The Essence of the Fukushima Daiichi Response: Naoto Kan’s “Incompetent Activism” and Micromanagement

Published on August 13, 2019.
This article republishes a chapter originally posted on March 10, 2019, examining Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s response during the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.
Referring to the Independent Investigation Commission’s report, it discusses Kan’s conduct when alternative batteries were needed after the emergency diesel generators failed, the excessive intervention by the Prime Minister’s Office, and his qualities as supreme commander, criticizing the confused accident response as a man-made disaster.

August 13, 2019.
Also, according to the report of the Independent Investigation Commission, when it became clear that the diesel generators, the emergency power sources at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, had broken down and that alternative batteries were needed, Mr. Kan behaved in an abnormal manner.
At the time, one official connected to the National Police Agency listed four types of supreme commanders: 1. competent and active, 2. incompetent and inactive, 3. competent and inactive, and 4. incompetent and active, and stated the following flatly.
This is a chapter I published on March 10, 2019, under that title.
The following is the continuation of the previous chapter.
The source of reputational damage.
Also, according to the report of the Independent Investigation Commission, when it became clear that the diesel generators, the emergency power sources at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, had broken down and that alternative batteries were needed, Mr. Kan behaved in an abnormal manner.
Using his own mobile phone, he directly asked the person in charge such questions as “How big is it?” “How many meters in length and width?” and “How heavy is it?” and was eagerly taking notes.
According to government officials, whereas an ordinary politician would first think, “How should we deal with this situation?” Mr. Kan showed an abnormal interest in “why the diesel generators had broken down,” and the discussion reportedly made little progress.
At the time, one official connected to the National Police Agency listed four types of supreme commanders: 1. competent and active, 2. incompetent and inactive, 3. competent and inactive, and 4. incompetent and active, and stated the following flatly.
“You already know which one Prime Minister Kan fits into, don’t you?
He is the worst pattern: the incompetent-active type, someone who, though incompetent, tries to do things he cannot possibly do.
This is the most troublesome type of all.”
Here is a typical example of bad “micromanagement,” in which, despite being incompetent, a person wants to excessively manage and intervene in the work of subordinates.
A half-informed man who knew neither his own limits nor his own shortcomings tried to control everything, and inevitably committed many mistakes.
That was probably the essence of the accident response by the Prime Minister’s Office.
This was a man-made disaster caused by Mr. Kan.
This article continues.

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