Published on September 3, 2019.
Based on an essay by Yamaoka Tetsuhide published in the monthly magazine Hanada, this article examines the weakness of the Japanese government’s international communication over its review of export controls toward South Korea.
It discusses why overseas media portray Japan as the villain, how Japan has failed to present sufficient security-based evidence, and what kind of logical argument and communication strategy Japan needs in order to win the international information war.

September 3, 2019.
When one looks at overseas reporting, it is written almost as if Japan were the villain, about to trouble the world through self-righteous actions.
What on earth is going on?
The following is the portion omitted from the previous chapter.
The Japan Air Opposition Party Association.
South Korea is literally going mad.
President Moon Jae-in has said things such as “We will never again lose to Japan,” as if he were driving the people into war.
Even a boycott of Japanese products has arisen, but the Japanese people are looking at it with cool eyes.
Many people are probably relieved that, unusually, the Japanese government is responding without wavering.
Within Japan, there is even an atmosphere of overwhelming victory, and theories of South Korea’s collapse are being whispered as if they were quite plausible.
However, I am disappointed, thinking, “Japan remains as poor as ever at communicating to the outside world.”
When one looks at overseas reporting, it is written almost as if Japan were the villain, about to trouble the world through self-righteous actions.
What on earth is going on?
In this matter, Japan should be 100 percent in the right.
The Japanese government must surely have explained Japan’s position carefully to the United States and the WTO.
Another WTO defeat like the one over Fukushima seafood products must never be allowed.
However, international communication with overseas media in mind is completely missing.
It does not feel persuasive.
Omission.
How to win the international information war.
If I were a foreign journalist who did not understand Japanese at all and had heard these statements through an interpreter, I frankly think I would have been confused.
Even if Japan says that the measures are not intended to affect Japan-South Korea relations, it is inevitable that removing preferential treatment will have an effect, and if Japan goes out of its way to remove preferential treatment, there must be a commensurate reason.
Japan says it is not a countermeasure, yet it says the reason is that the relationship of trust has collapsed because of South Korea’s attitude of breaking promises without hesitation, and while it says there are concerns from the standpoint of security, it makes no reference to concrete examples.
With this, it sounds as if Japan is saying, “We are angry at South Korea’s attitude, so we will stop the preferential treatment.
Security is the justification for it.”
Japanese people somehow let this pass because they are hearing it in Japanese.
With this, one cannot fight the international information war.
If it were I, I would construct the argument as follows.
There are two major reasons for this decision.
First, even if there are differences in historical perception, it is an undeniable fact that South Korea is making light of treaties and agreements between states, and since the relationship of trust has been lost, there is no reason to grant preferential trade treatment.
Furthermore, there is suspicion that strategic materials that can be diverted to military use are flowing to third countries, and the Japanese government is seeking an explanation regarding materials whose whereabouts are unknown, but the South Korean government has been unable to answer.
Until the South Korean government gives a clear answer and shows that it is implementing concrete improvement measures, it is only natural that Japan, as a matter of responsibility, has no choice but to return export control to the normal process.
The Japanese government is in the position of waiting for a sincere response from the South Korean government.
Of course, if one says this, one must specifically indicate the points of concern regarding export control related to security.
There is ample basis for doing so.
In July of this year, Fuji Television and the Sankei Shimbun reported that “from 2015 to March 2019, there were as many as 156 cases of illegal exports in which strategic materials flowed out of South Korea without authorization,” and a list prepared by the South Korean government, which served as the basis for this report, was presented.
According to Nishioka Tsutomu, visiting professor at Reitaku University, this list was provided by the South Korean government in May of this year to a lawmaker named Cho Won-jin, who belongs to a small conservative opposition party that argues that the impeachment of Park Geun-hye was invalid, for the purpose of exposing the sharp increase in illegal exports of strategic materials subject to export restrictions since the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in administration.
The Chosun Ilbo is also said to have reported it in that context.
Why does Japan not emphasize this more?
As Professor Nishioka points out, there are several extremely important points here.
The following can be judged objectively from the list as well.
① Since the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in administration, both the number and the monetary amount of detected illegal exports have sharply increased.
② The same companies tend to repeat illegal acts.
③ There have been no cases of criminal punishment.
④ Only light penalties, such as education orders, have been imposed.
⑤ There were also illegal exports to Iran and Syria, terrorist-supporting states closely connected to North Korea.
And this is extremely important: the Moon Jae-in administration has not responded to Japan-South Korea consultations on strategic-material trade management, which are said to be a condition for white-country treatment.
This corresponds with the following statement made by former Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori on a BS Fuji program on July 5.
“Until now, when a South Korean company said, ‘We want 100,’ Japan silently handed over 100, but when one looks closely, only about 70 is being used for industrial products.
When Japan asks the South Korean government what happened to the remaining 30, recently no report has been coming.”
These are precisely the points that should be thoroughly emphasized.
Japan must state clearly, “Apart from the loss of trust caused by repeated treaty violations, in light of this present situation, we have no choice but to judge that it is impossible to continue applying white-country status.”
If Japan merely says “from the standpoint of security,” it sounds like an excuse.
These points must be emphasized repeatedly, but what disappointed me was the reaction of Foreign Minister Kono Taro when South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha criticized Japan’s removal of South Korea from the “white country” list at the ASEAN Plus Three foreign ministers’ meeting held in Thailand on August 2.
The greatest weakness of the Japanese people.
South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha.
“The decision is unilateral and arbitrary.
We have serious concerns.”
Foreign Minister Kono.
“I do not understand on what basis Foreign Minister Kang is criticizing Japan.
Conducting effective export control from the standpoint of security is Japan’s role in the international community.”
I listened to this exchange in English, but I could not understand at all why Foreign Minister Kono did not immediately and specifically emphasize that there was a major fault on the South Korean side, and I could not help feeling frustrated.
Is Japan saying that, suddenly and without grounds, it is voluntarily reviewing export control from the standpoint of security?
Unless Japan loudly asserts that there is necessarily a commensurate reason, that this is a grave defect on the South Korean side, and that Japan is the victim that has no choice but to respond as a matter of responsibility, it will not get through to third parties.
Far from that, even in response to the aforementioned report exposing the increase in illegal export cases by the South Korean government, South Korea has brazenly resorted to sophistry, saying, “This list is proof that South Korea is conducting controls and detecting illegal acts.
Rather, Japan’s controls are looser.”
Even in response to this, the Japanese government does not make a clear rebuttal and merely repeats vague comments.
In this way, even when Japan is 100 percent correct and has sufficient grounds, the Japanese government’s real ability is such that it cannot mount an effective argument.
This may be the greatest weakness not only of the government but of the Japanese people, who “do not have a culture of debate.”
With this, Japan cannot fight the international information war and will become prey to overseas left-wing media.
Unless this weakness is overcome by every possible means, Japan cannot survive the turbulent international situation.
If asked to provide consulting on international communication, of course the Air Opposition Party would not refuse.