Drawing on a discussion among Yukihiro Hasegawa, Yoichi Takahashi, and Seki Hei published in the Hanada Selection magazine, this article examines questions raised at the time concerning a possible Wuhan laboratory incident, China’s February 2020 directive strengthening biosafety management in laboratories handling the novel coronavirus, reported U.S. concerns about safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and allegations concerning China’s influence over the WHO.

This article was originally published on August 10, 2020.
It cited a discussion among Yukihiro Hasegawa, Yoichi Takahashi, and Seki Hei published in Hanada Selection and examined the Wuhan laboratory-origin hypothesis and questions that were then being raised concerning the relationship between China and the World Health Organization.
The origins of SARS-CoV-2 have remained the subject of international scientific and intelligence investigation.
It is a documented fact that on February 15, 2020, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology announced guidelines calling for strengthened biosafety management at high-level pathogenic-microorganism laboratories handling the novel coronavirus.
The existence of that directive, however, does not by itself prove that SARS-CoV-2 escaped from a laboratory.
In June 2025, WHO’s Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens stated that the weight of the available scientific evidence supported zoonotic spillover, while also noting that insufficient laboratory-related information had been provided to permit a complete assessment of the laboratory-incident hypothesis.
Accordingly, what follows preserves the statements and concerns expressed in 2020 as a historical record while clearly distinguishing established facts from interpretations, suspicions, and allegations made by the participants or by the author.
【Text】
August 10, 2020
The following is drawn from a special discussion entitled “The Possibility That China Could Spread a New Virus,” featuring Yukihiro Hasegawa, Yoichi Takahashi, and Seki Hei, published in the then-current issue of Hanada Selection.
【Evidence Cited in Support of the Lab-Leak Hypothesis】
Hasegawa referred to statements made in early May 2020 by U.S. President Donald Trump concerning evidence that he said supported the possibility that the novel coronavirus had escaped from a laboratory in Wuhan, China.
He also referred to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s assertion that there was substantial evidence supporting such a possibility.
From those statements, Hasegawa said that the U.S. government appeared to be moving toward the position that the virus had escaped from a Wuhan laboratory.
Seki Hei responded:
“I also believe there is a high possibility that it leaked from a laboratory in Wuhan.”
He then asked why the outbreak emerged in Wuhan rather than Chengdu or Shanghai and pointed to the presence in Wuhan of a major state-supported institute conducting research on viruses.
Among the circumstances that attracted his attention was a report published on February 15, 2020, concerning measures announced by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology to strengthen biosafety management in laboratories handling the novel coronavirus.
Seki Hei argued that if the government was suddenly demanding tighter controls, this could suggest that previous management had been inadequate.
He went further and described the directive as being “almost equivalent to admitting the lab-leak theory.”
He added, however, that he did not know whether the virus itself had been artificially created or had arisen naturally.
A distinction must be made here.
China’s Ministry of Science and Technology did in fact announce stronger biosafety-management measures.
But Seki Hei’s conclusion that this amounted to an admission of a laboratory leak was his interpretation of that fact, not an admission made by the Chinese government itself.
Nevertheless, the decision by China’s own authorities to strengthen the management of high-level laboratories handling viruses shortly after the outbreak understandably raised questions about laboratory biosafety that deserved examination.
【Concerns About Wuhan Laboratory Safety in 2018】
The discussion then turned to renewed interest in the laboratory-origin hypothesis in April 2020.
Hasegawa referred to an April 14 Washington Post report concerning visits made in 2018 by U.S. science diplomats to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
According to the account discussed by Hasegawa, those visits resulted in diplomatic cables expressing concern about staffing and safety practices at the institute.
Hasegawa cited the reported warning that the institute faced a serious shortage of appropriately trained personnel required for safe operation.
The significance of the report was that concerns about laboratory safety in Wuhan had allegedly been communicated to Washington approximately two years before the COVID-19 pandemic.
Hasegawa also referred to subsequent reporting by Fox News concerning views attributed to U.S. officials about China’s virus research.
Together, these reports contributed to the growing debate in the United States during the spring of 2020 over whether a laboratory incident could have played a role in the emergence of SARS-CoV-2.
【Questions Raised About China and the WHO】
The discussion then turned to the relationship between China and the World Health Organization.
Hasegawa referred to comments by U.S. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien criticizing what he regarded as excessive Chinese influence over the WHO.
O’Brien contrasted the much larger financial contribution made by the United States with China’s assessed contribution and said that the United States was examining whether China had used other means to obtain influence.
Hasegawa interpreted these comments as suggesting that U.S. authorities were investigating the possibility of undisclosed Chinese payments.
He then speculated that U.S. intelligence agencies might already have accumulated significant information concerning the matter.
Seki Hei likewise criticized what he regarded at the time as the WHO’s unusually accommodating attitude toward China.
He said that if evidence were eventually produced proving that China had bought influence within the WHO, it would demonstrate an attempt to deceive the international community.
The conditional nature of that statement is important.
The discussion was dealing with suspicions and allegations concerning the WHO and China, not with a bribery scheme that had already been established as fact.
【Yoichi Takahashi on Elections in International Organizations】
Yoichi Takahashi went further in discussing elections within international organizations.
He expressed the view that such elections are heavily shaped by political bargaining and influence.
He cited the 2006 election for WHO Director-General, in which Shigeru Omi, then Regional Director for the Western Pacific, was a candidate.
Margaret Chan, who received strong Chinese backing, ultimately won the election.
Takahashi argued that money and international political bargaining had played an important role in such contests.
His stronger allegation that undisclosed payments determined the outcome, however, must be understood as his own assertion in the discussion rather than as a fact established by publicly verified evidence.
【Why I Published This Discussion】
My principal reason for introducing this discussion on August 10, 2020 was that I believed no plausible hypothesis concerning the origins of SARS-CoV-2 should be excluded before it had been properly investigated.
Wuhan was home to a major institute conducting advanced research on viruses.
Concerns about laboratory safety there had reportedly been raised by U.S. diplomats in 2018.
After the outbreak began, China’s own Ministry of Science and Technology called for stronger biosafety management in high-level laboratories handling the novel coronavirus.
None of these facts, separately or together, automatically proves that SARS-CoV-2 escaped from a laboratory.
But they were sufficient, in my view, to justify a thorough and transparent investigation of that hypothesis.
The same principle applied to the WHO.
Its reliance on information supplied by the Chinese authorities during the earliest phase of the outbreak and the judgments it made on the basis of that information deserved independent scrutiny free from political pressure.
The laboratory-origin hypothesis should not be accepted simply in order to condemn China.
Nor should it be rejected simply in order to defend China.
What is required is evidence.
What is required is data.
What is required is sufficient disclosure for the world to determine, as far as scientifically possible, what happened in Wuhan.
That was the core question I sought to raise on August 10, 2020.
To be continued.