Based on an essay by Udagawa Keisuke published in the monthly magazine WiLL, this article examines allegations that South Korea diverted strategic materials imported from Japan to Iran and North Korea, America’s demand that Japan assume responsibility for monitoring its own trade through intelligence and military capabilities, and the reality of international politics that cannot be understood by relying only on the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Nikkei, and NHK.

2020-01-09
If those strategic materials were not traded through regular channels, but were diverted goods exchanged through barter, America’s judgment would be thrown off, and it would end up fighting a war it did not need to fight.
The country that diverted them should originally be the one destroyed.
I am republishing the chapter I posted on July 29, 2019, under the title: “This Essay Painfully Teaches Us That, If One Merely Subscribes to the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Nikkei, and Similar Newspapers and Watches NHK, One Cannot Understand the Truth of Things — Not a Single Fact.”
The following is from an essay by Udagawa Keisuke published in this month’s issue of the monthly magazine WiLL, under the title “‘A Preemptive Punch at South Korea!!’ ‘What Is Japan Doing!’ — South Korea’s ‘Shadow Business’ Pointed Out by the United States.”
This essay painfully teaches us that, if one merely subscribes to the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Nikkei, and similar newspapers and watches NHK, one cannot understand the truth of things — not a single fact.
The residents of Miyagi, Iwate, Yamagata, Niigata, Akita, and Shiga Prefectures, who rely only on the above-mentioned media, or on local newspapers whose pages are composed of articles distributed by Kyodo News, which it is no exaggeration to say is beneath even the Asahi Shimbun, as their sources of information — and of course the residents of Okinawa as well, though in the first place, one wonders whether the four monthly magazines that every Japanese citizen must read are even available in Okinawa — must all go at once to the nearest bookstore to purchase this month’s issue of WiLL.
Strategic materials exported to South Korea went to that country.
What is the truth behind the review of export preferential treatment that the G19 accepted?
America’s True Feelings
America knew about South Korea’s “shadow business.”
And America slapped Japan on the backside for continuing to respond weakly to that South Korea.
“South Korea is outrageous. It is trying to team up with Xi Jinping and make our country go to war with Iran and with North Korea. South Korea has already become a country that must no longer be regarded as an ally.”
During the G20, in a place where aides from the leaders’ countries gathered, an American spat out these words.
At the G20, the eyes and ears of the mass media were focused on leaders of various countries, such as President Trump and President Xi Jinping.
However, leaders only say, to a certain extent, what has already been scheduled.
Therefore, when one wants to report on what people really think, the most efficient method is to catch aides, close associates, and, depending on the case, even guards from various countries and interview them.
Of course, in many cases, what they say may be only the personal opinion of an aide.
However, many staff members involved in summits and the like are quite familiar with the leaders, and leaders sometimes speak frankly with them.
Naturally, in that process, they are in a position to know what is in the leaders’ minds.
“America is still obtaining information that Iran and North Korea are making weapons of mass destruction through various methods. This does not mean confirming the weapons of mass destruction themselves, but determining that the materials and supplies needed to manufacture them have been assembled. In that case, one should immediately appeal to the international community, coordinate with it, and impose economic sanctions so that production cannot continue. If, after that, they still continue production, one should be prepared not to rule out the use of force. However, if those strategic materials were not traded through regular channels, but were diverted goods exchanged through barter, America’s judgment would be thrown off, and it would end up fighting a war it did not need to fight. The country that diverted them should originally be the one destroyed.”
The anger of the American aide showed no sign of subsiding.
Of course, the country “engaging in barter through irregular ship-to-ship transfers” was none other than South Korea.
The strategic materials in question are designated substances such as hydrogen fluoride, necessary not only for semiconductors but also for making nuclear warheads, sarin, VX gas, and the like.
Japan holds 90 percent of the trade share for these materials.
“Japan should immediately halt transactions of strategic materials with South Korea. Also, in order to ensure that its own products are not used illegally to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, Japan must deal with countries around the world through its own intelligence capability and military power. Should not a country that manufactures and sells strategic materials and weapons bear the obligation to monitor them so that those products and weapons are not used illegally?”
The Substance of the Shadow Business
In addition to the American aides, aides from countries such as Britain, France, and Germany were also present there.
In that setting, the American conveyed dissatisfaction with South Korea, and also dissatisfaction with Japan for having been unable to stop it.
“President Trump is dissatisfied that Japan does not use intelligence and military power to monitor its own trade and the improper use of the traded goods. Of course, he knows that there are constitutional restrictions, but the Constitution is something that the Japanese people can change in accordance with changes in Japan’s role in the world. He also has doubts about the security treaty under which America must go so far as to monitor Japan’s trade and even the improper use of those products beyond that. Japan ought to be a country that may possess self-defense capability and intelligence capability. Yet when the security treaty is mentioned, Japan immediately cries ‘war.’ However, Japan is indifferent to the fact that the world may become engulfed in war through Japanese materials and money, and indifferent to creating world peace by its own hands.”
The information America had obtained concerned South Korea’s crude oil transactions with Iran, including during the period of economic sanctions before Iran reached the nuclear agreement.
However, because economic sanctions were in place, South Korea apparently thought that if it conducted trade with money, the international community would find out.
Therefore, it bartered Iranian crude oil for strategic materials imported from Japan.
Those strategic materials were items that Japan had traded with South Korea under preferential treatment as a “white country.”
South Korea used Japan’s preferential treatment improperly to conduct “shadow business.”
At the same time, during the economic sanctions against North Korea, South Korea smuggled the Iranian crude oil that it had imported illegally in this way to North Korea through ship-to-ship transfers.
It is also said that South Korea diverted strategic materials to North Korea as well by using triangular trade with China.
The number of such incidents is said to exceed 150.
At first, America reportedly suspected Japan, the producing country.
However, there were no improper transactions with Japan, and because Japan has the abduction issue with North Korea, it had no reason to extend such convenience.
Next, America suspected China, Russia, Israel, and others, but there was reportedly no trace of such involvement.
Amid this, the country it set its sights on was South Korea.
After Moon Jae-in became president, Japan-South Korea relations worsened over the comfort women issue and the wartime laborer issue, and trade volume should have decreased.
Yet for some reason, it had increased.
America reportedly became suspicious, investigated, and uncovered the matter.
In addition, when considering the investigation into the manufacture of VX gas used in the 2017 assassination of a man believed to be Kim Jong-nam, the September 2017 missile launch in Iran believed to involve North Korea’s Hwasong-14, and the fact that South Korea suddenly drew closer to North Korea around the time of the PyeongChang Olympics, it was easy to imagine that the relationships among South Korea, North Korea, and Iran were deep.
Therefore, it was reportedly not difficult to form that hypothesis.
The rest is omitted.