Even as negotiations with the United States collapsed, Japan had no concrete plan for war. Tojo argued that withdrawal from China would only fuel anti-Japanese sentiment and trigger further conflicts, making retreat strategically untenable.

2017-06-17.
This is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Even after this point, the United States did not yield an inch in negotiations.
Japan’s ambassador to Britain sent a telegram to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, reporting that in light of Matsuoka’s resignation and Japan’s oil stockpile situation, this might be a good opportunity for the United States to negotiate with Japan.
However, the United States showed no sign of compromise whatsoever.
Even at this stage, neither the Japanese government nor the military had any plan for war against the United States.
This serves as one piece of evidence demonstrating that the so-called “joint conspiracy” argued later at the Tokyo Trials had no substance.
Then came the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941.
There, using the term “elastic limit,” it was explained in detail that if negotiations with the United States were dragged on aimlessly, Japan would lose its ability to fight due to sanctions imposed by the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.
With no oil and no scrap iron, the General Staff responsible for Japan’s defense could not make any concessions.
Regarding the issue of withdrawal from China, it was also stated unequivocally that “if Japan were to withdraw now, anti-Japanese sentiment in China would grow even stronger, and a second and third China Incident would inevitably erupt.”
Even if withdrawal was desired, Tojo feared that doing so lightly would cause further chaos on the continent and between Japan and China.
This is similar to how the United States today cannot easily withdraw from Iraq.