The sworn testimony of Tojo Hideki and Douglas MacArthur’s statement before the U.S. Senate converge on one point: Japan entered the war primarily out of self-defense. This historical record should be widely understood as essential knowledge.

2017-06-17.
This is a continuation of the previous chapter.
That the Emperor had no intention of waging war was made clear by the inclusion of the phrase “How could this possibly be My will?” in the Imperial Rescript declaring the opening of hostilities.
It is said that there was opposition from those around him to this revision.
They argued that if the Emperor appeared unwilling to wage war, morale would suffer.
Nevertheless, this wording was a direct embodiment of the Emperor’s sacred will.
At the same time, the phrase “to proclaim the great righteousness of the Imperial Way to both domestic and foreign audiences” was revised to “to preserve the honor of the Empire.”
This reflected the resolve that Japan must not abandon its dignity and could not submit to unconditional surrender by kneeling.
At the conclusion of the “Testimony,” Tojo repeatedly explains that the war was one of national self-defense.
Strikingly, this argument is entirely consistent with the testimony given by General Douglas MacArthur before the Joint Senate Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations from May 3 to 5, 1951.
MacArthur stated, “Japan had no indigenous raw materials. It produced no oil, nor many other essential resources such as tin and rubber. If the supply of these materials were cut off, more than ten million people would become unemployed. Therefore, the primary motive that drove them into war was self-defense.”
This testimony should be far more widely shared as essential knowledge among the Japanese people.
In concluding the “Testimony,” Tojo asserts that the war waged by the Empire of Japan was neither one of aggression nor exploitation, and that while he should bear responsibility for Japan’s defeat, he did not commit the so-called “war crimes” of “conspiracy” or “crimes against peace” for which he was charged at the Tokyo Trial.
Regarding Tojo’s dignified and logical stance, Hisahiko Okazaki—who possessed, as a Japanese, the finest traditions of British diplomacy, namely being a first-rate scholar and writer—observed that, setting aside the question of victory or defeat, Tojo Hideki was more admirable in foreign affairs than Taro Katsura, who had been prime minister at the time of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War.
Indeed, this is a statement worthy of being called a famous remark.