When The Asahi Shimbun asked for proof that Prime Minister Miyazawa had “apologized eight times,” the source presented in reply was Asahi’s own “Jiji Kokkoku” reporting. From that episode, this discussion by Yoshiko Sakurai, Ryusho Kadota, and Rui Abiru examines Asahi’s comfort women reporting, its international communication, its reporters’ self-image as watchdogs of power, the Yasukuni issue, and the consequences they attribute to Asahi’s reporting for Japan’s relations with South Korea and China.

August 18, 2020
This article records part of a discussion among Yoshiko Sakurai, Ryusho Kadota, and Rui Abiru concerning The Asahi Shimbun’s reporting on the comfort women issue and its subsequent examination of that reporting.
The discussion begins with questions sent by The Asahi Shimbun in response to an opinion advertisement placed in national newspapers by the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, and then expands to the newspaper’s attitude toward its comfort women reporting, its communication with the international community, its reporters’ conception of themselves as “watchdogs of power,” the Yasukuni issue, and Japan-China relations.
One especially symbolic episode appears at the beginning: when Asahi asked for proof that “Miyazawa apologized eight times,” the source presented in response was an article published by The Asahi Shimbun itself in its “Jiji Kokkoku” column.

Key Quotation

Sakurai
“On the first point, The Asahi Shimbun itself had reported in its ‘Jiji Kokkoku’ column that he had apologized eight times. So I replied, ‘It is your own article.’”

Asahi Reporters’ Self-Intoxication with Their Role as “Watchdogs of Power”

Sakurai　Actually, before Asahi published its two-day series of articles on the comfort women issue, the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals placed an opinion advertisement in every national newspaper stating that the process by which the comfort women issue and the Kono Statement were examined had been insufficient. We listed several points. Among them, we wrote that the mistaken information about forcible recruitment had taken on a life of its own, that Miyazawa apologized eight times during his visit to South Korea in January 1992, and that this began with erroneous reporting by Asahi. Then The Asahi Shimbun sent us two questions through the advertising agency. One was: “Do you have definite proof that Miyazawa apologized eight times? Do you have documentary evidence?” The other was: “You call it erroneous reporting by Asahi, but please show us the materials demonstrating the erroneous reporting.”
On the first point, The Asahi Shimbun itself had reported in its “Jiji Kokkoku” column that he had apologized eight times. So I replied, “It is your own article.” As for the second point, there was already a mountain of evidence, so we presented it. After that, however, we heard nothing more from them.
Asahi had been criticized in many quarters, and I believe that criticism ultimately led to its examination of its comfort women reporting. Yet, as with the exchange over the advertisement, Asahi makes no effort at all to explain itself. It takes an overbearing attitude and places itself in the position of the victim. It may be extremely difficult to make this newspaper reflect on its conduct. Perhaps the only way to make it do so is for its readers to abandon it. I think people should part company with Asahi.
Kadota　When I speak with Asahi reporters, they often say things along the lines of, “We have to monitor those in power.” Monitoring power is certainly one of the roles of journalism, so there is nothing wrong with that in itself. But in Asahi’s case, I have the impression that there are a great many reporters who are almost intoxicated with that image of themselves. During the Democratic Party of Japan administration, for example, rather than monitoring those in power they were extremely close to the government. And although, in the end, they were doing things that demeaned Japan and the Japanese people, in their own minds they conveniently rewrote the picture so that they were confronting and monitoring power. There seem to be many such interesting reporters.

Asahi Has Not Faced Its Own Responsibility

Sakurai　There is one more point in this special feature that must not be overlooked. For example, the testimony of Seiji Yoshida, which Asahi reported and helped disseminate, was cited as basic material in the United Nations Coomaraswamy Report and in a U.S. House of Representatives resolution criticizing Japan. Nevertheless, Asahi appears to have no awareness that it helped spread Japan’s disgrace throughout the international community. There is no sign of an attitude acknowledging that it bears a serious responsibility.
In the United States today, State Department spokesperson Psaki has referred to Japan’s comfort women issue at a press conference, and there have been cases in which Japan has been criticized. The Congressional Research Service prepares materials for Congress, and the House adopts resolutions on the basis of such materials. The background materials compiled by the Congressional Research Service contain assertions such as the forcible recruitment of more than 200,000 people, sexual slavery, and the killing of most of them—claims that make one wonder what country and what era they are describing. The Congressional Research Service did not collect these materials out of prejudice. It gathers every kind of source, compiles them, and provides them to members of Congress. At the root of those materials are biased and mistaken reports by The Asahi Shimbun. Yet Asahi itself behaves as though international criticism of Japan has nothing to do with its own reporting. As Mr. Abiru said, perhaps the fact that Asahi has issued virtually nothing in English is also because it has not faced its own responsibility. It has shifted the issue into one concerning violations of women’s rights.
I believe Asahi’s examination should first be translated in full, accurately, into English, Chinese, and Korean, and distributed overseas. Asahi itself should announce the errors in its own articles to the international community. But even that would not be enough. This is a moment when the government, too, must devote far greater effort to communicating information.
Abiru　One more point about Asahi’s institutional character. I agree with the criticism that it has acted cowardly, but when I look at reporters working on the ground, I also have to say that, fundamentally, they have not studied the comfort women issue sufficiently and do not understand it. One symbolic incident occurred during the first Abe administration, when the comfort women issue became a major political issue and then-Prime Minister Abe made a statement to the effect that, whatever might be said about “coercion in the broad sense,” there had been no “coercion in the narrow sense.” This deliberately turned around arguments that The Asahi Shimbun itself had developed, as well as claims made by Professor Yoshiaki Yoshimi of Chuo University. Yet at a press conference held by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki, an Asahi reporter stood up and began asking in an angry, loud voice, “The prime minister keeps talking about a narrow sense and a broad sense, but I do not understand what he means.” But it was you people who started talking about a narrow sense and a broad sense in the first place.
Sakurai　That distinction itself was something they created.
Abiru　Exactly. So rather than studying the issue objectively and concluding that they are correct, they speak from an a priori assumption that they represent justice and that they are right.
Kadota　It is clear that Japan-South Korea relations were damaged and that serious problems were left for the future, but I believe Asahi also bears major responsibility for Japan-China relations. I believe Japan-China relations before August 1985 were completely different from those after that month. What happened in August 1985? Asahi mounted a major campaign in an effort to prevent then-Prime Minister Nakasone, who advocated a final settlement of postwar politics, from making an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Eventually, the People’s Daily published an article saying that China was “closely watching developments in Japan concerning the Yasukuni issue.” Then, on August 14, an official spokesperson began saying that “Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine hurts the feelings of Japan’s Asian neighbors.”
Visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which had continued throughout the postwar period, began to be treated as a problem from that point onward. In other words, that was the moment the Yasukuni issue became a “diplomatic card.” Through what might be called The Asahi Shimbun’s “tip-off reporting,” the issue continued to grow larger and larger. I believe the deterioration of diplomatic relations and the lasting problems caused by Asahi’s reporting apply not only to Japan-South Korea relations but also to Japan-China relations.
Abiru　The same can be said of the Nanjing Incident. Asahi was also instrumental in turning that into a major controversy. Beginning with Katsuichi Honda’s Travels in China, it continued to repeat propaganda. Interestingly, although Asahi later criticized Yasukuni with extraordinary intensity, I believe an Asahi article from October 1951 prominently reported the story of a young American who had come to Japan with GHQ and had continued visiting Yasukuni Shrine. As he prepared to return to the United States, he reportedly said something like, “I am returning to America, but I will ask my Japanese friends to continue visiting and to pray for the spirits.” Asahi was not anti-Yasukuni from the beginning. At some point along the way, there must have been some kind of intention behind the change.
Kadota　Perhaps they thought it could be used as an issue.
Sakurai　You mean with the enshrinement of the so-called Class-A war criminals in mind. The places where anti-Japanese sentiment has become a factor in Japan’s diplomacy are China and the Korean Peninsula. It was Asahi that sowed the seeds of anti-Japanese sentiment in China and on the Korean Peninsula. The Asahi Shimbun has truly become the root of these evils.
Kadota　Many Chinese people are by no means anti-Japanese. They are kind. They are kind-hearted and good people, and the Chinese people I encountered in the 1980s liked Japanese people very much and treated them warmly. Yet that has been changing more and more. The Asahi Shimbun is not on the side of such people; it invariably sides with the Communist Party dictatorship.
Sakurai　I also think Mr. Kadota’s point is extremely important. There are many different kinds of people in China. There are people who understand Japan properly and who are also admirable human beings. At the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals we have established a Japan Study Award, and in its first year we selected Professor Anwei Liu of the Tokyo Institute of Technology for a special prize. He is a scholar who studies Zhou Zuoren, the younger brother of Lu Xun. When we asked him to deliver a commemorative lecture, he said, “There is no Chinese person who has seriously studied Japan and then speaks badly of Japan.” I think this means that people who genuinely know Japan are able to understand its good qualities. I thought he had said something truly important. People who genuinely look at Japan carefully have no reason to come to hate Japan, and in fact they do not.
Rather than focusing on Chinese people whose anti-Japanese consciousness has been inflamed by The Asahi Shimbun, we must build solid exchanges with the sincere people who certainly exist throughout Chinese society and who can see facts as facts, with leaders of the democratization movement who believe there is something wrong with the present Communist Party system and speak out against it, and with younger generations inclined toward democratization.
Kadota　So genuine friendship between Japan and China begins with the “closure” of The Asahi Shimbun.