This column by Masayuki Takayama exposes the overlooked causes behind the Fukushima nuclear disaster and critiques Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA).
Takayama argues that the U.S. had fully developed post-9/11 nuclear-terror countermeasures, yet GE failed to convey crucial safety upgrades to Japan, contributing to Fukushima’s power-loss catastrophe.
He further denounces the NRA—created under Naoto Kan—for imposing unrealistic, massively costly anti-terror and earthquake-tsunami requirements devised by individuals with no expertise in nuclear engineering or counterterrorism.
The result: skyrocketing nuclear costs, the collapse of Japan’s energy advantage, and the virtual destruction of nuclear power.
A must-read analysis for global readers interested in nuclear safety, terrorism, and energy policy.

Unfortunate events overlapped at TEPCO’s Fukushima plant.
Naoto Kan established the Japanese version of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, but appointed amateurs who knew nothing about nuclear power or terrorism as its members.
2024/08/06
2021/8/5

The following is from today’s issue of Weekly Shincho, concluding with Masayuki Takayama’s serialized column.
This essay again proves that he is the one and only journalist in the postwar world.
This essay also proves that he is the most suitable person for the Nobel Prize in Literature or the Peace Prize.
It is a must-read for all Japanese people as well as for people around the world.

Kyuden Power Self-Defense Force
Bin Laden had the terrorists hijack four civilian airliners.
Two of them were flown into the World Trade Center in New York, and the third crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.
The fourth, United Airlines Flight 93, turned around under the hijackers’ control but crashed en route.
Where was that plane aiming?
Some claimed from its bearing that it was headed for the White House.
But the target was only a three-story building, 21 meters tall.
The perpetrators had only light aircraft experience, and steering a 115-ton jetliner into such a small target would have been nearly impossible.
What they needed was something larger, easier to hit, and capable of causing catastrophic damage to American society.
From that viewpoint, the target that emerged was the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, located 40 km from New York City along the Hudson River.
There were three reactors.
What would happen if a 115-ton airliner slammed into one?
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) built a mock-up and conducted an experiment by crashing an F-4 Phantom jet into it.
The building was slightly damaged, but the containment vessel remained intact.
However, the impact and resulting fire were severe.
The shock cracked the bottom of the spent fuel pool beside the reactor, and all power sources were lost.
Cooling water could no longer circulate, the reactor went out of control, and the fuel rods in the emptied pool burned at high temperatures.
According to this scenario, 44,000 people around the plant would die in the initial stage, and ultimately 500,000 people within an 80-km radius would perish.
In other words, had the fourth plane struck here, the entire island of Manhattan would have become a dead city.
Based on this, the NRC issued an improvement order in 2005 requiring all nuclear plants to install multiple robust backup power systems.
The U.S. government newly established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which cooperated with the FBI and the Department of Defense to strengthen measures—from monitoring suspicious foreigners to thoroughly defending nuclear facilities.
It was also decided that if a civilian aircraft were hijacked, it would be shot down without hesitation.
The improvement order was also conveyed to GE, but GE did not inform TEPCO, which used GE-designed light-water reactors.
Had Japan been informed, the total loss of power during the massive tsunami of March 11 six years later could have been avoided.
That accident was a man-made disaster caused by an irresponsible American corporation.
Unfortunate events continued to pile up at TEPCO’s Fukushima plant.
Naoto Kan established the Japanese version of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, but appointed amateurs who knew nothing about nuclear power or terrorism.
For some reason, the NRA joined forces with earthquake researchers and demanded earthquake and tsunami countermeasures.
It forced plants to construct meaningless “Great Walls” around their sites.
For terrorism, it assumed attacks by 200-ton aircraft exceeding U.S. scenarios and required buildings strong enough to withstand them.
Such impacts and fires would be enormous.
If the administrative building burned, the water intake pipes for cooling would break as well.
Thus, the NRA ordered the construction of a massive 50,000-ton reservoir and an underground control room 100 meters beneath the surface.
Because ground attacks were also possible, plants were told to prepare for those as well.
Recently, the NRA punished TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki plant, claiming its anti-terrorism measures were inadequate.
But such measures should fundamentally be handled by the national government.
If a terrorist aircraft appears, the Self-Defense Forces should shoot it down.
If there is a ground attack, the Ground Self-Defense Force should crush it.
Yet the NRA forces all protection costs onto the nuclear plants.
The construction of meaningless walls and the cost of anti-terrorism measures now total several hundred billion yen per reactor.
As a result, nuclear energy costs have skyrocketed.
According to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, nuclear power has now become more expensive than solar panels.
In the past, nuclear energy cost less than 5 yen per kilowatt in real terms.
It provided inexpensive, stable electricity to factories across Japan, and towns surrounding nuclear plants could freely benefit from the revenue.
The public facilities around TEPCO’s Fukushima plant were all built with TEPCO’s money.
Thousands of millionaires were created through TEPCO-related work.
Even after the accident, TEPCO’s payouts continued, producing “disaster millionaires” everywhere.
Even so, nuclear power had still been capable of providing cheap, stable energy—until the NRA finally destroyed it.
At this point, why doesn’t the government deploy Self-Defense Forces with anti-aircraft missiles to each nuclear plant, and thereby restore the supply of inexpensive electricity?