China is intensifying a salami-slicing strategy using coast guard vessels, maritime militia, and airspace incursions to seize effective control of the Senkaku Islands without triggering Article 5. This essay exposes the legal and operational blind spots Japan must urgently address.

March 12, 2017

The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Since President Obama’s remarks in 2014, China has avoided deploying its navy and instead has used its coast guard, the Chinese version of a coast guard, to steadily accumulate faits accomplis.
As part of what is known as the “3-3-2 formula,” China has repeatedly sent three coast guard vessels into territorial waters three times a month, remaining for two hours each time.
This is a classic “salami-slicing strategy,” in which effective control is gradually eroded through the steady accumulation of faits accomplis.
Last August, China sent fifteen coast guard vessels into Japan’s territorial waters simultaneously, achieving a record of a total of twenty-eight incursions over four days.
Going forward, this salami slicing is expected to accelerate from “4-4-2” to “5-5-3,” further building faits accomplis.
China has also long made use of maritime militia, disguised as fishermen, in place of the People’s Liberation Army.
The United States has released photographs showing disguised fishing vessels carrying militia conducting mine-laying exercises.
In the past, hundreds of fishing vessels have surged into the waters around the Senkaku Islands and toward the Ogasawara area.
It is reasonable to conclude that these were militia actions directed from above.
In response to Secretary Mattis’s remarks, China will likely expand the frequency and scale of such non-military activities, accelerating efforts to seize effective control through accumulated faits accomplis.
It is difficult to classify the actions of coast guard vessels and militia as armed attacks, making it difficult for Japan to exercise the right of self-defense through the Self-Defense Forces.
That being the case, there can be no invocation of Article 5.
These situations fall within the scope of “territorial security,” an expanded exercise of police authority.
Although this is the most probable scenario, it was left unaddressed in the security legislation enacted two years ago.
The government proposes responding by deploying the Self-Defense Forces when the capabilities of the Coast Guard and police are exceeded.
This is a serious mistake.
Deploying the Self-Defense Forces when the opposing side has not deployed its military must never be done.
It would merely provide China with a pretext and fail to gain international support.
It would be the height of folly.
Nor should the Self-Defense Forces be deployed for law enforcement while constrained by police authority.
Even the United States constitutionally prohibits federal troops from conducting law enforcement.
Using the military for law enforcement deviates from international norms.
So what should be done.
For non-military activities, the only solution is to strengthen the Coast Guard and police so that they can respond through to the end.
This is territorial security, and enhancing these capabilities is an urgent task.
Now is the time to tackle it seriously.
Although strengthening defense capabilities was emphasized at the recent Japan–U.S. defense ministers’ meeting, defense strength must be understood as comprehensive, including the capabilities of the Coast Guard and police, not only the Self-Defense Forces.
A critical blind spot lies in the protection of airspace sovereignty.
In peacetime, there are police on land and the Coast Guard at sea.
In the air, there is no aviation police, and it becomes a direct confrontation between the Chinese Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force from the outset.
Moreover, aerial movements are extremely difficult for the public, including politicians, to grasp.
China will likely seek to repeat airspace incursions over the Senkaku Islands, just as it does maritime incursions, to contest effective control.
Airspace carries exclusive and absolute sovereignty.
If airspace incursions are allowed at will, it cannot be said that effective control exists or that the area is under administration.
Japan claims sovereignty over Takeshima and the Northern Territories.
However, Japanese aircraft cannot fly over them, while the opposing countries can do so freely.
Thus, they cannot be said to be under Japan’s administration.
Accordingly, despite being Japan’s inherent territory, they are not subject to Article 5 of the security treaty.
Two years ago, the Turkish Air Force shot down Russian aircraft that repeatedly violated its airspace, thereby defending its airspace sovereignty.
Even against a military power like Russia, it did not permit airspace violations.
This is the natural response of an independent state.
Only then can an area truly be said to be under administration.
Can the Japan Air Self-Defense Force similarly prevent Chinese military aircraft from violating the airspace over the Senkaku Islands.
The greatest obstacle is Japan’s legal defect.
Due to space limitations, I will be brief, but the current Self-Defense Forces Law’s provisions on airspace violation measures contain a fatal flaw.
Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Law stipulates missions regarding airspace violations, but entirely lacks provisions granting the authority to carry them out.
This is the only provision that assigns a mission without corresponding authority.
Regardless of the legislative history, the current interpretation is that unless explicitly written in law, the Self-Defense Forces cannot act even by a millimeter.
As a result, even if Chinese military aircraft repeatedly violate airspace, Japan cannot carry out the international norm of forcing them to leave or land, and shooting them down if they refuse, depending on the situation.
While politicians demand that airspace be defended resolutely, the authority to use weapons is not recognized.
From the field’s perspective, this is nothing but a double standard, yet it was left untouched in the security legislation two years ago.
This amendment is an urgent priority.
Once Chinese military aircraft are able to fly freely over the Senkaku Islands, the islands can no longer be said to be under Japan’s administration.
At that point, the United States will no longer say they are subject to Article 5.
This would complete China’s scenario of seizing sovereignty over the Senkakus without inviting U.S. military intervention.
This is no time to rejoice like “vassals reassured of their fief” upon hearing the words “subject to Article 5.”
China will pursue a strategy to seize sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands while avoiding the activation of Article 5.
Only the Japanese can defend Japan’s territory, territorial waters, and airspace.
Returning to this fundamental principle, Japan must steadily carry out what it must do: strengthening the Self-Defense Forces, reinforcing the Coast Guard and police, and amending the laws governing responses to airspace violations.