This July 19, 2020 article presents Rui Sasaki’s essay criticising Toshihiro Nikai, Keidanren and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while examining China’s Thousand Talents Plan, the participation of Japanese researchers, the transfer of advanced technology, the U.S. Export Control Reform Act of 2018, and the risks created by Japanese corporate dependence on China.

2020-07-19
【Rui Sasaki】LDP Secretary-General Nikai, Keidanren and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—The “Pro-China Trio” Left Behind by the Global Tide
Published: July 17, 2020
Updated: July 17, 2020
The coronavirus crisis has prompted the world to reconsider its strategy toward China.
Yet some people in Japan are still unable to keep pace with that change.
Originally published in the August 2020 issue of WiLL.
Emphasis within the text, other than headings, was added by me.
Japan’s “Invisible Invasion”
Professor Clive Hamilton’s Silent Invasion, published in Japanese by Asuka Shinsha, has attracted considerable attention.
In my books The Silent Invasion of Japan and The Day Japan Disappears, both published by Heart Publishing, I described the reality of Japan’s “invisible invasion,” drawing on a written interview with Professor Hamilton.
The difficulty is that those responsible approach quietly and without drawing attention.
Regarding what he describes as China’s expansionist character, I found an essay by Katsuo Hiizumi, professor emeritus at Aichi Prefectural University, particularly interesting.
The essay, published on the international information website Foresight, was titled “The Relationship Between Italy’s Novel Coronavirus Crisis and the Historic Mass Migration of Chinese People.”
Using that essay as a basis, I telephoned Professor Hiizumi and spoke with him.
He argues that the Han people who emerged in the Central Plain along the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River, the birthplace of Chinese civilisation, retain even today a “migration and settlement gene.”
They do not necessarily attempt an invasion by force of arms.
Instead, he says, they carry sleeping mats in order to secure a place to stay, repeatedly move into fertile land inhabited by other ethnic groups and eventually take it over.
This connects with the Chinese Communist Party’s “charm offensive” and “smile diplomacy.”
Hiizumi’s analysis is that this migratory characteristic was also an important cause of the explosive spread of the Wuhan virus in Italy.
Regarding these characteristics of the Han people, Hiizumi says that “the people who understand them least in the world are the Japanese.”
The Han people known to the Japanese are those who left behind the Four Books and Five Classics, composed Chinese poetry and performed Peking opera.
The Japanese do not know what he describes as their “true nature”: eating unusual foods, repeatedly migrating and taking control of new lands.
The true nature of the Han people, he argues, is evident from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region into which they settled.
Although the Han settlers initially lived peacefully with the Uyghurs, they eventually rose up in concert with the central government and declared, “This has been Chinese—Han Chinese—territory for four thousand years.”
The People’s Liberation Army poured into the region and began hunting down Uyghurs, an operation that continues even now.
Any Japanese person who regards the suffering of the Uyghurs as somebody else’s problem is extraordinarily complacent.
Such a person is like an insect that approaches an orchid mantis disguised as a flower and is easily devoured.
At the Shibazono housing complex in Kawaguchi, Saitama Prefecture, foreigners, including Chinese residents, account for more than half of the approximately five thousand residents.
Their number overtook that of Japanese residents several years ago.
Needless to say, I have no intention whatsoever of claiming that every Chinese resident is an invader.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that their numbers have continued to increase at what can only be described as an extraordinary pace and that complaints from local residents have not ceased.
Loud conversations between Chinese residents can be heard from early morning until late at night.
In addition to noise from children shouting and crying, children have reportedly left urine and faeces in places such as elevators and staircase landings, causing problems.
There is also an extensive area in Mihama Ward, Chiba City, that has been called a “Chinese housing complex.”
A residents’ association chairman told me that, when residents were discussing matters such as rubbish separation and the use of parking spaces, a Chinese man who had become angry after being cautioned threatened them by saying, “We will take over this housing complex.”
Intimidation Through Soka Gakkai
The issue is not limited to housing complexes in the Tokyo metropolitan area.
There have been calls across the country for plans to establish “Chinatowns” in the name of business, including in the centre of Sapporo’s Susukino entertainment district and the Airin district of Nishinari Ward, Osaka City, known as a district of day labourers.
These new Chinatowns, which could become new settlement bases, might eventually develop into Chinese enclaves and produce extraterritorial areas resembling Ikebukuro’s underground society.
The only “achievement” of the Wuhan virus may have been to expose and remind the public of the pro-China figures embedded in Japan’s political, bureaucratic and business establishments who do not understand the true nature of the Han people.
“The spirit behind China’s support for Japan cannot be measured in money.”
“We must devote our entire lives to repaying China’s kindness.”
These remarks were made in an exclusive interview with Hong Kong’s Phoenix Television on March 12.
“It is not appropriate to comment on the political actions of another country.
Would it not be sufficient to observe the situation carefully?”
This statement was made at a press conference on June 1.
The speaker was Toshihiro Nikai, secretary-general of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party.
The first remarks concerned the donation of one million masks by Alibaba founder Jack Ma.
The second concerned China’s decision to introduce a national security law in Hong Kong that would deprive people of freedom of speech, assembly and the press.
Nikai could not have been unaware that the national security law was a “Hong Kong suppression law” that denied the internationally promised principle of “one country, two systems.”
Adventure World in Wakayama Prefecture, Nikai’s home prefecture, houses six pandas, compared with the three at Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo.
In Ueno Zoo’s case, the panda rental fee is a substantial 950,000 dollars per year under a ten-year agreement.
Adventure World is privately operated and does not disclose its payment, but it presumably pays a similar amount.
The lovable panda, which lowers human vigilance, has been turned by the Chinese Communist Party into an instrument of its charm offensive.
Naturally, I am not criticising anyone for expressing gratitude after receiving masks.
The problem is that a senior governing-party official disrupted coordination with Japan’s ally, the United States, which had announced sanctions against China, and made remarks that appeared to abandon the people of Hong Kong, while at the same time rejoicing over the receipt of masks and expressing gratitude.
How must such conduct by a senior leader of Japan’s governing party appear to people around the world?
Even if the people of Hong Kong and Western governments feel anger at Nikai’s conduct, the Chinese Communist Party will not necessarily celebrate.
It will simply conclude that a person it has brought under its influence has behaved according to the script.
Nikai appears to be a committed supporter of China, but many members of the Diet have probably also been subjected to intense influence operations from China.
The methods are “intimidation” and “conciliation.”
Intimidation means applying pressure through Komeito and its supporting organisation, Soka Gakkai, which maintain friendly relations with China, by warning politicians that they will receive no cooperation in the next election.
I once heard that a member of the Japan–Tibet Parliamentary Group was told by the political minister at the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, “We will make sure you lose the election.”
This apparently meant that Soka Gakkai votes would not be directed to that politician.
At the same time, politicians who show favour toward China are invited there, introduced to senior Communist Party officials and allowed to pose for commemorative photographs as a means of winning them over.
Politicians who lack firmly established views on the nation and national security and who act merely to satisfy immediate electoral interests or personal vanity can easily be manipulated.
The Japanese government is equally feeble.
Regarding the national security law, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said at a May 28 press conference only that Japan was “deeply concerned about the situation in Hong Kong.”
He did not use words such as “condemnation” or “protest.”
That is utterly ineffective.
Xi Jinping’s state visit to Japan was abandoned for that year and was expected to be postponed indefinitely beyond the following year.
Nevertheless, is the desire not to “provoke China” not being displayed far too strongly?
An Anachronistic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
No matter how often Suga says that Japan’s response is “supported by both the United States and the United Kingdom,” Japan’s failure to coordinate with the Trump administration as it moves toward sanctions against China represents an endlessly pathetic diplomatic posture.
President Trump must be grinding his teeth at Japan’s timidity.
China is attempting to drive a wedge between Japan, the United States and Europe.
If China concludes that Japan is the easiest country to influence, a chill could emerge between Japan and Western countries as they deepen their confrontation with China.
A senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official offered the following explanation of the Japanese government’s response:
“Does everyone condemning China truly serve the national interest?
Precisely because the situation is like this, we must communicate even more closely with China.”
Sankei Shimbun electronic edition, May 30.
How long will the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continue repeating the same words?
With the arrival of a new Cold War between the United States and China, the age in which Japan could maintain relationships with both sides without making a choice has ended.
The result of failing to condemn China can be seen in the daily entry of Chinese government vessels into the contiguous zone and territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands and the attempted seizure of a Japanese fishing vessel in May.
At that time, more than ten Japanese employees of private companies were also being detained in China without the alleged facts of their cases being made public.
Prime Minister Abe may have become exasperated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ accommodating attitude toward China.
He indicated that Japan intended to lead efforts to prepare a joint statement on the national security law at the G7 summit that autumn.
I hope that he will send a strong message and prevent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from reducing it merely to an expression of “deep concern.”
Keidanren as a Tribute Mission
The Japanese business community’s accommodation of China is also in a critical condition.
In particular, the three organisations of Keidanren, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Japan-China Economic Association resemble a tribute mission.
In September of the previous year, representatives of all three organisations travelled together to China.
They bowed respectfully to Premier Li Keqiang and ingratiated themselves by declaring that Japan’s entire business community would welcome Xi Jinping’s planned visit to Japan that spring.
Behind the scenes, it was well known among informed people that they were urging the Prime Minister’s Office not to provoke China.
In October 2018, approximately five hundred business leaders accompanied Prime Minister Abe on a visit to China.
Despite having received a severe warning against excessive involvement with China in Vice President Pence’s speech shortly before the visit, they behaved like subjects performing the “three kneelings and nine prostrations.”
This was a ritual of submission to a Qing emperor in which a subject knelt once and bowed his head three times, repeating the sequence on three occasions.
Did they raise objections concerning their fellow Japanese businesspeople detained in China?
Or did they merely flatter Chinese leaders and rub their hands together in the hope of receiving favourable treatment in business?
Yang Haiying, a Chinese-born professor at Shizuoka University, described the visit by the three organisations as follows:
“At the opening of the talks, Japanese business leaders bowed deeply while Premier Li remained expressionless.
The scene resembled a premodern ‘tribute mission’ appearing before an emperor.”
Newsweek Japan, October 25, 2018.
As I will explain later, President Trump is serious, unlike Japan’s pathetic business community.
Unless Japan fundamentally reassesses supply chains that depend on China, Japanese companies themselves could become targets of sanctions.
An Opportunity to Move Away from China
The Wuhan virus fully exposed the depth and danger of Japanese corporate dependence on China, from automobile manufacturing to masks, disinfectants and other sanitary products.
If China were deliberately to halt production and exports, the Japanese economy would suffocate.
China’s share of Japan’s total imports increased from 14.5 percent in 2000 to 23.5 percent in 2019.
China also accounted for 21.1 percent of Japan’s imports of intermediate goods, exceeding the United States figure of 16.3 percent and placing Japan at the top among advanced countries.
Reuters, May 1.
Correcting this imbalance must be the starting point.
Nevertheless, countless Japanese companies, ranging from small and medium-sized businesses to major corporations such as Toyota, have established operations in China.
What is not widely understood, however, is that the greatest China-related risk may arise not when entering the Chinese market but when attempting to leave it.
Because the withdrawal of Japanese companies would damage the Chinese economy, particularly through the loss of employment, Chinese authorities are reluctant to approve their departure.
Companies can be subjected to accusations involving labour or taxation, presented with enormous financial demands and ultimately prevented from withdrawing.
The barriers are high because of language difficulties and insufficient knowledge of Chinese domestic law.
The situation becomes still more complicated when a Japanese company has established a joint venture with a Chinese partner.
It is therefore necessary to create withdrawal projects involving teams of specialists in accounting, taxation and other fields rather than leaving individual companies to act alone.
Even if this costs a certain amount of money, taking the indirect route may be the fastest way forward.
Compared with the possibility of additional tax assessments, it would be inexpensive.
As noted earlier, China-related risk also includes the possibility of sanctions imposed by the United States on Japanese companies.
In the summer of 2018, the United States enacted the Export Control Reform Act, ECRA, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act.
ECRA is a law that principally restricts the export to China of American advanced technology and technology capable of military application.
It can be described as a new, China-focused version of COCOM, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls.
The seriousness of the United States can be seen in its inclusion of biotechnology, artificial intelligence and other fields among the targets of regulation.
These fields overlap with those designated under the “Made in China 2025” programme.
This reflects a strong American determination not to transfer any more advanced technology to China.
Because the export of such products is prohibited in principle, Japan must also review joint development projects with Chinese companies and industry–university technological cooperation.
Otherwise, Japanese organisations could become subject to sanctions for ECRA violations.
China is also headhunting overseas talent through the state-run “Thousand Talents Plan,” and regrettably, many Japanese researchers are participating.
Their involvement must be reconsidered not only from the standpoint of a brain drain from Japan but also from the perspective of possible ECRA violations.
The Wuhan virus taught Japan that it should withdraw from China across a wide range of industries, from the automobile sector, which was promoting AI-powered autonomous driving in partnership with Chinese information-technology companies, to the apparel sector.
Japan possesses manufacturing techniques, traditions and originality cultivated over the course of its history.
Japan’s movement away from China would also contribute to correcting China’s unfair trade practices.
My new book, scheduled for publication by Heart Publishing in July, discusses in greater detail the present reality of China’s “silent invasion of Japan” and the case for moving away from China.
I encourage interested readers to consult it.
Rui Sasaki
Born in Tokyo in 1964.
After graduating from Waseda University, Sasaki joined the Sankei Shimbun.
He became known as an investigative reporter through his coverage of the Tokyo subway sarin attack.
He later became a political reporter, serving as chief correspondent at the Prime Minister’s Office and the Liberal Democratic Party press club before becoming deputy political editor.
After four years as Washington bureau chief, he became deputy chairman of the editorial board in October 2018.
During his time as an editorial writer, he appeared on Yomiuri Television’s Takajin no Soko Made Itte Iinkai and became known as one of the Sankei Shimbun’s leading commentators.
His books include Why Are Japanese People So Indulgent Toward Koreans?, published by Ibus, and The Silent Invasion of Japan and The Day Japan Disappears, both published by Heart Publishing.