In 2012, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara proposed that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government purchase the Senkaku Islands and put them to peaceful public use.
Nearly 100,000 donations totaling more than 1.4 billion yen were contributed, but the Noda administration nationalized three of the islands on September 11, 2012.
This article asks how Japan’s effective control might have been strengthened had Tokyo’s plan been implemented.

August 3, 2020
On April 16, 2012, then Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced during a speech in Washington, D.C., that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government intended to purchase part of the Senkaku Islands.
Ishihara stated that an understanding had been reached with the landowner, and Tokyo subsequently established a dedicated office to conduct surveys and develop a plan for the islands’ practical use.
Tokyo was not planning to construct a Self-Defense Forces base.
Its official report specified a small boat refuge where fishermen could shelter temporarily during storms and communications equipment for rescue and emergency contact.
Supporters of the plan contributed approximately 1.48 billion yen.
After the national government acquired three of the islands, Tokyo placed the remaining donations in a fund.
After expenditures for surveys and public information activities, the fund currently holds 1,427,489,460 yen.
On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government acquired Uotsuri Island, Kita-kojima Island and Minami-kojima Island.
The government described the purpose as ensuring the long-term peaceful and stable maintenance and administration of the islands.
This article raises the question of whether Tokyo’s ownership and implementation of visible public-use projects could have demonstrated Japan’s sovereignty and effective control more clearly, both domestically and internationally.
Key Quotation
“If the Tokyo Metropolitan Government had purchased the islands, it had already reached an agreement with the landowner and intended to make Japan’s effective control more visible by developing harbor facilities and other infrastructure on the Senkaku Islands.”
Full Text
August 3, 2020
If the Tokyo Metropolitan Government had purchased the islands, it had already reached an agreement with the landowner and intended to make Japan’s effective control more visible by developing harbor facilities and other infrastructure on the Senkaku Islands.
The following is a continuation of the preceding chapter.
If the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Had Purchased Them
Eight years ago, Japan had an opportunity to consolidate its effective control of the Senkaku Islands.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government proposed purchasing the privately owned islands, which had been leased by the national government, and putting them to practical use.
On April 16, 2012, Shintaro Ishihara, then Governor of Tokyo, delivered a speech at a symposium sponsored by the Heritage Foundation in the United States and announced Tokyo’s plan to purchase the Senkaku Islands.
An agreement had already been reached with the landowner, and the plan was intended to make Japan’s effective control more visible by constructing harbor facilities and other infrastructure on the islands.
The announcement of Tokyo’s purchase plan caused an uproar throughout Japan.
The Democratic Party administration, which had continued to show excessive consideration toward China, was particularly shaken.
China also reacted excessively.
After facing strong Chinese protests, Uichiro Niwa, Japan’s ambassador to China, stated that the purchase, if implemented, would cause a serious crisis in relations between Japan and China.
Thereafter, Ambassador Niwa increasingly made statements that appeared sympathetic to China.
Some media organizations and progressive political groups, misled by Governor Ishihara’s image as a political hawk, claimed that Tokyo’s purchase would lead to the construction of a Self-Defense Forces base and attempted to persuade the Japanese public that consideration should be shown toward China.
It should have been obvious that the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces was not something that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government could decide.
To demonstrate that the purchase reflected the will of the Japanese people, Tokyo solicited donations to finance it.
Approximately 100,000 donations totaling 1.47 billion yen were received.
Tokyo initially accepted the donations into its general account.
Consequently, the use of the donated funds to purchase the islands required approval by the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly.
At the time, a Democratic Party-affiliated caucus was the largest group in the assembly.
The office responsible for the Senkaku Islands, established within the governor’s secretariat, therefore prepared a plan based on forms of public use that the assembly could accept.
Specific proposals included creating an international research facility for the marine environment, installing communications equipment in cooperation with Ishigaki City and other local authorities so that fishermen could operate safely, and constructing a small boat refuge near the islands where fishermen could shelter during rough seas.
It was a peaceful utilization plan designed with international understanding and the livelihoods of Japanese citizens in mind.
China, which is thoroughly familiar with Japan’s land-ownership system, placed pressure on the Japanese government in an effort to prevent Tokyo’s purchase at all costs.
In July of that year, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, confronted with the Tokyo purchase plan supported by the Japanese public, announced the national government’s intention to purchase the islands.
In subsequent years, it has often been argued that it would have been preferable for Tokyo to have purchased the islands rather than for the national government to have nationalized them.
Had the islands become property of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, pressure applied by China to the Japanese government would not necessarily have stopped Tokyo’s utilization plans.
In particular, if the islands had become a center for environmental protection and maritime activities, they would have attracted international attention and made Japan’s effective control more widely recognized.
It was the best policy available under the circumstances at the time.
In July 2012, more than 100 Chinese fishing vessels entered Tamanoura on Fukue Island in the Goto Islands, purportedly seeking emergency shelter from a typhoon.
The residents of the Goto Islands, whose local waters were occupied by the Chinese vessels, had no choice but to wait anxiously for them to depart.
Tamanoura was occupied by Chinese vessels on two further occasions in August of the same year.
These incidents can also be interpreted as pressure from China.
That August, Ambassador Niwa’s official vehicle was attacked while traveling through Beijing, and the Japanese flag mounted on it was torn away in a humiliating act.
Finally driven into a corner by China, the Noda administration proceeded with nationalization on September 11.
China seized upon the nationalization to organize government-led demonstrations and attempted to unite domestic opinion through anti-Japanese sentiment.
The demonstrations in Qingdao and the burning of a Japanese-affiliated supermarket immediately after nationalization were also suspected of having been incited by the authorities.
China subsequently continued its “salami-slicing” tactics, gradually accumulating faits accomplis to place itself in an increasingly advantageous position.
In 2014, as many as 212 vessels described as coral-poaching boats converged on the waters surrounding the Ogasawara Islands and devastated the local marine environment.
China’s distant-water fishing fleets naturally could not have undertaken such movements without authorization or direction from the authorities.
The Japan Coast Guard was able to arrest only ten Chinese captains in the Ogasawara area.
The Chinese vessels also disturbed the seabed and abandoned large quantities of fishing nets, and it was believed that the fishing grounds would require a long period to recover.
To be continued.
Notes on Sources and Terminology
The original Japanese text dated August 3, 2020, has been reproduced without alteration.
Ishihara’s announcement was made in Washington on April 16, 2012.
Official Tokyo records state that he announced the proposed purchase and utilization of the islands in April 2012.
The understanding between Ishihara and the owner had not developed into a final written sales contract.
Ishihara later described it as remaining within the realm of an oral promise, although he maintained that a relationship of trust and agreement existed.
Tokyo’s official management report specified a temporary boat refuge for fishermen and emergency communications equipment, rather than a large commercial harbor or military base.
Final donations totaled approximately 1.48 billion yen.
After roughly 80 million yen was spent on surveys and public information activities, 1,427,489,460 yen remained in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s Senkaku Islands Utilization Fund.
The national government acquired Uotsuri Island, Kita-kojima Island and Minami-kojima Island on September 11, 2012.
On October 30, 2014, the Japan Coast Guard confirmed 212 vessels believed to be Chinese coral-fishing boats between the Ogasawara and Izu island groups.
Ten vessels were apprehended in the waters surrounding the Ogasawara Islands, while sixteen Chinese coral-fishing vessels were apprehended nationwide during 2014.
The arguments that the Chinese government directed the fishing fleets and orchestrated or incited the anti-Japanese demonstrations are presented as the author’s analysis and assessment.