An analysis of military balance in East Asia explaining why China cannot openly attack Okinawa or Taiwan.
The essay examines deterrence through U.S.–Japan forces, Russia’s strategic role, and nuclear options beyond apology-based diplomacy.

Even China, which desperately wants Okinawa and Taiwan,
cannot launch conspicuous military actions and instead waits for its moment while engaging in information warfare.
2016-10-31
The following continues from
“Different countries hold different views.
Whichever path is chosen, it must be chosen by the Japanese people themselves.”
All emphasis in the text, except for the heading, is mine.

As an alternative to new alliances or nuclear possession,
for example, purely as one possible option,
there is a way to consider
not China, not South Korea, not North Korea,
but Russia as the key.
The absolute condition China must satisfy in order to wage war against the United States and Japan
is cooperation with Russia and access to Russian weapons and oil.
Therefore, even if Japan and the United States do not—or cannot—form an alliance with Russia,
merely separating China and Russia
is effective as a form of war deterrence.

In essence, this is close to the reverse of
China’s current attempts at “Japan–U.S. separation operations”
through issues such as the comfort women problem and the Yasukuni Shrine.

If Japan and the United States were to face
Russia, ranked second in military power,
and China, ranked third,
simultaneously, they would be at a disadvantage.
However, if Russia does not become an enemy,
even without becoming an ally,
the balance becomes
“the United States, ranked first + Japan, ranked fifth (+ Russia, ranked second),”
and even if a war were to occur against China, ranked third,
it would result in an overwhelming victory.

Those with sharp instincts may already understand that
this condition,
in which one side would overwhelmingly win even if war broke out,
does not mean that a one-sided war occurs,
but rather that war does not occur at all.

That is precisely the significance of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.
At present, because Japan and the United States hold a slight advantage,
even China, which desperately desires Okinawa and Taiwan,
cannot engage in conspicuous military action
and has no choice but to wait and conduct information operations.

For China, Asian diplomacy means nothing more than
reducing the influence of Japan and the United States in Asia.
For Japan, Asian diplomacy means
reducing China’s influence in Asia.
That is precisely why China and countries that benefit China
fear a stronger Japan and attempt to obstruct it.

The previously cited
Emmanuel Todd
offered a unique interpretation.
“Nuclear weapons are a shelter for security.
If a country possesses nuclear weapons, it is freed from military alliances
and avoids being drawn into war.
This is Gaullist thinking.”
“If two major nuclear powers exist in a region,
all countries in that region
will come to think that
‘nuclear war is absurd.’”

Considering military balance through alliances and diplomacy
is one possible option,
and as Todd argues,
if one wishes to avoid being dragged into another country’s war,
then instead of alliances,
possessing nuclear weapons independently
is also one possible path.

Japanese newspapers rarely write such articles,
but beyond “apology,” “aid,” and “friendship,”
there exist many different ways of thinking
and many different choices.

To be continued.