Published on January 30, 2020. Citing a Sankei Shimbun column by Abiru Rui, this article examines the obstruction carried out by pro-China politicians and the Foreign Ministry’s China School as former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui sought to visit Japan for the first time after leaving office. Through the responses of Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro, Foreign Minister Kono Yohei, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, and Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko, it warns of China’s remaining operational and infiltrative power within Japan’s political and bureaucratic worlds.

January 30, 2020
That is because the author was also covering the Prime Minister’s Office at the time, and he was reporting on the slapstick drama that unfolded as the Japanese government showed consideration for, and tried to anticipate the wishes of, China, which regarded Lee as an enemy.
The following is from a serialized column by Abiru Rui, one of the finest active journalists today, published in today’s Sankei Shimbun under the title “The Pro-China Faction That Remains Deeply Rooted in Political and Bureaucratic Circles.”
His existence and his insight also prove that the Sankei Shimbun is now the most decent newspaper.
Reading this newspaper’s series “Secret Records of Lee Teng-hui,” which approaches the real image of former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, I found the articles in the morning editions of the 26th and 27th, which examined the twists and turns that led to his first visit to Japan after leaving office in 2001, especially interesting.
That is because the author was also covering the Prime Minister’s Office at the time, and he was reporting on the slapstick drama that unfolded as the Japanese government showed consideration for, and tried to anticipate the wishes of, China, which regarded Lee as an enemy.
Blatant Obstruction
At that time, both the politicians close to China who were called the “pro-China faction” and the Foreign Ministry’s China School, the Chinese-language training group, were far more emotionally committed to siding with China than they are now, and public opinion was also lenient toward China.
When I think of that, I feel that, although it is still far from sufficient, Japan-China relations have become considerably more normal.
In those days, even Lee’s visit to Japan for the purpose of medical treatment after he had become a private citizen was subjected to blatant obstruction.
This was despite the fact that then Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro had, since the previous year, conveyed to the Foreign Ministry, former prime ministers, close aides, and others his intention to accept Lee.
The application for an entry visa for Lee’s visit to Japan was almost made to have never been submitted or accepted by pro-China elements within the Foreign Ministry.
When the application could no longer be hidden, Yokoi Yutaka, then director of the China and Mongolia Division, tried to evade the issue by falsely stating that the application documents “lacked formal requirements.”
In addition, Makita Kunihiko, then director-general of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau and the serving head of the China School, personally spread false information to the Prime Minister’s Office and elsewhere, saying such things as “Lee is healthy,” “the Japanese doctor whom Lee wishes to consult for treatment said, ‘He can be treated even if it is not by me,’” and “the Taiwanese medical association opposes his visit to Japan.”
“If Japan mishandles its response, Japan-China relations will be set back by ten years.”
Foreign Ministry bureaucrats from the China School went around telling ruling party executives this.
Makita was also seen frequently visiting former Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu, who had a thick pipe to China.
Furthermore, Foreign Minister Kono Yohei, known as a pro-China figure, at one point resisted Prime Minister Mori by saying he would resign if a visa were issued, and is said to have appealed as follows.
“What will become of my position, after I have devoted myself single-mindedly to being pro-China for thirty years?”
However, on this occasion, unusually, the tone of the media was almost unanimous, including companies that normally did not want to write anything inconvenient for China.
The editorials of the newspapers in Tokyo all wrote at once that Lee’s visit to Japan should be recognized on humanitarian grounds.
At that time, I cannot forget that Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, also a pro-China figure, declared the following at a regular press conference.
“If we let Mr. Lee come to Japan and something happens, it will be the fault of you newspapers.”
An Infiltrating Power That Must Be Watched
In reality, however, nothing serious happened.
It is true that China strongly criticized Japan and canceled planned visits to Japan by senior Chinese government officials.
But when Koizumi Junichiro, Mori’s successor as prime minister, visited Yasukuni Shrine, the target of China’s criticism of Japan shifted almost entirely in that direction.
Even under the Koizumi administration, there was another incident in which Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko, also a pro-China figure, unilaterally conveyed during a Japan-China foreign ministers’ telephone meeting that, in the future, even if Lee applied to visit Japan, it would not be approved.
Today, the Foreign Ministry has changed considerably, and such extreme defense of China by pro-China elements, and words and actions completely attached to China, have become comparatively less conspicuous.
Even so, there are still many people in political and bureaucratic circles who hold opinions as if they had been taken in by China.
One can never be too vigilant toward China’s operational power and infiltrating power.
Editorial Writer and Political News Department Editor