For two years after March 11, Asahi Shimbun deliberately obscured the fact that the failed reactors at Fukushima were manufactured by General Electric (GE), shifting blame entirely onto Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Masayuki Takayama exposes how GE’s boiling water reactors were structurally defective due to severe stress corrosion cracking, how Japanese engineers painstakingly rebuilt and stabilized them, and how Asahi’s media deception became the foundation of Japan’s anti-nuclear propaganda.

The Worst Culprit in the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Was the United States

Two full years after March 11, an article appeared in the Asahi Shimbun that was rather surprising.
It was an interview with a former General Electric (GE) official who had been stationed at the TEPCO Fukushima nuclear plant.
Why was this surprising?
Because from the moment of the disaster, Asahi had consistently blurred the fact that the reactors that caused the accident were manufactured by GE.

For example, an early article by nuclear affairs editorial writer Keiji Takeuchi, titled “Careless Assumptions,” stated:
“The containment vessel was not equipped with a vent valve because ‘core meltdown would not occur in Japan.’ A valve introduced under pressure from international trends has now become the lifeline. This shows how careless the original accident assumptions were.”

Reading this alone, one would believe that the reactor was Japanese-made and did not even have a gas vent valve.
But the reactor was unmistakably manufactured by GE, and the valve was installed by TEPCO after observing the Three Mile Island accident in the United States.
The “careless assumptions” belonged to GE, yet Asahi made it appear as if TEPCO’s assumptions had been inadequate, thereby laying the groundwork for the subsequent anti-nuclear abolition propaganda.

Now, at this late stage, they suddenly admit that the reactor was GE-made.
Perhaps they thought the public had already forgotten.
Perhaps they intended to quietly correct their earlier misdirection without anyone noticing.
What is astonishing is the content of that interview itself.

The GE official was a Japanese man born in Okinawa who had once devoted his youth to anti-base protests.
He later worked as a sailor, was eventually hired by GE, and despite knowing neither thermal neutrons nor criticality, became a “specialist” in boiling water reactors (BWRs).
One may naturally wonder whether that was truly safe.
He then revealed that “the Fukushima reactors experienced several abnormal incidents, including design flaws on GE’s part.”

This was indeed the case.
Among them, stress corrosion cracking was particularly severe.
High-pressure steam pipes and the shroud surrounding the reactor core cracked one after another, causing radioactive leaks.
The power-generation turbines also fractured, and even the fuel rod cladding failed.
In short, it was a thoroughly defective reactor.

The reactor became inoperable, yet GE took no action whatsoever.
Instead, TEPCO and Japanese manufacturers such as Toshiba cooperated to solve the problems.
These were the very engineers whom Asahi later derisively called the “nuclear village.”

They identified the cause of the stress corrosion as the high carbon content of the stainless steel and the welding process.
The fragile turbines were replaced not with cast molds but with solid, precision-machined, integrated units using Japanese technology.
During this series of improvements, the gas vent valve that would later prevent the worst catastrophe was also installed.

After these modifications, the GE-model reactors—aside from their outward appearance—were entirely Japanese-made and experienced no failures until the massive tsunami of March 11.
Yet the interview makes no mention of this.
Instead, the reporter steers the conversation toward the question, “Is nuclear power dangerous?” and leads the former GE official to speak at length about TEPCO’s supposed indifference to safety, framed as the anguish of a GE resident engineer.

“BWRs cannot be handled without great expertise. I had to sharpen all five senses, touch the piping, and check for abnormal vibrations and temperatures,” he says.
But he fails to mention that the piping he inspected had already been replaced with safe, Japanese-made components.

His manner of speaking suggests how thoroughly he had acquired the habit of American-style lying.

Another point he avoids is the fundamental question of why GE irresponsibly left defects such as stress corrosion cracking unaddressed.
This column continues.