It is fundamentally wrong to equate the danger of a North Korean nuclear attack that could kill hundreds of thousands of people with the risk of an empty booster falling after separating from an interceptor missile.
Examining the gap in Japan’s defenses created by the suspension of the Aegis Ashore deployment, the exhaustion of the Self-Defense Forces, the possibility of U.S. troop withdrawals, and the threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia, Yoshiko Sakurai calls for increased defense spending and a policy shift that would give Japan the capability to strike enemy bases.

June 26, 2020
It is fundamentally wrong to place the danger of suffering a nuclear attack from North Korea on the same level as the danger of an empty tank about 1.8 meters long falling to the ground.
Yoshiko Sakurai is a national treasure as defined by Saicho.
Indeed, she is a treasure of the highest order.
Together with Masayuki Takayama’s column, Yoshiko Sakurai’s regular column “Renaissance” concludes each weekly issue of Shukan Shincho.
The following is from an article titled “Make Strikes on Enemy Bases Possible and Change Japan’s Policy,” published in yesterday’s issue of Shukan Shincho.
The Asahi Shimbun is already beyond consideration……but this morning, I found an online article gleefully reporting that only three Japanese companies were included among the 100 companies worldwide whose profits had increased following the coronavirus outbreak.
When I looked, it was an article from the Asahi Shimbun Digital edition.
The Asahi Shimbun is rotten to the core.
It gleefully reported that only three Japanese companies were included, that most of the companies were American or Chinese, and that South Korean companies were also among those appearing in the rankings.
The article overflowed with delight that, among the groups of companies of which Japan is proud before the world, only three had been ranked among the companies whose profits had increased after the coronavirus outbreak, and with equal delight that South Korea had the same number.
Even leaving aside such a newspaper, the news programs of NHK, which is in reality Japan’s state broadcaster, have never once presented an opinion based on the entirely natural and self-evident perspective set forth below.
The same is probably true of most commercial broadcasters.
They are the very source of Japan’s dysfunction.
All emphasis within the text, apart from the headings, is mine.
China extends its “hand of aggression” like water.
Water flows into every part of the lowest ground.
China penetrates every weak point it can find.
At a time when the United States is in turmoil because of the Wuhan virus crisis and its movements are constrained by the presidential election in November, China’s hand of aggression is moving boldly even in the areas surrounding Japan.
Under these circumstances, on June 15, Defense Minister Taro Kono abruptly announced, “We are suspending the Aegis Ashore deployment plan.”
The decision to introduce the land-based Aegis system, known as Aegis Ashore, was made in December 2017 to strengthen Japan’s response to the threats from China and North Korea, the two-front defense effort that Japan absolutely must pursue.
Deployment at Ground Self-Defense Force bases and training grounds in Akita City, Akita Prefecture, and Hagi City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, would make it possible to protect the entire Japanese archipelago.
Two Aegis Ashore units could detect North Korean missiles and launch both interceptor missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles.
They were therefore expected to provide both a powerful defense and a powerful retaliatory capability.
Furthermore, once Aegis Ashore had established the capability to respond to North Korean missiles, Japan’s seven existing Aegis destroyers could be redirected toward countering China, which threatens the Senkaku Islands and Okinawa in the Nansei Islands.
The plan, however, was forced into a major revision by Kono’s sudden decision.
As the reason for changing the plan, Kono stated that the reality differed from the explanations that had long been given to Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures.
If an enemy missile attack occurred and an interceptor missile were launched from Aegis Ashore, the main body of the interceptor would fly high and destroy the enemy missile in outer space.
However, it was discovered that the booster, or first-stage rocket, which separates during flight, could fall outside the Self-Defense Force training ground and onto privately owned land.
Local residents had previously been assured that the booster would always fall within the training ground.
Kono said that the deployment was being suspended because this explanation had proved to be untrue.
Former State Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahisa Sato pointed out:
“It is fundamentally wrong to place the danger of suffering a nuclear attack from North Korea on the same level as the danger of an empty tank about 1.8 meters long—the booster used to launch the missile—falling to the ground.”
Distorted Thinking About National Defense
The possibility that this empty tank might strike a private home is not zero, but it is infinitely close to zero.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons, on the other hand, possess more than ten times the killing power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
The Scud and Nodong missiles capable of carrying such powerful nuclear weapons already place the whole of Japan within their range.
A diabolical North Korean attack could take the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
Japan’s uniquely distorted thinking about national defense is revealed in the attitude that places two vastly different dangers—an empty shell of a booster and a missile carrying a nuclear weapon—on the same level.
It is the bad habit of making decisions on the basis of wishful thinking without looking at reality.
Politicians and the media must think more realistically.
Sato further emphasized:
“For example, PAC-3 systems are deployed at the Ministry of Defense. If the capital is subjected to a missile attack, it would be best if an Aegis destroyer or another system could intercept the missile in outer space—that is, in the upper layer. If the missile escapes that interception and must be intercepted in the lower layer closer to the ground, the PAC-3 system will operate. At that point, there is a considerable danger that wreckage from the intercepted missile will fall on Shinjuku Ward. The government should honestly tell the people this. It should then explain specifically what kind of system could prevent a situation such as ‘wreckage falling on Shinjuku Ward.’ There are ways to minimize harm to the public, including purchasing a larger site or securing space for an interceptor missile base along the coast.”
Meanwhile, Itsunori Onodera, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Research Commission on Security and a former defense minister, said that the government had not decided to cancel the deployment of Aegis Ashore.
“The Aegis system is still being manufactured. If a suitable location capable of replacing Akita and Yamaguchi can be found, it could be installed there, but an offshore location is also a strong candidate.”
The conceivable options are: ① installing the system on an offshore structure, or ② placing it aboard a Maritime Self-Defense Force Aegis destroyer.
It has been pointed out that even the same Aegis system requires different specifications for offshore and land-based deployment.
However, because the system is still being manufactured, modifications remain possible.
Even if it can be modified technically, Japan faces another difficult problem.
That problem is the exhaustion of the Self-Defense Forces.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force, in particular, lacks both personnel and ships.
Its personnel fill rate is 91.7 percent, and even the number of days allotted to the most important training exercises has been repeatedly reduced.
One of the original purposes of introducing Aegis Ashore was to reduce the burden on the Maritime Self-Defense Force.
If its introduction is now rejected and, as Onodera suggests, the system is installed offshore or placed aboard an Aegis destroyer, it will probably be difficult to operate with the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s existing capabilities.
An “Investment” Mindset
Kono’s decision must not be allowed to create a gap in the defense of the entire Japanese archipelago.
To prevent that, the government must first make absolutely clear its determination to protect the people and the national territory at any cost.
Now is the time to demonstrate a firm determination to confront aggression.
That is the first step toward closing the gap in Japan’s defenses.
In this respect, Kono’s remarks were extremely inappropriate.
Regarding the review of Aegis Ashore, he said, “It is not rational even as an investment. Let us make a clean break and abandon it.”
Wasteful government spending must, of course, not be permitted.
However, it is foolish to discuss national defense solely in terms of how much money it costs.
North Korea and China are located next to Japan, while Russia, acting jointly with China, is making moves in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands as though seeking to seize Japanese territory.
As long as Japan is surrounded by countries that will ultimately not hesitate to use military force to achieve their objectives, it must make every possible defense effort, beyond calculations of profit and loss.
As defense minister, Kono is reportedly devoting his energies to abolishing plastic shopping bags at stores inside the ministry and encouraging the use of reusable bags.
But once the country and its territory have been taken away, everything is over.
As defense minister, he must not merely announce the suspension of Aegis Ashore deployment with an “investment” mindset.
He must fulfill his responsibility to present a concrete plan for filling the gaping hole in Japan’s defenses created by that decision.
In June, President Trump ordered that the number of U.S. troops stationed in Germany be reduced by 9,500 to 25,000 by September.
The withdrawal from Germany was temporarily postponed because of strong opposition in the U.S. Congress.
However, former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell told the Financial Times on June 11 that the decision “should be understood within the broader framework of withdrawing U.S. forces from many countries, including Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, South Korea, and Japan.”
This means that the fundamental direction of U.S. policy has not changed.
Let us confirm this point clearly.
The Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is an international treaty, and both the United States and Japan, as responsible nations, will presumably honor it properly.
However, to deal with China, Japan itself must develop its defense capabilities as a responsible nation.
To demonstrate that national will, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should act in the opposite direction from Kono’s words by increasing the defense budget and presenting a new policy that would enable Japan to strike enemy bases.