Inspired by essays in Seiron, this piece reassesses Japan’s market crash, expanding the hypothesis from Chinese involvement alone to a convergence of U.S. and Chinese strategic interests, and demands transparency from the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

February 15, 2016

A close friend told me that there was a superb essay on Sayuri Yoshinaga in this month’s issue of the magazine Seiron.

When I read that essay, I assumed that its author must also be a reader of my blog.
Taking what I had written about Sayuri Yoshinaga as inspiration, Ogawa Eitarō—an intellectual commentator nearly equal to a scholar, a graduate of Osaka University and the graduate school of Saitama University—wrote almost everything I had intended to say, leaving nothing out.

I strongly recommend purchasing it.
Seiron costs only 780 yen including tax.

Now, I would like to introduce the opening essay by Masayuki Takayama.
Once again, he proves himself to be the one and only genuine journalist in the postwar world.
As always, it is an essay that makes the scales fall from one’s eyes.

Reading his essay, I immediately felt the need to add another prime suspect to my hypothesis that the recent major collapse of Japanese stocks was caused by the Chinese government.

In other words, as two countries that both possess CIA-equivalent intelligence agencies and have maintained long-standing channels, it became clear to me—with a sense of shock—that this was the result of converging intentions: those of the United States (seeking massive profits in Japan) and those of the Chinese government, aiming to reduce public support for Prime Minister Abe and BOJ Governor Kuroda through yen appreciation and a stock market crash.

In any case, nothing changes in the fact that the Tokyo Stock Exchange—Japan’s market, a market meant for the development of the Japanese people—must immediately disclose to the Japanese public who continued to push the yen higher and who kept short-selling the Nikkei Average.

If my hypothesis is correct, then the remarks by Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, could truly be described as the words of an embodiment of evil—yet remarkably astute.

“Do not allow speculators to take the lead.”
There is no doubt that this statement was made with a full understanding of the methods used by speculators.

Masayuki Takayama’s essay will be introduced in the next chapter.