Republishing an essay first issued on April 10, 2018, this article examines Soviet KGB operations targeting Japanese politics, government institutions, industry, and the mass media through the Mitrokhin Archive and The Mitrokhin Archive II by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. It argues that Japan must recognize its vulnerability to foreign intelligence, propaganda, and influence operations and remain alert to contemporary activities by China and other states.

August 11, 2020
On April 10, 2018, I published an essay describing the Mitrokhin material as an intelligence source of extraordinary importance concerning the espionage activities of the Soviet KGB.
I am republishing that essay because I believe the Japanese public must understand the danger posed by foreign influence operations directed at Japan.
In 2020, my particular concern was China.
My statement that Chinese activities targeting Japan had surpassed those of the former Soviet Union reflected my strong assessment of the contemporary situation; it was not a quantitative conclusion established by the Mitrokhin Archive itself.
To understand why such vigilance is necessary, however, the history revealed by the Mitrokhin material remains essential.
【What Is the Mitrokhin Archive?】
Vasili Mitrokhin was a longtime KGB officer and archivist who had access to an enormous body of records belonging to the KGB’s foreign-intelligence service.
Over many years, he secretly copied information from KGB documents by hand and concealed his notes at home.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, British intelligence helped him leave for the United Kingdom in 1992, together with his archive.
My original article described him as having carried out “six large containers of classified documents.”
A more precise description is that the material consisted primarily of Mitrokhin’s extensive handwritten notes copied from KGB files rather than the original KGB documents themselves.
The collection transported to Britain nevertheless filled roughly six large cases and contained an extraordinary volume of material.
The archive was examined by British intelligence, and Cambridge historian Christopher Andrew, a leading scholar of intelligence history, was given access to work with Mitrokhin.
Their research ultimately produced The Mitrokhin Archive and The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World.
These works describe KGB espionage, political influence, disinformation, and industrial intelligence operations in numerous countries.
Japan was among them.
【KGB Operations Targeting Japan】
The material concerning Japan describes Soviet efforts directed at political parties, government institutions, industry, and the mass media.
Accounts discussed in my original article referred to contacts with political organizations, attempts to obtain information from Japanese government institutions, penetration of diplomatic circles, and industrial espionage designed to acquire technology useful to the Soviet Union.
The target was therefore not politics alone.
Diplomacy.
Government.
Industry.
Technology.
And public opinion.
Any institution capable of influencing national decision-making could become an intelligence target.
【The Media as an Intelligence Target】
I considered the KGB’s interest in Japanese journalism particularly important.
Accounts based on Mitrokhin’s notes identify several codenames associated with Japanese journalists in the 1970s.
They included:
“BLYUM,” described as an Asahi Shimbun journalist.
“SEMYON,” associated with the Yomiuri Shimbun.
“KARL,” or “KARLOV,” associated with the Sankei Shimbun.
“FUDZIE,” associated with the Tokyo Shimbun.
And “ODEKI,” described as a senior political reporter at a major Japanese newspaper.
An essential caution is necessary.
These are codenames and organizational descriptions contained in material attributed to the Mitrokhin files.
They do not justify linking unidentified codenames to particular present-day journalists without evidence.
Nevertheless, the broader point is significant.
The KGB was interested in newspapers across the Japanese political spectrum.
Not only the Asahi.
The Yomiuri as well.
The Sankei.
The Tokyo Shimbun.
For a foreign intelligence service, the fundamental question was not whether a journalist belonged to the political right or left.
It was whether that person possessed information, access, or influence.
【How Much Influence Did the KGB Have?】
The material cited in the original essay also contained claims concerning KGB influence within the Japanese press, including the Asahi Shimbun.
Such claims must be interpreted carefully.
Being described in an intelligence file as an “agent” does not necessarily establish precisely how consciously or extensively a person cooperated.
A source.
A confidential contact.
A willing agent.
Someone who supplied information without understanding the true identity of the person receiving it.
These categories are not identical.
Historical intelligence records must therefore be read critically.
But caution must not become an excuse to deny that foreign intelligence organizations did in fact target Japanese journalism.
【Agents, Confidential Contacts, and Public Opinion】
The account presented in my original article stated that by the autumn of 1972 the KGB’s Tokyo political-intelligence apparatus had built a significant network of agents and confidential contacts.
Japan was one of the world’s most newspaper-oriented societies.
Newspapers therefore had exceptional power to influence how citizens perceived foreign countries, political leaders, international conflicts, and national policy.
Influence operations need not consist simply of ordering someone to publish a false article.
They can operate through the selective provision of information.
What should be emphasized?
What should be ignored?
Who should be regarded as trustworthy?
Who should be regarded as dangerous?
Repeated choices of that kind can gradually shape an entire society’s perception of reality.
【Journalists as Sources of Intelligence】
Journalists also possess another characteristic attractive to intelligence services.
Through their work, some gain access to politicians, senior officials, diplomats, and information unavailable to ordinary members of the public.
The original article cited material concerning a Tokyo Shimbun journalist codenamed “KOCHI,” who was described as having access to valuable information concerning government circles.
Even when information is not formally classified, knowledge of government thinking, internal disagreements, personal relationships, and negotiating positions can be highly valuable to a foreign state.
A journalist collects information in order to report.
An intelligence organization can therefore seek to exploit the same access for entirely different purposes.
【Recruitment Networks】
The original essay also discussed a journalist codenamed “ROY,” whose articles were reportedly useful for intelligence purposes.
The material further suggested that individuals already within an influence network could help recruit additional contacts.
Foreign intelligence work rarely stops with one person.
One contact opens the door to another.
A professional relationship becomes a personal relationship.
A personal relationship becomes a confidential one.
The network expands.
【Why Do People Cooperate?】
Accounts based on the Mitrokhin material suggested that money was an important motive for some media contacts.
The process may begin innocently.
Meals.
Information exchanges.
Travel assistance.
Small favors.
Payments.
The boundary can be crossed gradually.
Foreign intelligence officers do not necessarily begin by asking someone directly to “become a spy.”
Other methods involve personal vulnerabilities.
The original article cited the case of “SEMYON,” who was reportedly compromised during a visit to Moscow through activities that could be used against him.
Money.
Ideology.
Ambition.
Relationships.
Sex.
Illegal behavior.
Embarrassing information.
Intelligence services study and exploit human vulnerabilities.
【Has Japanese Journalism Been Vigilant Enough?】
This was the central reason I wrote the article in 2018.
Has the Japanese media been sufficiently alert to the possibility that foreign governments and intelligence agencies deliberately seek to influence Japanese society?
Postwar Japan has sometimes treated the very idea of hostile foreign influence as though it were inherently conspiratorial.
The history of KGB activities shows otherwise.
Foreign political influence, propaganda, media operations, and espionage are not fantasies.
They have been instruments of statecraft.
At the same time, a journalist must never be called a foreign agent merely because his or her opinions resemble those of another government.
Pro-China does not automatically mean “Chinese agent.”
Pro-Russian does not automatically mean “Russian agent.”
Pro-American does not automatically mean “American agent.”
Evidence is required.
Money.
Secret contacts.
Instructions.
Benefits.
Covert cooperation.
Transfers of information.
These are the matters that must be investigated.
【Political Donations and Organizations Linked to North Korea】
My original article also referred to political donations involving a group that had been discussed in connection with individuals linked to North Korea.
The figures should be stated accurately.
Naoto Kan’s political fund-management organization, Soshikai, donated a total of 62.5 million yen between 2007 and 2009 to a political organization called Seiken Kotai o Mezashita Shimin no Kai.
Kan acknowledged the donations in parliamentary questioning.
My original reference to more than 200 million yen from the Democratic Party side should not be confused with the amount donated by Kan’s own organization; broader figures discussed at the time involved multiple Democratic Party politicians and political organizations.
The central principle remains unchanged.
Where financial relationships involving politically sensitive organizations exist, the media should investigate them regardless of ideological convenience.
【And Then There Is China】
I did not republish this essay on August 11, 2020 simply to discuss the Soviet Union.
My real warning concerned China.
The Chinese Communist Party governs an enormous state apparatus.
Diplomacy.
Business.
Research institutions.
Academic exchange.
Companies.
Cultural organizations.
Social media.
The internet.
Universities.
Local governments.
Civil organizations.
Modern influence operations have far more channels available to them than Cold War intelligence services possessed.
Japan must therefore avoid two opposite errors.
It must not label people foreign agents without evidence.
But it must also not pretend that foreign influence operations do not exist.
That is one of the central lessons of the Mitrokhin Archive.
An open democratic society protects freedom of speech, academic freedom, political activity, journalism, and international exchange.
Those freedoms must be defended.
But authoritarian states and intelligence services can attempt to exploit the openness of democratic societies.
Protecting freedom therefore also requires the ability to defend that freedom against covert manipulation.
【The Media Must Also Examine Themselves】
Government interference with journalism must be treated with the greatest caution.
Freedom of the press is fundamental to democracy.
But freedom of the press cannot mean that credible evidence of secret cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies should simply be ignored.
Where concrete evidence exists, governments, parliaments, courts, and news organizations themselves must investigate it.
Above all, newspapers and broadcasters should maintain rigorous ethical rules and transparency concerning relationships between their employees and foreign governments, foreign intelligence organizations, and entities acting on behalf of foreign states.
The media rightly scrutinize domestic power.
They must also be willing to scrutinize themselves for the influence of foreign power.
The Mitrokhin Archive is not merely a record of the past.
It is a warning to Japan in the present.