The Anti-Nuclear Information War Seeking to Sever Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Amid the automatic extension of the Japan–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, inaccurate information was circulated about Japan’s plutonium stockpile and the risk of nuclear proliferation.
This essay examines the Nuclear Energy Commission’s policy, the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, the nuclear fuel cycle, and NHK’s reporting, arguing that Japan’s nuclear energy policy is being undermined at its very foundation.
January 17, 2020
The policy of the Nuclear Energy Commission can be read as one that would sever Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle and drive the nuclear power industry toward its end. Does it not coincide perfectly with Mr. Kan’s scheme?
I am reposting, with tightened paragraphs, the chapter originally published on August 6, 2018, under the title: NHK commentator Noriyuki Mizuno even went so far as to denounce Japan by saying that “China and North Korea have named Japan and pointed to the possibility of its nuclear development” (August 1, “Jiron Kōron”).
The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Japan’s nuclear energy policy is literally on the verge of being destroyed at its very foundation.
Japan has imported uranium for nuclear power plant fuel from the United States and other countries, and has processed uranium fuel used in reactors to extract plutonium.
The nuclear fuel cycle consists of reusing that plutonium in the prototype fast-breeder reactor Monju in Fukui Prefecture, or in ordinary light-water reactors through pluthermal power generation.
Japan’s nuclear policy is built upon this basic premise.
However, Monju has been decided for decommissioning.
In order to maintain the nuclear fuel cycle, the only remaining option is pluthermal power generation.
Among the nuclear power plants that have restarted, only four reactors are capable of pluthermal operation.
Each reactor consumes 0.4 tons of plutonium per year.
If the reprocessing plant in Rokkasho Village, Aomori Prefecture, which is expected to be completed in three years, begins operation, eight tons of plutonium will be extracted annually through the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
Therefore, in order to carry out the Nuclear Energy Commission’s “pledge” to reduce Japan’s plutonium stockpile, arguments have emerged that spent nuclear fuel should not be reprocessed, or that reprocessing should be restricted.
The policy of the Nuclear Energy Commission can be read as one that would sever Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle and drive the nuclear power industry toward its end.
Does it not coincide perfectly with Mr. Kan’s scheme?
The people are made to bear the enormous burden of renewable energy.
Japan fails in its nuclear power policy.
It becomes excessively dependent on fossil fuels such as coal.
And it falls into the position of being a massive emitter of CO2.
Why is our country being driven down such a foolish path?
In the process leading to the automatic extension of the Japan–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, information flew around from the Japanese side, and also from the American side, such as “Japan’s plutonium stockpile of 47 tons,” “enough for about 6,000 atomic bombs,” and “the danger of nuclear proliferation.”
But these statements are not accurate.
The 47 tons of plutonium held by Japan is reactor-grade plutonium.
It differs in composition from weapons-grade plutonium used for nuclear weapons, and its purity is also remarkably low.
Of Japan’s plutonium, approximately 36 tons was reprocessed on commission in Britain and France, and is being stored by those two countries.
Moreover, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, are permanently stationed at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
Japan is under strict control.
For Japan to manufacture atomic bombs is scientifically and physically impossible.
There is no problem whatsoever with Japan’s possession of plutonium.
The only way to solve the problem is to operate the reprocessing plant and complete the nuclear fuel cycle.
Nevertheless, Japan as a whole shrank back in the face of inaccurate information, or information that contained a specific purpose.
As soon as the Japan–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was automatically extended, the media immediately reported “concerns from the international community.”
NHK commentator Noriyuki Mizuno even went so far as to denounce Japan by saying that “China and North Korea have named Japan and pointed to the possibility of its nuclear development” (August 1, “Jiron Kōron”).
The aim of such information is to force the reprocessing plant into abandonment, collapse the nuclear fuel cycle, and bury Japan’s entire nuclear power sector.
The Abe administration, which bears responsibility for Japan’s energy policy, should recognize that Japan’s future is facing a crisis because of anti-nuclear information, and should work to rebuild its energy policy.
