Published on August 8, 2019. This is a continuation of the roundtable discussion by Sakurai Yoshiko, Kadota Ryusho, and Abiru Rui in the monthly magazine Hanada. It argues that Japan repeatedly called on South Korea to hold talks under the Japan–South Korea Claims Agreement, while South Korea refused to respond, and criticizes Asahi Shimbun’s stance on Japan’s export-control review.

2019-08-08
Japan has followed that provision and, for the past six months, has been calling on South Korea to “hold talks,” yet South Korea has not responded at all.
What more, exactly, does Asahi expect Japan to do?
The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Sakurai
It writes, “They should urgently seek a breakthrough through high-level consultations between diplomatic authorities,” but the so-called forced labor ruling is also a matter that was completely settled by the Japan–South Korea Claims Agreement.
Article III of the Japan–South Korea Claims Agreement states that if a dispute arises, the two sides should hold talks.
Japan has followed that provision and, for the past six months, has been calling on South Korea to “hold talks,” yet South Korea has not responded at all.
What more, exactly, does Asahi expect Japan to do?
Abiru
The Japanese government has spoken quite strongly to South Korea, but the other side has turned a deaf ear.
From the beginning, it has had no intention of talking.
It is useless to tell such a counterpart to “talk more.”
Either Asahi understands nothing, or it has no serious intention of solving this problem.
Unless some form of forceful action is involved, South Korea will not understand.
Sakurai
In the first place, the strengthening of export controls is not an “embargo.”
The EU does not treat South Korea as a white country.
It treats South Korea in the same way as many other countries.
With this measure, Japan is simply asking South Korea to go through the same kind of procedures.
That is all there is to it, and therefore the EU is not criticizing Japan over exports of semiconductor materials.
It accepts this as a standard method.
Left-wing media outlets, beginning with Asahi, do not report this overall picture.
Export controls will build Japan–South Korea friendship
Abiru
For example, at the party leaders’ debate on July 3, Prime Minister Abe properly said something to that effect.
An Asahi reporter asked about the export-control issue, saying, “Isn’t this kind of retaliatory measure strange?”
Prime Minister Abe countered, “That understanding is mistaken.”
Taking into account that Japan is also a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which calls for preventing the transfer of conventional weapons and related technologies that undermine regional stability—the export-control regime established after the dissolution of COCOM, an international framework for the control of exports of conventional weapons and related dual-use goods and technologies—he said the following.
“Each country has an obligation to carry out trade controls for security purposes. In a situation where the other country does not keep its promises, preferential measures cannot be taken, and Japan’s review of the controls is a natural decision. It does not violate the WTO at all.”
Continuing preferential measures for a country that keeps neither promises nor treaties would be a betrayal of Western countries and liberal nations, so this is a natural measure.
Kadota
South Korea is a country of sadaejuui, servility to the great, bowing down before the strong while becoming overbearing toward the weak.
Unless one deals resolutely with such a country, one will be looked down upon, and an equal relationship cannot be built.
In other words, for the sake of a true Japan–South Korea relationship, Japan has no choice but to take a proper attitude.
That is why I have always argued that it is important to impose controls on South Korea.
This is the first time Japan has taken a resolute stance toward South Korea.
If there is to be true Japan–South Korea friendship in the future, I think these export controls are its starting point.
South Korea’s currency crisis is imminent
Abiru
In addition to its sadaejuui of following great powers, South Korea is also a country of yarō jidai, overestimating itself and believing it is a greater power than it actually is.
Considering its history of having treated China as its suzerain state, perhaps it cannot be helped, but if one takes a weak-kneed attitude toward such a country, it will only become more and more arrogant.
After all, without not only dialogue but also forceful action such as sanctions, there can be no real discussion.
Kadota
South Korea has shown sufficient respect toward the United States and China.
That is because they are strong.
They slam down their national demands.
In human relations and international relations alike, it is important to show respect to the other party and maintain a certain degree of restraint.
However, South Korea has never shown either respect or restraint toward Japan.
That is because Japan has never once taken a resolute attitude toward South Korea.
That is why South Korea has kept looking down on Japan and has come to think it can treat Japan any way it likes.
Unless that is corrected, a true Japan–South Korea relationship can never be born.
Abiru
That is why South Korea cannot complain to China.
South Korea still insists that the Sea of Japan be called the East Sea, but regarding the sea on its western side, the “Yellow Sea,” it does not complain and demand that it be called by the Korean name, “West Sea.”
That is because the Yellow Sea faces China.
A few years ago, when I spoke with a famous Korean university president, he said this.
“Koreans actually dislike Chinese people. They behave as if they were a suzerain state and act arrogantly. But when they take a strong line, Koreans cannot say anything. It has already been engraved into our DNA.”
Leaving aside whether the DNA theory is correct, I thought that this is probably the nature of Koreans.
Kadota
That is an interesting episode.
That is precisely why there is a possibility that a true Japan–South Korea relationship will begin this time.
For that purpose, second and third rounds of controls are still necessary.
Abiru
The government has already prepared as many as one hundred sanctions options, and depending on how export controls are administered, they can be strengthened or weakened.
If South Korea behaves meekly, they can be loosened; if it behaves with shameless arrogance, they can be tightened.
The Japanese government is handling this with flexibility.
Recently, when I spoke with a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he said the following.
“In any case, the Moon Jae-in administration cannot solve the problem. For our part, that does not trouble us. Even if Japan–South Korea relations remain chilled for the next ten or twenty years, Japan will not be troubled at all.”
That is the atmosphere now throughout the Japanese government as a whole.
Kadota
If the pro-South Korea factions within the Liberal Democratic Party, such as the Kōchikai and Heisei Kenkyūkai, are kept under control and these export controls continue as they are, the South Korean economy will suffer serious damage.
Because South Korea raised the minimum wage, its perceived youth unemployment rate—the figure calculated by treating those preparing for employment or in incomplete employment as unemployed—has reached 24%, the highest level in its history.
These export controls will strike directly at semiconductor manufacturing, which is a core industry.
South Korea’s currency crisis is looming right before its eyes.
Sakurai
As an additional measure, there are even voices discussing the cancellation of credit guarantees.
For South Korean companies, including Samsung, South Korean banks provide credit guarantees.
However, because South Korean banks alone have low international creditworthiness, they cannot satisfactorily issue letters of credit connected with trade—payment guarantee documents issued by banks as a means to facilitate trade settlements—unless banks from countries with high creditworthiness provide guarantees.
Therefore, Japanese banks are guaranteeing credit in order to support South Korea.
If Japan were to stop guaranteeing letters of credit connected with South Korean trade, other countries might follow Japan’s lead, and the impact on the South Korean economy would be immeasurable.
The Japanese side has no intention of driving South Korea into a corner to that extent, but it is necessary to use such things as cards in negotiations.
This article continues.