China is unlikely to confront the United States directly over the Senkaku Islands, but it has no intention of abandoning its claim. This essay warns that Beijing will pursue sovereignty through methods designed to avoid triggering Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, exposing the limits of deterrence.

March 12, 2017

The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
The preceding text is omitted.
Now, regarding the Senkaku Islands, what must the government do going forward.
At the very least, this is not a moment for the government to feel relieved.
There is no doubt that deterrence against China’s military intervention in the Senkaku Islands has been strengthened.
China will never deliberately confront the United States.
As a firm believer in power, China understands better than anyone that its military strength still falls far short of that of the United States.
Accordingly, it will refrain from actions that would clearly fall under the scope of Article 5.
However, it would be a grave mistake to assume that China will therefore refrain entirely from making moves against the Senkakus.
China has positioned the Senkaku Islands as a “core interest.”
It will never abandon its objective of seizing sovereignty.
From this point forward, China will pursue a strategy to take control of sovereignty in ways that do not trigger Article 5 of the security treaty.
A senior Chinese official has stated as follows.
“For us, the most convenient form of the Japan–U.S. alliance is one that fails to function at the critical moment.”
To be continued.