published on October 7, 2015.
Bold text except for the title is mine.

Characteristics of Crimes Committed by Korean Residents in Postwar Japan
Crimes committed by Koreans increased immediately after the defeat.
This was something unimaginable before Japan’s wartime defeat.
The reorganization of the police system and the ambiguity of criminal jurisdiction over Koreans contributed to this.

In August 1945 there were five incidents.
In September, nineteen.
In October, twenty-six.
In November, thirty-six.
In December, forty-two.
Many were cases of group assault, group conflict, or seditious behavior, and there were eight cases of group robbery.

As for murder, there was an incident on December 29, at Naoetsu Station on the Shinetsu Line—an important junction—where, under the gaze of many witnesses, a young Japanese man was killed by a group of three Koreans.
The three Koreans, each carrying about 30 kilograms of black-market rice, tried to board a train by smashing its window glass.
When the young Japanese man reprimanded them, they beat him to death with pipes and shovels, saying he was being “insolent toward Koreans.”

Afterward, the local police arrested the three Koreans and sent them to the prosecutor’s office as flagrante delicto murderers, but the U.S. Military Government stationed in Echigo-Takada took custody of them and released them.
This action by the U.S. Military Government was perceived as a sign that the U.S. forces, upon occupation, had “liberated the Koreans.”
By elevating the status of Koreans above that of the Japanese who had attacked Pearl Harbor, it symbolized their liberation.

In February 1946, the GHQ issued a memorandum stating, “In regard to Koreans who provide appropriate evidence of their intention to repatriate to Korea, any judgment rendered by a Japanese criminal court shall be reviewed by GHQ, which will take appropriate measures” (from The Korean Minority in Japan).
The action of the U.S. Military Government in Echigo-Takada toward these murderers anticipated this memorandum.
Once it became clear that they had been conscripted wartime laborers, they were released without trial.

What we learn from reading Abe Nangyū’s study is that we in fact know almost nothing about postwar Japan.
People subscribed to the Asahi or Mainichi, adopted a superficial moralistic pose, and believed they understood the whole world—this could be said to characterize many Japanese in the postwar era.

The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Bold text except for the title is mine.

Immediately after the defeat there was a severe food shortage.
The GHQ delayed the repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria for a full year because of this food crisis.
During this period, Koreans transported black-market rice from the Hokuriku region to Kyoto, and on January 24, 1946, in Kyoto, Koreans staged a riot by attacking the Shichijō Police Station over a dispute connected to black-market rice investigations.
This was encouraged by the way the occupying U.S. forces treated Koreans.

Koreans often clashed with Japanese police during black-market rice crackdowns.
The attack on the police substation near Toyama Station in August of the same year was also an incident triggered by Koreans resisting black-market rice enforcement.

Because the U.S. Military Government released the killers in the Naoetsu Station case without even putting them on trial, Koreans interpreted this as recognition that they ranked above Japanese.

Crimes are said to stem from poverty and ignorance, but in this era, the actions of the U.S. Military Government and the GHQ caused Korean residents to disregard Japanese law.
The American historian Edward W. Wagner argued that “in Korean cultural tradition, an individual’s relationship to the law is subjective, and this notion had been ingrained in the minds of Koreans” (from The Korean Minority in Japan), which contributed to the high incidence of crimes committed by Korean residents.

In addition, the large number of illegal immigrants was another cause of frequent crime, as noted in the National Police Agency’s Crime Statistics Report.
Illegal immigration occurs in many countries around the world, which is why systems such as “special residence permits” exist.

However, in postwar Japan, the issue of illegal immigration was of a completely different magnitude in terms of scale and timing—amid national reconstruction—compared to nations like the United States.
As illegal immigrants from the Korean Peninsula increased and hindered Japan’s economic recovery, the GHQ prohibited entry without authorization of the Supreme Commander in March 1946 and began enforcement in April.

Police apprehension records show that from 1946 to 1953, a total of 60,963 illegal immigrants were arrested.
Of these, 21,400 were in 1946 alone, an extraordinary number.

At GHQ’s request, Korean residents in Japan were repatriated to the Korean Peninsula.
With Koreans themselves desiring repatriation, the Japanese government repatriated them in an orderly manner by the end of 1946.
However, many Koreans who had repatriated returned to Japan illegally due to the political, economic, and social instability in Korea, longing for the living conditions they had enjoyed in Japan.
Moreover, the recorded figures reflect only those who were arrested; in reality, several times more Koreans are believed to have entered Japan illegally.

Koreans resorted to illegal re-entry after the GHQ issued a memorandum in March 1946 stating, “Non-Japanese who have repatriated to their homeland may not return to Japan until commercial transport becomes available, unless they have the permission of the Supreme Commander.”
The number of repatriates from Japan between August 1945 and the issuance of this memorandum reached 944,438.
Of these, approximately 500,000 are estimated to have repatriated voluntarily.

After the memorandum, while enforcement against illegal immigration became stricter, the GHQ continued to order systematic repatriation until the end of 1946.
As a result, about 1,523,338 Koreans were repatriated by the end of that year.

The number of Korean residents in Japan in 1938 was 799,878.
Just before the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War in 1940, the number had increased to 1,241,315.
By the end of 1944, just before Japan’s defeat, the number reached 1,936,843.
These figures form the basis of the commonly cited “approximately two million” Korean residents in Japan.

In 1945, the year of the defeat, passage across the Genkai Sea became difficult due to attacks by U.S. submarines.
Subtracting the number of those repatriated between August 1945 and the end of 1946 from the 1,936,000 Korean residents leaves 413,505.
Meanwhile, the 1947 national census recorded 508,905 Korean residents, suggesting that roughly 100,000 were illegal immigrants.
The registered population increased further to 535,236 by March 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War.
At that time, mechanisms existed that allowed illegal immigrants to obtain registration.
Registration only became strict after Japan regained independence in 1952.

Crimes Committed by Koreans in the First Ten Years After the War
According to the National Police Agency, male illegal immigrants were responsible for many of the crimes committed by Koreans.
Although rarely mentioned today, crime statistics for foreigners living in Japan (excluding Okinawa) were recorded during the first ten postwar years.
According to the Crime Statistics Report of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, more than 20,000 Koreans were prosecuted every year, with the peak in 1950—when the Korean War broke out—reaching 29,440 arrests and 6,026 convictions.

In comparison, the number of Chinese offenders that year was only 370.
Measured per 1,000 residents, Koreans had a crime rate of 4.55, Chinese 0.8, and Japanese—despite the postwar devastation—only 0.59.
This shows how extraordinarily high the crime rate among Koreans was.

The National Police Agency noted that the crime rate appeared high because it was calculated using the registered foreign population.
In the case of Koreans, many crimes were committed by unregistered individuals—illegal immigrants.

This chapter continues.