Originally published on October 17, 2019.
Based on an article by Sakurai Yoshiko published in the Sankei Shimbun, this essay argues that the Kansai Electric Power gift scandal must not be confused with Japan’s energy policy, and examines delays in Nuclear Regulation Authority reviews, the IAEA’s harsh assessment, Tomari Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, and facilities for dealing with specified serious accidents, emphasizing the need for scientific, rational, and swift nuclear safety reviews.

October 17, 2019.
The mission of the Nuclear Regulation Authority is to review the safety of nuclear power plants scientifically, rationally, and swiftly, to put them into operation, to stabilize the supply of electricity, and to contribute to the realization of a prosperous national life.
The following is from an article by Sakurai Yoshiko, published on yesterday’s front page of the Sankei Shimbun under the title “The Nuclear Regulation Authority Must Reflect Deeply.”
As I have mentioned many times, Sakurai Yoshiko is not only a person worthy of the People’s Honor Award, but also a living Saicho of our time, and it is no exaggeration to say that she is a national treasure of Japan.
A large amount of cash was hidden at the bottom of a confectionery box.
Gold coins and U.S. dollar bills were also handed over.
This was the situation when the top executives of Kansai Electric Power received money and goods amounting to hundreds of millions of yen from a former deputy mayor of Takahama Town, Fukui Prefecture, where the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant is located.
It was astonishing that such things were still being done in this day and age.
From the background of the money and goods transfers that destroyed trust, the complex and bizarre nature of this case comes into sharp relief.
Kansai Electric explains that it could not return the money and goods because it was severely rebuked by the former deputy mayor.
There one glimpses the deep darkness of a society where intimidation and irrationality run rampant.
Even so, as a responsible corporation, there must have been a path by which the company could have collectively managed the money and goods and deposited them with the authorities.
Kansai Electric’s responsibility for failing to do so must be severely questioned.
Following Kansai Electric’s scandal, there are voices concerned that the restart of nuclear power plants, already greatly delayed, will be delayed still further.
However, confusing Kansai Electric’s receipt of money and goods with Japan’s energy policy will only harm the national interest.
Regarding nuclear power policy, Japan is now in an abnormal and special situation with no parallel anywhere in the world.
The main cause is that the Nuclear Regulation Authority, composed of five members including Fuketa Toyoshi, has not reached world standards as a group of experts and therefore is not functioning effectively.
Specific examples of its failure to function as a group of experts will be described later, but the assessment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, the authority of the international community on nuclear power, is extremely severe.
In January 2016, the IAEA sent a team of nineteen senior experts to Japan for twelve days and conducted an evaluation of the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the Nuclear Regulation Agency.
In the report, which runs to about 130 pages, it is frankly stated that, in view of the poor current state of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, there is a great need for improvement.
As a so-called Article 3 commission, the Nuclear Regulation Authority is guaranteed a strong independence into which even the government cannot intervene.
Strong authority entails a heavy responsibility commensurate with it.
Excellent personnel are necessary to carry out grave responsibilities.
However, the IAEA harshly criticized it, saying that “the Nuclear Regulation Authority’s human resources, management system, and especially its organizational culture are at an initial stage,” and cut deeply by saying that it “does not have capable personnel to carry out the tasks assigned to it.”
The criticism that Japan’s regulation lacks predictability and is ad hoc hits the mark exactly.
Fuketa and the others should deeply engrave this point in their hearts.
The IAEA even recommended that, in order to promote a high-level safety culture for nuclear power plants, the Nuclear Regulation Authority should “consider introducing concrete measures such as awareness-raising training or awareness surveys.”
Those who dominate the site of Japan’s nuclear power generation are people who cannot pass muster on the front lines of the international community.
Yet no one can intervene.
Next year, the IAEA will come to investigate how far the Nuclear Regulation Authority has overcome and improved the problems previously pointed out.
Because the Nuclear Regulation Authority has hardly improved or solved anything during this period, the results will inevitably be extremely severe.
The mission of the Nuclear Regulation Authority is to review the safety of nuclear power plants scientifically, rationally, and swiftly, to put them into operation, to stabilize the supply of electricity, and to contribute to the realization of a prosperous national life.
However, looking at any case of a nuclear power plant whose review is currently prolonged, there is no example in which the review has been carried out scientifically, rationally, and swiftly.
A representative example is Hokkaido Electric Power’s Tomari Unit 3, Japan’s newest pressurized light-water reactor.
Although the geological and ground survey had been judged “mostly completed” three years earlier, it was then said that the amount of volcanic ash serving as evidence to deny the possibility that faults within the site would move in the future was insufficient, and the review returned to square one.
If this Tomari Unit 3 had been operating, the major blackout would not have occurred at the time of the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in September last year, and enormous economic losses should have been avoided.
The same is true of Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant.
Kariwa Units 6 and 7 passed the conformity review at the end of December 2017, but in what is called “rock-paper-scissors after the fact,” the possibility of liquefaction within the site was pointed out.
The countermeasures are enormous, and at this stage there is no prospect of completion.
Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Act clearly states that ensuring safety shall be carried out “based on established international standards.”
However, no “established international standards” yet exist for the judgment of active faults and rational countermeasures against them, or for liquefaction.
In such circumstances, in reviews led by Ishiwatari Akira, a member of the Nuclear Regulation Authority and former president of the Geological Society of Japan, operators are required, in the worst case, to prove that faults have not moved going back 400,000 years.
Because active fault reviews are led by Mr. Ishiwatari, many cases are stagnating there.
Among the nine nuclear reactors currently in operation, Kyushu Electric Power’s Sendai Units 1 and 2, Kansai Electric Power’s Takahama Units 3 and 4 and Oi Units 3 and 4, and Shikoku Electric Power’s Ikata Unit 3 will be forced to stop because of delays in construction of “specified serious accident response facilities,” because, while safety reviews take nearly four years, requirements are added one after another.
For all these nuclear power plants, the Nuclear Regulation Authority instructed the installation underground of large-scale facilities exceeding the strength of the reactor buildings and enormous water sources, and the construction could no longer meet the five-year deadline asserted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority.
Japan’s Administrative Procedure Act clearly states that review conditions must be specified, must not be changed midway, and that reviews must be conducted promptly.
The conduct of the Nuclear Regulation Authority clearly conflicts with this.
On April 24 of this year, at the Nuclear Regulation Authority, Mr. Fuketa stated, “Risks do not increase just because the deadline has arrived,” and “The condition of the plants has reached the safety level we require,” yet he decided that if the deadline is exceeded due to construction delays, the nuclear power plants will be stopped.
Without sufficient communication with the electric power companies, it stops safe nuclear power plants.
Is this not precisely intimidation using the authority of an Article 3 commission?
How is it different from the former deputy mayor mentioned at the beginning?
I urge Mr. Fuketa and the rest of the Nuclear Regulation Authority to reflect deeply.