Published on August 4, 2019. This essay introduces an article by Abiru Rui in the monthly magazine Sound Argument, discussing Japan’s tighter export controls on semiconductor materials to South Korea, the comfort women agreement, wartime labor lawsuits, the radar-lock incident, and the harmful role of the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League.

2019-08-04
Japan once regarded South Korea as important, as a neighboring country belonging to the same Western liberal sphere, but now that it has become clear that this is not actually the case, how should Japan deal with it?
It can be said that the will of the Japanese people has already solidified.
The following is from an article by Abiru Rui, one of the finest active journalists of our time, published in this month’s issue of the monthly magazine Sound Argument under the title “The Useless Japan-Korea Parliamentary League.”
How should Japan face South Korea, a different kind of country with which it does not share many values?
Japan once regarded it as important, as a neighboring country belonging to the same Western liberal sphere, but now that it has become clear that this is not actually the case, how should Japan deal with it?
It can be said that the will of the Japanese people has already solidified.
Regarding the government’s strengthening of export controls on semiconductor materials bound for South Korea, in a joint public opinion poll conducted by Sankei Shimbun and FNN, Fuji News Network, on July 14 and 15, 70.7 percent answered that they “support” it, while only 14.9 percent answered that they “do not support” it.
Also, regarding whether they think South Korea is a trustworthy country, 74.7 percent, almost three quarters, answered “I do not think so,” while only 12.1 percent answered “I think so.”
During this period, major newspapers such as Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and Nikkei Shimbun, as well as major television stations such as NHK and the key commercial broadcasters, criticized the government’s response and demanded that Japan behave more appeasingly toward South Korea, but it appears that this did not resonate with the people.
They were probably appalled, thinking, “What are you saying at this late stage?”
South Korea has reneged on the Japan-South Korea agreement that declared the “final and irreversible resolution” of the comfort women issue, has not only failed to remove the comfort woman statue in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, but also dissolved the comfort women foundation after receiving 1 billion yen.
In lawsuits by workers from the former Korean Peninsula, the so-called former wartime laborer lawsuits, South Korea has revived issues that were “settled completely and finally” under the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and the Japan-South Korea Claims Agreement based on it, ignored international law, and demanded damages from Japanese companies.
This was done while the former wartime laborers put on the face of victims, despite having been in favorable treatment.
During that time as well, South Korea has groundlessly insulted Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force ensign, the Rising Sun Flag, as a “war-criminal flag” and demanded its exclusion, has made unreasonable demands for an apology from His Majesty the Emperor, now Emperor Emeritus, and on top of that, has irradiated a Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft with dangerous radar, while refusing to admit wrongdoing.
Faced with South Korea’s endless harassment and spoiled behavior that seems to say “anti-Japan is innocent,” the majority of the people have already come to think that there is no reason to give South Korea preferential treatment, and have judged that South Korea cannot be a partner.
South Korea is an incompatible country whose standards of behavior are decisively different from Japan’s in whether it values promises and good faith, and whether it observes international treaties and agreements.
This can be said to be the result of that fact having spread widely.
The current thinking of the Japanese government is expressed succinctly by the following words of a former vice-minister for foreign affairs.
“I think it is time, once and for all, to sever ourselves from talk of the thirty-six years of Japanese imperial rule and the like.
We take responsibility for the present and the future, but more than seventy years have passed since the war, and I think we can no longer go along with talk from 1910, the Japan-Korea annexation.”
A betrayal of the Western liberal sphere.
However, when one looks at the reactions of the political world, the degree of divergence from public consciousness is no different from that of the leftist mass media.
On an NHK program on July 14, Fukuyama Tetsuro, secretary-general of the Constitutional Democratic Party, criticized the government’s measure and argued as follows.
“It is a minus for the national interest if the international community sees Japan as having taken a trade-related countermeasure to a political problem.”
Koike Akira, secretary-general of the Japanese Communist Party, agreed with this.
“Using trade issues to resolve political disputes is a forbidden move.”
Furthermore, Yoshikawa Hajime, former secretary-general of the Social Democratic Party, also showed his agreement.
“Japan should stop stirring up nationalism.”
Although they speak of Japan’s national interest, what they are saying is exactly the same as the South Korean side’s argument.
Moreover, it is South Korea that is stirring up nationalism, while the Japanese people are calm and are rather casting a cold gaze upon South Korea’s fierce reaction.
Still more, while the present measure may contain some retaliatory elements, it is basically a measure based on security requirements.
A senior government official points out.
“There is a considerable possibility that South Korea has diverted chemical substances imported from Japan to North Korea or Iran.”
Behind the measure is the sense of crisis that, if the current situation were left as it is, Japan could unknowingly end up helping terrorism or nuclear proliferation.
Despite this, recognizing the South Korean side’s argument can be called a betrayal of the Western liberal sphere.
In the House of Councillors election, the Constitutional Democratic Party appears to have refrained from launching a large-scale criticism of the government on this issue after seeing that public support for the government’s strengthened export controls was high.
However, in any case, until now, whenever trouble arose between Japan and South Korea, the mass media and Diet members who, as usual, either stood on South Korea’s side or showed understanding toward South Korea’s side appeared.
The South Korean side, empowered by their existence, became aggressive and forcibly pushed through its claims by arguing black into white.
Even when the Japanese side objected, South Korea would counter as follows.
“Do not influential Japanese newspapers and Diet members also recognize South Korea’s claims?
What the Japanese government says is not different from the opinion and view of Japan as a whole, is it?”
This is the same in diplomacy toward China and toward North Korea, but parliamentary diplomacy shows many cases in which, far from helping the government’s negotiations, it drags them down.
It can be said that the representative example is the suprapartisan Japan-Korea Parliamentary League, chaired by Nukaga Fukushiro of the Liberal Democratic Party.
Even tracing events since the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea in May 2017, it has been of no use at all.
No, rather, by making a good face toward South Korea, it has produced the reverse effect of making it harder for Japan’s anger and resolve to be conveyed to the South Korean side.
To begin with, the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League was established in 1972, in the very midst of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War.
At first, it had the character of an organization for solidifying the unity of the Western camp against the Eastern camp, including the Soviet Union, and was centered on members of the Liberal Democratic Party and the former Democratic Socialist Party.
However, before long, its purpose was lost, and, in the name of Japan-Korea friendship, members of the former Democratic Party and the Communist Party also joined, and it turned into a mere friendship association.
With the Communist Party entering inside, the distance between the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League and the administration and government of the time also widened, and it became increasingly unclear what purpose the organization existed for.
Three months after the inauguration of the Moon administration, Mr. Nukaga visited South Korea and met with Mr. Moon.
Just before visiting South Korea, Mr. Nukaga had boasted regarding the former wartime laborer lawsuits that he would “say what must be said,” but once the lid was opened, he merely conveyed that “many citizens in Japan are worried,” and did not even receive a reply from Mr. Moon.
As Nishioka Tsutomu, visiting professor at Reitaku University and an expert on Korean Peninsula affairs, has pointed out, when Koreans say “10,” they say “20.”
Therefore, if Japanese people, with their usual restraint and consideration, say “5” when they mean “10,” it is conveyed as only one quarter of the reality.
When dealing with Koreans, only by striking them with twice the anger and disappointment of the Japanese people do they finally understand, “Ah, is that so”; but the way Mr. Nukaga spoke was equivalent to saying nothing.
Did it not merely give a misunderstanding about Japan’s current recognition of the situation?
In December of that year, a joint general meeting of the Japan-Korea and Korea-Japan parliamentary leagues was held in Japan, but in the joint statement that was announced, wording demanding that the Moon administration implement the Japan-South Korea agreement over the comfort women issue was, in the end, not included.
After the general meeting, Kawamura Takeo, secretary-general of the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League, Liberal Democratic Party, explained the reason as follows.
“There are also public sentiments due to the change of administration in South Korea, and we had to give consideration.
Both sides compromised.”
Does this mean that temporary South Korean public sentiment should be given priority over the promise made by both the Japanese and South Korean governments?
Because Japan shows consideration and compromises in places like this, South Korea believes that if it comes out strongly, Japan will bend.
Take responsibility for conveying a mistaken perception.
Because Japan has continued doing such things, the South Korean side is bewildered by the Japanese government’s current measure, thinking “this is different from usual,” and reacts emotionally.
In the sense that it spread misunderstandings and unnecessary expectations on the South Korean side regarding Japan’s true intentions, the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League may have become a cause of worsening relations rather than contributing to friendship and goodwill.
Furthermore, at the same time, this joint statement directly mentioned the Murayama Statement, which expressed “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for Japan’s past colonial rule and aggression, and the Kono Statement, which, without basis, recognized coercion in the recruitment of comfort women, and wrote as follows.
“The Japanese side reaffirmed that it will continue to inherit the positions of these successive administrations.”
This was a retreat, even though the Abe Statement marking the seventieth anniversary of the end of the war had already overwritten the Murayama Statement, and after the Abe Cabinet had verified the shoddiness of the process by which the Kono Statement was created.
Furthermore, regarding the granting of local voting rights to permanent foreign residents, the Japanese side wrote that it would “continue to make further efforts toward realization.”
Because it is suprapartisan, including the Communist Party, the content contradicts the position and intentions of the Japanese government, and this too damages diplomatic consistency.
At that time, in response to this joint statement, the reader service office of Sankei Shimbun received harsh voices such as the following.
“It does a hundred harms and not one good.”
A 72-year-old man from Yokohama City.
“The responsibility for allowing South Korea to become this arrogant lies entirely with the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League.”
A man from Chiba City.
All the other comments were also harsh.
The general public understands the location of the problem far better.
They understand that past groveling diplomacy and apology diplomacy toward South Korea and China were meaningless, and rather produced bad results.
In any case, in October 2018, three days after the South Korean Supreme Court handed down a final judgment ordering Japanese companies to pay compensation in the former wartime laborer lawsuits, the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League held an officers’ meeting, and Mr. Nukaga said as follows.
“The judgment violates the Japan-South Korea Claims Agreement, that is, it violates international law, and we will ask the South Korean government to correct the situation.
We would like to make efforts to create good relations in a way that complements the government’s diplomacy.”
After that, Mr. Kawamura stated as follows in an interview with Yukan Fuji.
“At the joint general meeting, I will say to the South Korean side what must be said, namely that ‘this series of moves is difficult to understand.’
That is because it will lead to future friendship.”
Reading this, one may think, well, they do understand after all, but Mr. Kawamura also says the following in the interview, so he is still appeasing.
“In South Korea, resentment and bitterness toward Japan remain.
Even so, if we only say that we dislike what they are doing, that will merely stir up anti-Japanese sentiment.
We also want to listen to the South Korean side’s arguments and, in a future-oriented manner, compile the wording of the joint statement of the Japan-Korea and Korea-Japan parliamentary leagues.
There is nothing good about Japan-South Korea relations breaking down.”
In the end, during the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League’s visit to South Korea and meeting with Mr. Moon in December of the same year, the Japanese side asked South Korea to take appropriate measures regarding the South Korean Supreme Court judgment, but the tone was still weak.
On the contrary, as I also introduced in this column in the February issue of Sound Argument, Shii Kazuo, chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, instigated Mr. Moon and, despite not representing the Japanese government, said something that could cause misunderstanding about the Japanese side’s thinking.
The exchange was as follows.
Mr. Shii: “The Japanese government also recognizes that individual claims rights have not disappeared in the wartime laborer issue, and I hope for a positive resolution that values this point of agreement.”
Mr. Moon: “If we stand on that position, could we not achieve an amicable resolution?”
It is easy to imagine that Mr. Moon must have felt encouraged.
Moreover, at the closing ceremony and press conference of the joint general meeting held inside the South Korean National Assembly in Seoul on December 14, the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League even shut out a reporter from the political news department of Sankei Shimbun.
What country’s way of doing things is that?
There is an additional episode to this visit to South Korea by the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League.
In conjunction with the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League’s visit to South Korea on the 13th and 14th, the South Korean navy conducted defense drills on Takeshima, Okinoshima Town, Shimane Prefecture, which South Korea illegally occupies.
Even after Japan had shown that much consideration, the South Korean side ended up despising and laughing at its weak-kneed attitude.
That too is only natural.
Toward someone who follows along with an ingratiating smile even after being trampled on and one-sidedly beaten, no one can possibly feel respect or affection.
At most, such a person would seem uncanny, and no friendship could be born.
I will quote a letter by Hashimoto Akimitsu, a self-employed man from Kawanehon Town, Shizuoka Prefecture, published in the “Talk Room” letters column of Sankei Shimbun on February 27 of this year.
“I have never heard that the existence of the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League has served the national interest.
Has it not simply been the case that the Japanese side has been used one-sidedly by the South Korean side?
Has the Japanese parliamentary league not continued sending mistaken signals to the South Korean side?
Many distinguished Diet members participate in the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League, but surely they have an obligation to explain themselves to the people.
(Omitted) Has the time not come to review the existence of the outdated Japan-Korea Parliamentary League, which does not serve the national interest?”
The Japan-Korea Parliamentary League and the Korea-Japan Parliamentary League are said to be holding a joint general meeting in Japan this September.
However, the Japan-Korea Parliamentary League, which has become a useless object, would be better dissolved already.