A July 10, 2020 account of the collapse of opposition unity in the Tokyo gubernatorial election, including the CDP’s abandoned effort to recruit Taro Yamamoto, its decision to support Kenji Utsunomiya in order to prioritize relations with the Communist Party, and the resulting conflict with the Democratic Party for the People.

July 10, 2020
The Collapse of the Unified Opposition Candidate Plan: Taro Yamamoto, Kenji Utsunomiya, the CDP’s Priority on Communist Party Cooperation, and Yukio Edano’s Reversal
The following is a continuation of the preceding chapter.
This text is taken from an article by journalist Takayuki Hikawa published in the monthly magazine WiLL under the title “How Many Tongues Does His Excellency Azumi Have?”
The quoted section below was written before the Tokyo gubernatorial election held on July 5, 2020.
It therefore contains predictions concerning the election result.
Before the election, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan attempted to establish a unified opposition candidate against Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike.
The party initially considered running Renho.
Former senior education ministry official Kihei Maekawa and Tokyo Shimbun reporter Isoko Mochizuki were also mentioned as possible candidates, but none of these plans materialized.
Akira Nagatsuma subsequently presented party leader Yukio Edano and Secretary-General Tetsuro Fukuyama with a choice between supporting Kenji Utsunomiya and recruiting Taro Yamamoto as the unified opposition candidate.
According to Hikawa’s article, Edano and Fukuyama initially chose Yamamoto.
However, Yamamoto’s side reportedly demanded either official endorsement by Reiwa Shinsengumi or an agreement among the opposition parties to reduce the consumption tax rate to five percent.
The Constitutional Democratic Party would not accept the five-percent proposal, and the negotiations reached an impasse.
Meanwhile, when Utsunomiya announced his candidacy, the Japanese Communist Party immediately declared its support for him.
The Constitutional Democratic Party then chose to prioritize its relationship with the Communist Party rather than continue negotiations with Yamamoto.
It decided to support Utsunomiya.
According to Hikawa, Edano later told people around him:
“We never considered recruiting Yamamoto from the beginning. Utsunomiya is the best possible candidate.”
If Edano and Fukuyama had previously decided to recruit Yamamoto, this later statement would raise serious questions about the credibility of Edano’s words.
The Democratic Party for the People, meanwhile, refused to support Utsunomiya.
One of its senior officials reportedly described him as an extreme left-wing candidate, and the party decided not to endorse anyone.
At the same time, the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Democratic Party for the People were considering merger negotiations after the end of the Diet session.
Yet the two parties could not agree even on a single candidate in the Tokyo gubernatorial election.
A merger pursued merely to create a larger electoral organization, without resolving major differences in political principles and policy, could only produce further conflict.
After negotiations with the established opposition parties failed, Yamamoto announced his own candidacy.
Utsunomiya and Yamamoto therefore competed for many of the same left-wing and anti-Koike voters.
The political forces that had promised to create a unified opposition candidate ultimately placed two competing candidates in the race and created a situation that benefited Governor Koike.
The following internal accounts and attributed statements are recorded as claims presented in Hikawa’s article.
Yamamoto and Utsunomiya Could Both Be Defeated
Reiwa Shinsengumi, led by Taro Yamamoto, was experiencing financial difficulties.
The approximately ¥400 million in donations collected during the previous year’s House of Councillors election had reportedly been exhausted, and the party needed to raise additional funds.
Hikawa argued that the Tokyo gubernatorial election offered Yamamoto an opportunity to raise money.
At the same time, Yamamoto deeply distrusted established parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Communist Party.
To preserve his political independence, he needed to avoid appearing to have been absorbed by those parties.
Yamamoto was also uncertain that he could defeat Koike.
A crushing defeat could severely damage his political influence, and he therefore hesitated to enter the race.
On May 25, Yamamoto visited Utsunomiya’s office in Tokyo for a direct meeting.
Yamamoto reportedly intended to inform Utsunomiya that he was considering running.
However, immediately after the meeting began, Utsunomiya declared his own determination to enter the race.
According to Hikawa, Yamamoto was overwhelmed by Utsunomiya’s forcefulness and was unable to mention his own plans.
When Utsunomiya announced his candidacy on Twitter that day, the Communist Party immediately declared its support.
In response, Edano, Fukuyama and others held a meeting on June 2 to make a final decision.
The single point on which they agreed was that relations with the Communist Party should receive the highest priority.
The party abandoned Yamamoto, who remained hesitant and continued to make policy demands, and decided to support Utsunomiya, the candidate backed by the Communist Party.
According to Hikawa’s article, Edano later told people around him:
“We never considered recruiting Yamamoto from the beginning. Utsunomiya is the best possible candidate.”
However, the preceding chapter reported that Edano and Fukuyama had earlier decided to proceed with Yamamoto.
If that account was correct, Edano’s statement represented an attempt to justify his position after negotiations had failed.
A senior official of the Democratic Party for the People responded:
“We cannot support an extreme left-wing candidate such as Utsunomiya.”
The party decided to allow its members and supporters to vote independently.
After the end of the ordinary Diet session, the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Democratic Party for the People secretly resumed discussions about a possible merger.
Their previous merger talks had failed in January 2020.
Nevertheless, members of both parties again argued that they should form a larger opposition bloc in preparation for the next general election.
However, if the parties could not agree on a candidate for the Tokyo gubernatorial election because of differences in principles and policy, how could they unite as a single party?
Their positions differed on the consumption tax, relations with the Communist Party, national security, constitutional policy and nuclear energy.
A merger that ignored those differences and aimed only to increase the number of parliamentary seats would not represent a principled political realignment.
It would be an electoral alliance of convenience.
Such a merger would create only further confusion and disappointment.
On June 15, Yamamoto held a press conference at the Diet and announced his candidacy for governor.
He strongly criticized the Constitutional Democratic Party:
“It is fatal that they cannot even decide to reduce the consumption tax to five percent at this moment. Can they see the people who are suffering?”
Yamamoto promised payments of ¥100,000 to all Tokyo residents and ¥1 million to every business in the city.
Hikawa described these promises as distribution-based populism.
Genki Sudo, then a House of Councillors member of the Constitutional Democratic Party, posted on Twitter:
“The party supports Utsunomiya, but personally I support Yamamoto!”
Sudo later left the party.
While the party supported Utsunomiya, one of its own lawmakers supported Yamamoto.
The party could not maintain unity even within its own parliamentary ranks.
A Constitutional Democratic Party executive was quoted in Hikawa’s article as saying:
“Utsunomiya and Yamamoto will now divide the vote. Opposition cooperation will collapse, and a crushing defeat by Koike is certain.”
The opposition ultimately failed to produce a unified candidate.
The Constitutional Democratic Party supported Utsunomiya in order to prioritize its relationship with the Communist Party.
Yamamoto entered the race independently after criticizing the party’s refusal to reduce the consumption tax.
The Democratic Party for the People rejected Utsunomiya and chose not to endorse anyone.
Sudo supported Yamamoto in defiance of his own party’s position.
Before they could compete against Koike on policy, the opposition parties became consumed by conflict with one another.
Hikawa predicted that if Utsunomiya and Yamamoto finished behind not only Koike but also Taisuke Ono, the former deputy governor of Kumamoto supported by the Japan Innovation Party, the political damage to the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Democratic Party for the People would be severe.
That passage was a prediction written before the election.
Whatever the final ranking, however, the opposition’s failure to unify its candidate, policies and political principles was undeniable.
The sequence showed that opposition cooperation was not based on a shared view of the nation or a common policy program.
Its aims were to defeat Koike, damage the Abe administration and increase parliamentary seats in the next general election.
Candidates and parties were then assembled around those electoral objectives.
That was why cooperation collapsed as soon as Yamamoto presented a specific policy demand concerning the consumption tax.
When the Communist Party supported Utsunomiya, the Constitutional Democratic Party quickly abandoned its effort to recruit Yamamoto.
The Democratic Party for the People could not accept Utsunomiya’s political position and withdrew from cooperation.
When parties with different political principles attempt to form a large bloc solely for electoral advantage, those contradictions inevitably emerge at decisive moments.
Parties unable to coordinate even one election candidate cannot credibly claim that they will form a stable government after an election.
Voters do not need an opposition whose only purpose is to oppose.
They need parties that can explain how they would govern Tokyo, develop the Japanese economy, manage foreign policy and national security, and design taxation and social welfare.
Edano’s reported claim that he had never considered Yamamoto, after having previously chosen to recruit him, symbolized the political conduct of the Constitutional Democratic Party at the time.
When the words of political leaders change according to immediate convenience, they cannot earn public trust.
The unified opposition candidate plan was not destroyed merely by Koike’s political strength.
It was destroyed by opposition parties that placed electoral tactics above policy and failed to share a common purpose or political philosophy.
To be continued.