The China Coast Guard was placed under the command of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission in 2018, transforming it into a military organisation capable of operating jointly with the People’s Liberation Army during a crisis.
Around the Senkaku Islands, Chinese government vessels were becoming larger and more heavily armed, remaining inside Japanese territorial waters for longer periods and pursuing Japanese fishing boats.
Through an article by Tokai University Professor Yoshihiko Yamada, this record examines China’s salami-slicing tactics and the fundamental limitations of relying on the Japan Coast Guard alone to defend the Senkaku Islands.

August 3, 2020
Judging from its organisational structure, the China Coast Guard is no longer an organisation that can be dealt with by the Japan Coast Guard.
It has become an organisation that can only be confronted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
The following is taken from an article by Tokai University Professor Yoshihiko Yamada, published in this month’s issue of the magazine Seiron under the title, “August Will Be a Dangerous Month in the East China Sea.”
It is essential reading not only for the Japanese people but for people throughout the world, especially those who make their living through the United Nations.
On September 7, 2010, in waters surrounding Uotsuri Island in the Senkaku Islands, a Chinese fishing boat rammed a Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel engaged in the protection of Japan’s territorial waters.
The fishing boat attempted to escape and rammed another patrol vessel that pursued it.
Following the incident, China began to assert explicitly its claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, and the Democratic Party of Japan government then in power allowed itself to be manipulated by the Chinese government.
Looking back, the fishing boat’s assault amounted to China’s declaration of war in its campaign against the Senkaku Islands.
In that incident, the Democratic Party government, preoccupied with the immediate state of Japan–China relations, released and returned the arrested captain without prosecuting him.
That decision contributed to the subsequent threats against Japan’s territory and territorial waters.
China’s maritime expansion has been carefully prepared.
It has expanded the area under its control through “salami tactics,” accumulating faits accomplis by means of small changes that the other side may fail to notice.
In its plan to seize the Senkaku Islands, China has gradually strengthened its vessels by increasing their size and equipping them with weapons.
In 2020, the Chinese government’s plan to seize the Senkaku Islands appeared to enter a new phase.
In May, its conduct escalated to the point at which a patrol vessel comparable in size to a warship pursued a Japanese fishing boat and attempted to drive it from the surrounding waters.
Immediately after the incident, Chinese Foreign Ministry Deputy Spokesman Zhao Lijian said at a press conference:
“The Japanese fishing vessel was operating illegally in Chinese territorial waters, and it was therefore ordered to leave the area.
We also responded resolutely to the unlawful obstruction by the Japan Coast Guard.”
With these words, China publicly declared that the Senkaku Islands were under Chinese administration.
By July, Chinese patrol vessels had been roaming continuously around the Senkaku Islands for more than three months.
The length of each intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters was also increasing.
Chinese vessels had remained inside the territorial sea continuously for nearly forty hours.
The warnings and demands to leave issued by the Japan Coast Guard meant nothing to them.
Under continuous pressure, the Japanese government responded on every occasion by firing another diplomatic “regret cannon” through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and lodging a protest with the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo.
The government must have known that expressions of regret had no effect, but it avoided taking active countermeasures.
The only response it selected was to order the Japan Coast Guard to maintain its dedicated patrols.
In 2016, the Japan Coast Guard established a specialised Senkaku territorial-waters security unit at its Ishigaki office under the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, which is responsible for Okinawa.
The unit consisted of approximately 600 personnel and twelve patrol vessels and committed its full strength to guarding the islands.
China, however, observed Japan’s response and established a patrol system and equipment superior to Japan’s.
While the Japan Coast Guard responded with four 1,000-ton-class patrol vessels, the China Coast Guard often deployed one 5,000-ton-class vessel, one 3,000-ton-class vessel and two 1,000-ton-class vessels.
The difference in strength was obvious.
The Japan Coast Guard planned to deploy a 6,500-ton-class patrol vessel, but China already possessed two 12,000-ton vessels, among the largest patrol ships in the world.
The China Coast Guard possessed three times as many patrol vessels of 1,000 tons or more as Japan possessed in the same class.
In the expansion of its security forces and the strengthening of its equipment, China was likely to hold the advantage.
In 2013, seeking to counter the Japan Coast Guard, the Chinese government reorganised four of the five agencies engaged in maritime security.
It combined China Marine Surveillance, the State Oceanic Administration’s maritime-management body; the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command of the Ministry of Agriculture; the maritime police organisation under the Ministry of Public Security; and the customs organisation responsible for entry and exit control.
These bodies were unified to create the China Coast Guard under the State Oceanic Administration.
As China’s maritime expansion progressed, it sought to make the China Coast Guard a more powerful organisation.
In 2018, the Coast Guard was placed under the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission.
Although it continued to be commonly called the China Coast Guard, it formally became the Coast Guard Corps of the People’s Armed Police Force.
It was incorporated into a military structure rather than remaining a purely civilian police organisation.
In an emergency, it would operate as one with the People’s Liberation Army.
Judging from its organisational structure, the China Coast Guard is no longer an organisation that can be dealt with by the Japan Coast Guard.
It has become an organisation that can only be confronted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
To be continued.