A July 10, 2020 record examining the near-total absence of constitutional deliberation in Japan’s Diet during the COVID-19 crisis, opposition resistance to discussing an emergency clause, and the contradiction between claiming to defend constitutionalism while refusing parliamentary debate.

July 10, 2020
A Diet That Refused to Debate the Constitution: The Pandemic, the Emergency Clause, and the Opposition’s Contradictory Constitutionalism
The following is a continuation of the preceding chapter.
This text is taken from an article by journalist Takayuki Hikawa published in the monthly magazine WiLL under the title “How Many Tongues Does His Excellency Azumi Have?”
The ordinary session of the National Diet in 2020 lasted for 150 days.
Nevertheless, the Constitution Commission of the House of Representatives held substantive deliberations only once.
The corresponding commission in the House of Councillors did not meet at all.
Substantive constitutional deliberation had already remained stalled for more than two years.
It was during this period that the global COVID-19 pandemic occurred.
The rapid spread of the virus raised fundamental questions.
What would happen to parliamentary terms, elections, government authority, individual rights, restrictions on private activity, and relations between the national and local governments if the Diet could no longer meet normally?
Could Japan’s Constitution and legal system adequately respond to a national emergency of a kind that had not previously been anticipated?
There were, of course, serious arguments both for and against adding an emergency clause to the Constitution.
Some warned that such a provision could lead to an excessive expansion of government power.
Others argued that clear rules were necessary to maintain parliamentary and national functions during a major disaster, epidemic, or armed attack.
Precisely because both sides raised serious concerns, the political parties should have debated them thoroughly and publicly in the Diet’s constitutional commissions.
The opposition parties, however, dismissed constitutional discussion, including debate over an emergency clause, as “not urgent at all” and refused to participate in deliberations.
The criticism presented here is not simply that the opposition opposed constitutional amendment.
It is that the opposition refused even to participate in proceedings where it could state its objections, explain its reasons to the public, and challenge the governing parties’ proposals.
The final authority to amend the Constitution belongs not to Diet members but to the people.
The Diet can only initiate an amendment.
No amendment can take effect without approval in a national referendum.
Preventing the commission from meeting and obstructing the debate required for citizens to form their own judgment is neither constitutionalism nor prudence.
It deprives the public of the opportunity to consider and decide constitutional questions.
The following is Hikawa’s account of the constitutional commissions during the 2020 Diet session.
Sabotaging Constitutional Amendment
The ordinary Diet session lasted for 150 days, yet the Constitution Commission of the House of Representatives met for deliberation only once.
In the House of Councillors, the number was an astonishing zero.
For more than two years, no substantive deliberation had been held in the commissions.
As the spread of COVID-19 led many citizens to call for consideration of an emergency clause in the Constitution, the opposition declared that the matter was “not urgent at all” and showed no willingness to participate.
On June 11, the governing parties proposed holding a meeting of the commission.
The opposition rejected the proposal, claiming that constitutional deliberation could not take place while the House of Councillors Budget Committee was meeting.
Jun Azumi of the Constitutional Democratic Party then criticized the governing parties:
“It was an aggressive attempt to hold the Constitution Commission unilaterally. Rather than making a sincere effort to debate in the commission, it appeared to be a performance directed at forces seeking to advance constitutional amendment. It was an extremely unpleasant response.”
But under what conditions would the opposition have agreed to deliberate?
When a meeting was proposed, the proposal was condemned as unilateral.
When a date was suggested, another committee’s meeting was used as a reason for refusal.
When no meeting took place for an extended period, responsibility was placed entirely on the governing parties.
The side refusing to deliberate blamed the other side for the absence of deliberation.
Hikawa described this as a groundless political complaint.
At the only House of Representatives Constitution Commission meeting held during the session, on May 28, Nobuyuki Baba, secretary-general of the Japan Innovation Party, stated:
“Although constitutional debate takes place actively outside the Constitution Commission, including in media discussion programs and the Diet Budget Committee, the proper arena for such debate has virtually ceased to exist. It is an abnormal situation that the free-discussion forum in which each party can express its views candidly has continued to be closed. Members of the Diet, who serve in the highest organ of state power and should continuously debate the Constitution, must understand that this is no time to remain asleep.”
He was exactly right.
Politicians expressed their opinions for and against constitutional amendment on television programs and at press conferences.
During elections, they declared that they would defend constitutionalism.
Yet in the formal parliamentary body established for constitutional deliberation, they refused even to participate in free discussion.
That cannot be described as fulfilling the responsibility of a national legislator.
Beginning discussion in the Constitution Commission does not automatically amend the Constitution.
Parties opposing amendment can explain why they oppose it.
If they believe an emergency clause would be dangerous, they can identify the dangerous provisions and propose restrictions on governmental authority.
If they believe the existing Constitution and statutes are sufficient, they can explain the legal grounds and practical procedures.
That is what democratic parliamentary deliberation requires.
Instead, the opposition prevented the forum from opening.
It declined to participate.
When the governing parties proposed a meeting, it rejected the proposal by criticizing the manner in which it had been made.
This raised the question of whether the opposition was protecting the Constitution or merely protecting a political condition in which the Diet was prevented from debating it.
Article 96 of the Constitution of Japan establishes the procedure for constitutional amendment through initiation by the Diet and approval by national referendum.
For the people to make an informed decision, extensive parliamentary deliberation and public disclosure are necessary.
Continuously refusing deliberation also prevents this constitutional procedure from functioning in practice.
The COVID-19 crisis revealed weaknesses in Japan’s national institutions that were difficult to see in ordinary times.
What should happen to parliamentary terms if a national election cannot be held during an epidemic?
How should votes be conducted if a major disaster prevents many legislators from attending the Diet?
Under what legal authority, and to what extent, may movement and business activity be restricted to protect human life?
If government power is temporarily expanded, who should supervise that power and determine when it ends?
Regardless of whether one supports or opposes an emergency clause, these are questions that the Diet must examine.
If the opposition genuinely fears abuse of government authority, it should attend the commission and propose mechanisms to restrict that authority.
By refusing debate, it prevents both the weaknesses of the existing system and the risks of amendment proposals from being clearly presented to the public.
The foundation of democracy is free and open discussion among people with differing views.
Refusing deliberation because opinions differ is the opposite of democracy.
Constitutionalism does not consist of repeatedly invoking the word “Constitution.”
It requires limiting power through law and continually examining that system in public.
Can opposition parties that continually close the formal forum for such deliberation credibly claim to defend constitutionalism?
“What they say and what they do are entirely different.”
They demanded that the Diet session be extended while arranging a closing-night party in advance.
They demanded accountability from the government while refusing to participate in deliberation themselves.
They invoked constitutionalism while preventing free debate in the Constitution Commission.
This pervasive contradiction between words and actions remained the defining reality of the opposition.