Written on March 28, 2017, this essay from Sankei’s Seiron column argues that Japan’s political and media focus on short-term disputes has undermined national security, critically reassessing the Koizumi visit to Pyongyang and the Six-Party Talks.

How Japan Undermined the Only Moment North Korea Might Have Disarmed

A 2017 analysis showing how misplaced diplomacy weakened U.S.-led pressure and enabled North Korea’s nuclear survival.

2017-03-28
The following is from today’s Seiron column in the Sankei Shimbun.
A Crisis Invited by the Lack of Sovereignty Awareness
When observing Japan’s recent political world and media, there is something profoundly unsettling.
That is the fact that both the Diet and the media devote extensive coverage to short-term political skirmishes that are not the essence of national governance, while crises threatening Japan’s security and sovereignty—such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs—are treated lightly, as if they were transient events.
It is precisely this kind of response that may have produced the grave North Korea–related situation we face today.
This is not only Japan’s problem but also the result of errors in the international community’s policy toward North Korea, and thus it should be considered from a broader perspective.
The Mistakes of the Koizumi Visit and the Six-Party Talks
By the 1990s, North Korea’s nuclear issue had already become serious, and in 1995 the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, President George W. Bush in January 2002 designated North Korea and two other countries as part of the “Axis of Evil” and declared that “all options are on the table,” signaling a readiness to use military force.
With the United States taking the lead, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was overthrown in December of the previous year, and in March 2003 Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq was destroyed by military attack, the merits of which are not discussed here.
This stance deeply frightened dictators such as Kim Jong-il and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, with the former going into hiding for extended periods out of fear of assassination and the latter abandoning his nuclear program in December 2003.
The author believes that this period, when the United States demonstrated unwavering resolve, was the only time when North Korea’s nuclear abandonment had real feasibility.
This does not mean that military force should have been used against North Korea, nor that it was the only solution to the nuclear and missile problem.
It means that only against the backdrop of a real possibility of force can negotiations and dialogue succeed in compelling nuclear abandonment.
However, during this very period, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang in September 2002, and the Six-Party Talks aimed at halting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs began in August 2003.
The author views these two actions by Japan and the international community as classic examples of failing to understand both the psychology and reality of North Korea’s leadership.
Japan Destroyed the Most Important U.S. Strategy
The Koizumi visit to Pyongyang was suddenly announced on August 30, 2002.
On that day, the author was meeting one-on-one with the official responsible for Japan policy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as part of a long-standing security experts’ dialogue.
At that moment, a subordinate entered the room and handed the director a document, which he signed and then said to me,
“Hakamada-san, this is the major news of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang. I have just signed the Russian Foreign Ministry statement welcoming it for the stability of Northeast Asia.”
Shortly thereafter, I spoke privately with Mr. Kunadze, a former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister who also served as ambassador to South Korea.
As a diplomatic professional, he frankly expressed a harsh assessment of Koizumi, contrary to the official statement.
“Mr. Koizumi views the North Korea issue solely from the perspective of domestic politics and has absolutely no understanding of international strategy or diplomacy.”
By this, he meant that Koizumi had shattered what should have been Japan’s most important U.S. strategy.
To be continued.