Originally published on July 7, 2019.
Based on a major essay by journalist Udagawa Keisuke in WiLL, this piece sharply examines why the Japanese media continue to attack President Trump and traces that tendency to the “Japan-China Journalist Exchange Agreement” and the influence of the Chinese Embassy.
It questions the postwar structure of Japan-China media relations, its continuity with the Kōno and Murayama statements, and the loss of independence within Japan’s press.

2019-07-07
Why do they keep attacking Trump…?
One can understand it if it is the American media, but for the Japanese media to report in that way as well is a somewhat strange situation.

This is a chapter I posted on 2018-12-13 under the title, “Without examining the content, or clarifying the true intent of China’s announcements by comparing them with the claims of other countries, they report content recognized as being completely different from facts and international common sense.”
The following is from a major work by journalist Udagawa Keisuke, published in the monthly magazine WiLL under the title, “The ‘Japan-China Reporting Agreement’ that still binds newspapers and television.
Because Japanese people are absurdly earnest, they are still bound by it.
Throw away such waste paper!”
Why Do They Keep Attacking Trump?
The results of the U.S. midterm elections seem to have been satisfactory for President Trump.
The Japanese media are making a great fuss as though President Trump’s policies had begun to lose momentum because he lost the majority in the House of Representatives.
However, during President Obama’s time, the Democratic Party did not hold a majority in both houses, and because of that, budgets could not be passed in the United States, and there were even times when government facilities were temporarily closed.
Compared with that, the fact that the ruling party in the Senate is Republican can be evaluated as making for more stable politics than during President Obama’s time.
Nevertheless, there is no sign whatsoever that “Trump-bashing” will disappear from the world of news reporting.
One can understand it if it is the American media, but for the Japanese media to report in that way as well is a somewhat strange situation.
“No, just between us, if we do a report supporting Trump, we get scolded from above.”
That is what a director at a certain television station, not very well regarded among conservatives, said.
It was while we were talking over drinks about why they do not report neutrally on the contents of the midterm elections.
“Why?”
“Well, it seems complaints come from ‘Motoazabu,’ saying it violates the agreement.”
“The Chinese Embassy?”
The director put his index finger to his lips and gestured to me not to speak, then suddenly brought his face close and said, “What are you going to do if someone hears you say that so loudly?
I’ll get fired immediately.”
“Who is going to hear?”
“There are Chinese people everywhere, so you never know from where word will get back to ‘Motoazabu,’ do you?”
The director, speaking in a very troubled whisper, hurriedly changed the subject.
But what exactly is this “violation of the agreement”?
The keyword that solves the mystery is the “Japan-China Journalist Exchange Agreement.”
The Japan-China Journalist Exchange Agreement.
Its formal name is “Exchange of Official Notes Concerning the Exchange of Journalists Between the Governments of Japan and China,” and it was concluded in 1972 between Hashimoto Hiroshi, Counselor at the Japanese Embassy in China, and Wang Zhen, Deputy Director of the Press Bureau of China’s Foreign Languages Department.
It is somewhat complicated, but the original text was a “Memorandum Concerning the Exchange of Newspaper Journalists Between Japan and China,” which had been exchanged before the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, but because it lapsed upon the conclusion of the Japan-China Trade Agreement, the same content was concluded again on the same day.
However, the fact that it was called an “official note” and a “memorandum” means that it was neither a formal agreement between the two countries nor a treaty.
Naturally, it was nothing more than an informal arrangement that was never ratified by the Diet.
And yet, for some reason, not only has the Japanese media failed to free itself from the spell of this agreement, it has been completely dominated by it.
In 1962, between Japan and China, which at that time had no diplomatic relations, a “Memorandum on Comprehensive Japan-China Trade” was concluded, and economic exchange was given priority.
For the purpose of reporting on this economic activity, in 1964 it was decided that journalists from both Japan and China would be exchanged and that trade liaison offices would be mutually established.
The Japanese representatives were Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who was then engaged in trade, and House of Representatives member Matsumura Kenzo.
Matsumura Kenzo was a man who served concurrently as Minister of Welfare and Minister of Education in the Higashikuni Cabinet, and within the Liberal Democratic Party he formed a faction with Miki Takeo and was a leading figure of the “Hatopa.”
After the fall of the Ikeda Cabinet, he recommended Kōno Ichirō and was in constant conflict with the Kōno faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, while his secretaries, such as Tagawa Seiichi and Kōno Yōhei, later established the New Liberal Club.
Moreover, that same Kōno Yōhei later issued the “Kōno Statement,” creating a major obstacle to current Japan-China relations.
The contents of this agreement were revised several times.
Among them was the 1968 “Communiqué of the Japan-China Memorandum Trade Talks,” in which rather serious matters were discussed.
It may be a little difficult to understand, but let me list the key points here.
• Advancing friendly Japan-China relations is beneficial for peace in Asia and the world.
• The obstacles existing in Japan-China relations were brought about by American imperialism and the anti-China policies pushed by the Japanese authorities, and the Japanese side deeply understands this and will make further efforts to eliminate such obstacles and promote the normalization of Japan-China relations.
• Both Japan and China agree to uphold the three principles of “not adopting anti-China policies,” “not participating in conspiracies to create two Chinas,” and “not obstructing the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China,” together with the three political principles and the principle that politics and economics are inseparable.
These “three principles” were the official view presented in 1958 by Executive Committee member Liao Chengzhi, acting on behalf of Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, to Socialist Party House of Councillors member Sata Tadataka, who was visiting China, and afterward they became principles that China repeatedly brought up whenever the opportunity arose.
It may be said that relations became so complicated because, with respect to China before Reform and Opening, Japan pushed trade for the pursuit of its own profits alone, regardless of Japan’s overall politics or the international situation.
For that reason, this trade was even called “LT Trade,” taking the initials of Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who began the agreement.
The Sacrifices Paid for the “Statements.”
Japan as a country has sacrificed things that matter, such as politics and ideology, because it has given excessive priority to the economy of a portion of people.
This agreement as well was accepted almost without awareness, as though Japan had been taken hostage by the need to conduct trade, yet Japan ended up agreeing to various things, such as anti-American policies, the inseparability of politics and economics, and One China.
What makes it even worse is that principles decided by a Socialist Party politician were then reinforced by a former minister of the Liberal Democratic Party.
The spirit of this agreement remains 그대로 in the “Kōno Statement” and the “Murayama Statement,” and indeed, through the joint work of the Hatopa faction in the Liberal Democratic Party and the Socialist Party of that time, Japan came to a state of watching China’s mood while completely ignoring matters important to Japan.
Let me repeat that neither this agreement, nor the Kōno Statement, nor the Murayama Statement, was ever an expression of Japan’s will through formal procedures, nor were they treaties, nor were they ratified by the Diet.
Now then, I have gone on at length about this journalist exchange agreement, but if one says that an arrangement made more than half a century ago still dominates the Japanese media today, there may not be a few people who find that surprising.
However, the actual scene is the conversation at the beginning.
It is not very difficult to spot people coming and going to the Chinese Embassy in television stations in Roppongi, newspaper companies in Tsukiji, or broadcasting station lobbies and meeting rooms in Shibuya.
Naturally, in matters regarding China, they report centered on the announcements of the Chinese Communist government.
Without examining the content, or clarifying the true meaning of China’s announcements by comparing them with the claims of other countries, even when the content is recognized as something completely different from facts and international common sense, they report it as it is and feel nothing about doing so.
Does this not lead to a situation in which the independence of reporting disappears?
Of course, not a few Japanese people already understand such things.
It is no exaggeration to say that the internet is overflowing with criticism of media organizations that report while worrying about China’s wishes.
However, the situation is becoming one that cannot be treated as merely a domestic problem.
To be continued.