August 7, 2020.
As U.S.-China rivalry intensifies, where should Japan place its strategic weight?
Iwata and Sasaki discuss the U.S.-Japan alliance, economic dependence on China, nuclear deterrence, freedom of speech, and the fundamental divide between totalitarianism and liberal democracy.
The dialogue warns against a diplomatic posture of trying to remain equally close to both Washington and Beijing and questions the excessive expectations that parts of Japan’s business community have placed on China.

The following is a continuation of the preceding chapter.
The previous chapter discussed the Chinese Communist Party’s information warfare and what the speakers described as America’s “great miscalculation”: the expectation that economic development would eventually make China more politically free and democratic.
This chapter turns to the question of what position Japan itself should take as the relationship between the United States and China changes.
At the center of the discussion are the need to define the U.S.-Japan alliance clearly as the foundation of Japan’s diplomacy and security, the danger of excessive economic expectations toward China, and the fundamental question of which political order can preserve freedom, democracy, and freedom of speech.
Do Not Try to Please Everyone
Sasaki:
In trade policy toward China, there are times when the Democratic Party takes an even tougher position than the Republican Party.
Iwata:
Japan needs to be much more sensitive to changes in America’s stance toward China.
A policy of remaining friendly with both the United States and China may appear prudent, but ask whether that logic would have worked during the Cold War between East and West.
It would not have.
There was no realistic option of being equally friendly with both the United States and the Soviet Union.
If forced to choose, Japan should make its position unmistakably clear and stand with the United States, a country founded upon the principles of freedom, equality, and democracy.
Sasaki:
There is no need to turn the rudder all at once, but Japan must not try to please everyone either.
Japan’s position is clear.
The U.S.-Japan alliance is the foundation.
Otherwise, Japan could end up assuming enormous risks, as South Korea has by attempting to court both the United States and China.
Japan’s business community places far too much expectation on China.
In security terms as well, Japan currently remains in a situation in which it cannot avoid relying on the American nuclear umbrella.
At the same time, China possesses nuclear weapons, and Japan faces the reality of exposure to the threat of successive nuclear-missile attacks.
Suppose Japan and China were to conclude a security treaty.
The question would then be whether China would truly have the will to confront American nuclear power.
If Japan were attacked by the United States, would China really risk itself to defend Japan?
Would the People’s Liberation Army not instead seize the opportunity to move into Japan?
Iwata:
Totalitarian China is not a state worthy of trust.
Sasaki:
Ideally, of course, Japan should maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance while developing an independent nuclear deterrent of its own.
Iwata:
Some argue that this would destabilize the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but if Japan did not possess long-range ballistic missiles, the United States—and President Trump in particular—would accept it.
Sasaki:
Moving closer to China would, in effect, create the possibility that Japan could once again find itself confronting the United States.
Japanese people need to think very carefully about that.
Moreover, if Japan were to place itself under Chinese hegemony, there would be absolutely no freedom of speech.
Iwata:
China has an ideology intended to replace freedom and democracy.
It is the idea that leadership by the Chinese Communist Party is itself superior.
Yet while its political system is totalitarian, its economy incorporates elements of economic liberalism.
If asked whether Japan should become the same kind of society, there can be only one answer: an unequivocal refusal.
Sasaki:
Moreover, it is only the appearance of a market economy, while the gap between rich and poor continues to widen.
If resentment among the Chinese people continues to grow, the situation could develop into something resembling the Hong Kong protests.
It also seems possible that restrictions on going outside were intended in part to suppress the possibility of anti-government demonstrations.
Iwata:
At present, the authorities are suppressing the situation by force.
But public dissatisfaction is also increasing over the response to the virus.
It could erupt at any time.