This article faithfully reconstructs the dialogue “The Japanese Do Not Truly Understand the Chinese” by Masayuki Takayama and Katsuo Hiiizumi (Professor Emeritus, Aichi Prefectural University), published in the January issue of WiLL. Through historical records of executions and rebellions under Mao, mass starvation during the Great Leap Forward, suppression of religious sects, and the opportunistic nature of Overseas Chinese communities, the discussion exposes the fundamental illusion of viewing China as a “moral state.” It argues that the Chinese Communist Party tolerates neither rebellion nor dynastic change and urges Japan to abandon moralistic illusions and adopt a sober, realistic understanding of China.

This article is a faithful reconstruction of the dialogue titled “The Japanese Do Not Truly Understand the Chinese”, published in the January issue of the monthly magazine WiLL, conducted between Masayuki Takayama and Hiizumi Katsuo (Professor Emeritus at Aichi Prefectural University).

Through records of rebellions and executions during the Mao Zedong era, the tens of millions of deaths caused by the Great Leap Forward, the suppression of religious sects, and the Chinese practices of “rule-breaking,” “bribery,” and “bureaucratic domination,” as well as through the sharp insights of Lin Yutang and numerous modern historical examples, this dialogue exposes how illusory the long-held image of China as a “moral state,” preserved by postwar Japanese intellectuals and China specialists, truly was.

It further excavates the realities long overlooked by the so-called “atonement narrative toward China,” including the history of the overseas Chinese and their “rootless” nature, the Chinese Communist Party system and its structure of bribery, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaigns, “wolf-warrior diplomacy,” the fraudulent image of Sun Yat-sen, the distortions of Japan’s China diplomacy over the past 80 years, and acts of cruelty and information warfare such as those surrounding the First Sino-Japanese War, the Jinan Incident, and the fabricated “Unit 731 photographs.”

By contrasting Yanagita Kunio’s theory of the Japanese people and citations from Mutsuo Mabuchi with the Chinese culture of “slave mentality” and “deception and plunder,” which stands in direct opposition to the Japanese capacity for “creative reconstruction,” the dialogue concludes that Japan must not treat China as a “moral state,” but instead confront it with cold realism and a shrewd diplomacy modeled on taoguang yanghui—concealing one’s strength while biding one’s time.

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What follows is an excerpt from the special dialogue feature titled “The Japanese Do Not Truly Understand the Chinese” published in the January issue of WiLL, featuring Masayuki Takayama, the singular and unparalleled journalist of the postwar world, and Hiizumi Katsuo, Professor Emeritus at Aichi Prefectural University.

This is a must-read not only for the Japanese people but for readers around the world.
In particular, the Japanese must read every single word with these truths engraved into their hearts.
This column is issued with that conviction.
All emphasis within the text, except for headings, is mine.

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The Japanese Do Not Truly Understand the Chinese

The Japanese have continued to harbor illusions about China.
Now is the time to awaken!

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(Omitted introduction)

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Revolution by the Replacement of the Dynasty Is Not Permitted

Takayama:
Who are the Chinese, really? Japanese scholars, quite frankly, have barely given this any serious thought at all.
Emeritus Professor Kazumi Kobayashi of Kanagawa University wrote a short essay titled “Rebels Who Dream of Becoming Chinese Emperors.”
In 1980, during his first visit to China, he stayed overnight in Jining, Shandong Province.
There, he happened to see a public notice announcing that several “counter-revolutionary elements” had been executed.
He wrote:
“I had previously conducted some research on the rebellions of heretical sects and secret societies during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Yet I was utterly astonished to discover that in the sublime People’s Republic of China—the very center of the world revolution under the guidance of the great socialist revolutionary Mao Zedong—there still existed ‘heretical sect followers’ like the White Lotus believers of the Ming and Qing eras.”
I am simply dumbfounded that Japanese scholars could speak of Mao Zedong in such reverent tones.

Hiizumi:
Even Mineo Nakajima, a specialist in Chinese politics, was shocked when he witnessed the Cultural Revolution.
He exclaimed, “Why would a moral state like China engage in such actions?” (laughs)

Takayama:
There is no way China is a “moral state” (laughs).
One indication that China is anything but stable is found in the Gazetteer of Hebei Province, which records ten cases of plots to establish a new dynasty and proclaim the emergence of a new emperor in opposition to the socialist regime.
Meanwhile, the Gazetteer of Shandong Province reports that between 1954 and 1984 there were 2,503 rebellions, and that 217 individuals who sought to ascend the imperial throne were arrested.
Even the fact that executions continued into the 1980s is shocking.

Hiizumi:
Videos of executions in China are even available on YouTube.
They are, in a grim sense, quite revealing.

Takayama:
From 1958 onward, during the era of the Great Leap Forward, tens of millions of people starved to death.
Mao Zedong issued instructions on how to dispose of the countless corpses, saying, “Bury them in the fields—they will become good fertilizer.”
He felt no concern whatsoever for the people.
That is why hundreds of “emperors” and religious leaders from sects such as the Yiguandao rose up to overthrow the communist regime.
One might have thought that at least someone would succeed in revolution.
Yet the Communist system crushed all of them.
The Chinese Communist Party was so powerful that it even forbade the traditional Chinese principle of dynastic replacement through revolution.

Hiizumi:
Does this mean that the Chinese people today have turned their backs on the Communist regime?
Absolutely not.
Chinese families are buying up luxury high-rise condominiums in the very center of Tokyo.
Only now is the Japanese government finally moving toward regulation.
Why, then, do the Chinese purchase land and real estate in Japan?
Some commentators claim that they are “fleeing the Xi Jinping regime,” but is that really true?
Looking at the history of the overseas Chinese, they go wherever there is money to be made.
Even after emigrating, it does not mean they are staunchly opposed to the Xi regime.
If profit lies elsewhere, they will even return to China.

Takayama:
What is rather admirable is that, despite the extensive destruction caused by overseas Chinese throughout Southeast Asia until the early Meiji period, they were unable to put down roots in Japan.
Back then, it was fortunate that we did not yet have scholars like Mr. Kobayashi.
But what about now?
If one believes that China is a respectable country or even admires it, it is impossible to grasp the true nature of the Chinese people.