Drawing on a discussion among Yukihiro Hasegawa, Yoichi Takahashi, and former Chief of Staff of Japan’s Joint Staff Katsutoshi Kawano published in Hanada Selection under the title “Hold U.S.–Japan Military Exercises Around the Senkakus,” this article examines Chinese coast-guard activity around the Senkaku Islands, Article V of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Hong Kong’s National Security Law, the First Island Chain, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the importance of maintaining clear Japanese administration of the islands.

This article was originally published on August 10, 2020.
The discussion quoted below appeared at the time in Hanada Selection and featured Yukihiro Hasegawa, Yoichi Takahashi, and former Chief of Staff of Japan’s Joint Staff Katsutoshi Kawano.
References such as “next year, 2021, marks the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party” should therefore be read in their original 2020 context.
The central issue raised in the discussion was not merely the possibility of an outright military attack.
It was the danger that repeated coast-guard operations and assertions of Chinese “law enforcement” could gradually establish facts on the ground and create uncertainty over who actually exercised administration of the Senkaku Islands.
【A Dangerous Situation Around the Senkakus】
Hasegawa described the situation around the Senkaku Islands in July 2020 as abnormal.
On July 14, four China Coast Guard vessels entered Japanese territorial waters around the islands and remained there for approximately two hours.
By July 24, Chinese government vessels had been observed around the Senkakus for 102 consecutive days, then the longest such period since Japan’s national government acquired ownership of three of the islands in September 2012.
Hasegawa also referred to China’s increasingly explicit claims of sovereignty and its objections to the operation of Japanese fishing vessels in the surrounding waters.
Kawano responded:
“The situation is quite dangerous.”
He argued that China was attempting to create the impression that it exercised administrative authority around the Senkakus.
Article V of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty applies to territories under the administration of Japan.
The United States has historically taken no position on the ultimate question of sovereignty over the islands while recognizing that they are under Japanese administration and therefore fall within the scope of Article V.
For that reason, Kawano emphasized the importance of administration itself.
He interpreted repeated Chinese coast-guard operations, including the pursuit of Japanese fishing vessels, as an effort to portray Chinese actions as normal exercises of jurisdiction.
He issued a particularly important warning:
“If Japan simply sits back and does nothing, China may come to ‘misunderstand’ that even if it moves against the Senkakus, the United States will not intervene. From there, the possibility of the use of force emerges.”
The central issue was deterrence.
Allowing another state to conclude that its actions will meet no response can itself increase the danger of escalation.
【The South China Sea, the Indian Border, and Hong Kong】
Hasegawa stressed that China’s increasingly assertive behavior was not limited to the Senkakus.
He referred to serious incidents involving Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in the South China Sea in April 2020 and the deadly clash between Chinese and Indian troops in the Himalayas in June.
With the Chinese Communist Party’s centenary approaching in 2021, he also speculated at the time that Beijing might seek some major action to mark the anniversary.
That was his assessment in the political circumstances of 2020.
【Article 38 of Hong Kong’s National Security Law】
Takahashi focused strongly on Article 38 of Hong Kong’s National Security Law.
The provision applies the law in certain circumstances to offenses allegedly committed outside Hong Kong by people who are not permanent residents of Hong Kong.
Takahashi regarded this broad extraterritorial reach as profoundly troubling.
Hasegawa noted that countries including Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom were moving at the time to suspend extradition arrangements with Hong Kong in response to the new law.
【Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Senkakus Are Connected】
Kawano emphasized China’s concept of the First Island Chain.
He argued that Okinawa, Taiwan, and the South China Sea formed part of a strategic line within which China sought to expand its military and political freedom of action while limiting the ability of the United States and other external powers to intervene.
From this perspective, he argued:
“Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Senkakus must be understood as interconnected.”
Takahashi added the South China Sea to that picture.
Their warning was that methods used to establish incremental facts on the ground in the South China Sea could eventually be applied in the East China Sea as well.
【Taiwan or the Senkakus?】
Hasegawa asked whether Taiwan might be China’s next target after Hong Kong.
Kawano responded that Beijing was likely considering which would be easier to pressure—Taiwan or the Senkakus.
Taiwan had a resident population, increasing international visibility, and strengthening security ties with the United States.
The Senkakus, by contrast, were uninhabited.
He suggested that this difference could affect Beijing’s strategic calculations.
Takahashi likewise said at the time that he believed pressure on the Senkakus was highly likely.
These were assessments made by the participants in 2020.
【Why Japan Must Make Its Administration Visible】
Hasegawa argued that because the islands were owned by the Japanese state, the government carried an even greater responsibility for their stable administration.
He raised the possibility of stationing government personnel there.
Takahashi pointed out that Shinzo Abe had discussed consideration of such a measure during the 2012 Liberal Democratic Party leadership election and in subsequent election platforms.
Kawano said that although the Japan Coast Guard and the Self-Defense Forces were working to maintain control of the situation, relying solely on their continued efforts had limits.
In his view, Japan needed to reconsider a situation in which there were neither facilities nor permanent personnel on the islands.
He pointed to the South China Sea as the warning.
China had gradually expanded from limited activity around reefs to large-scale land reclamation and the construction of artificial islands.
Despite statements in 2015 that China did not intend to militarize the area, military facilities were subsequently developed.
China also rejected the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award.
For Kawano, the lesson was clear: once incremental changes on the ground are allowed to accumulate, reversing them becomes extremely difficult.
【Ways to Demonstrate Administration】
Takahashi suggested that Japan could make its administration more internationally visible through peaceful activities such as multinational marine-science research conducted in waters around the islands under Japanese governmental authority.
He also referred to Kuba Island and Taisho Island, which have historically been designated as U.S. military training ranges, and discussed the political significance that renewed use might carry.
Kawano responded that such a step would require a major political decision by the United States as well.
The underlying argument throughout the discussion was not that Japan should seek armed conflict.
It was that deterrence requires preventing Beijing from concluding that Japan will do nothing and that the United States will remain uninvolved.
【The Miscalculation Japan Must Prevent】
For me, the most important sentence in this discussion remains Kawano’s warning:
“If Japan simply sits back and does nothing, China may come to ‘misunderstand’ that even if it moves against the Senkakus, the United States will not intervene. From there, the possibility of the use of force emerges.”
In relations between states, war does not arise only because one side deliberately seeks war.
It can also arise when one side wrongly concludes that the other will not respond.
Japan therefore needs neither emotional provocation nor empty rhetoric.
It needs to make clear that it administers its own territory, to maintain credibility in the U.S.–Japan alliance, and to prevent strategic miscalculation.
Hong Kong.
Taiwan.
The South China Sea.
The East China Sea.
The Senkaku Islands.
They should not be viewed merely as separate episodes.
They must also be examined within the broader development of China’s regional strategy.
That was the central warning of the discussion I introduced on August 10, 2020.
To be continued.