The Invisible Front—Organized Mobilization at the Nagano Olympic Torch Relay and the Chinese Communist Party’s “Fifty-Cent” Online Influence Operations
This article presents a dialogue between Masayuki Takayama and Tadanobu Bando concerning the organized mobilization of Chinese students at the 2008 Beijing Olympic torch relay in Nagano and the online commentators commonly known as the “Fifty-Cent Party.”
It examines how physical mobilization and online opinion-shaping may be used to advance the political objectives of the Chinese Communist Party.
2020-07-07
The following continues from the preceding chapter.
The reference in the original dialogue to the “1998 Nagano Olympics” is incorrect.
The event in question was the Beijing Olympic torch relay held in Nagano City on April 26, 2008.
Zenkoji Temple had originally been scheduled to host the starting ceremony, but withdrew amid concerns about China’s repression in Tibet and the safety of the temple and its visitors.
Several thousand Chinese students travelled to Nagano by chartered buses and displayed Chinese flags in support of the torch relay.
Scuffles occurred between some Chinese supporters, pro-Tibet demonstrators, and Japanese nationalists.
Five people were arrested, and four Chinese supporters were reportedly injured.
The claims made in the dialogue that between 5,000 and 8,000 people attended and that each participant received 5,000 yen and a boxed meal could not be independently confirmed from the official records and major reports examined for this republication.
They are therefore preserved as statements made by Tadanobu Bando rather than presented as independently established facts.
The expression “Fifty-Cent Party” does not denote the formal name of a single unified organization.
It is a colloquial term generally applied to online commentators who publish material favourable to the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party.
They are commonly referred to as wangluo pinglun yuan, or online commentators.
The name is said to derive from the claim that commentators were once paid five mao, or 0.5 yuan, for each post.
This does not mean that every person described by the term belongs to one organization or receives payment for each comment.
It is nevertheless documented that, from 2018 onward, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission called for the organized development of a powerful online publicity force to conduct propaganda, guide public opinion, and participate in what it described as ideological struggle on the internet.
The following statements are presented as the respective views of Masayuki Takayama and Tadanobu Bando.
【The Activities of Online Operatives】
Bando
Chinese organizations have established various networks within Japan, and in my view that system is now largely complete.
When the Beijing Olympic torch relay was held in Nagano in 2008, Tibetans living in Japan and Japanese citizens opposed to the repression of Tibetans stood along the route carrying Tibetan flags.
Large numbers of Chinese people arrived carrying the national flag of China.
Some members of the opposing groups clashed, and Japanese participants were also drawn into the disturbance.
Many of the Chinese participants were students, and the action appeared to be organized.
I was told that approximately 5,000 to 8,000 people attended and that they received 5,000 yen and a boxed meal.
Chinese student associations exist at universities throughout Japan, and I believe that students were mobilized through those organizations.
I also believe that Chinese education authorities and the educational sections of Chinese diplomatic missions exercise influence over overseas student organizations.
In my view, organizations of this kind were operating behind the Nagano mobilization.
Another group that has attracted considerable attention for online activities is commonly known as the “Fifty-Cent Party.”
Its members are generally referred to as online commentators.
They write posts and comments that benefit the Chinese Communist Party and report comments regarded as hostile to the Party.
They became known as the “Fifty-Cent Party” because it was said that they received five mao, or 0.5 yuan, for each post.
Rather than beginning as a single, firmly established national organization, online commentators are said to have been recruited or directed separately by local governments, administrative bodies, universities, and websites.
The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission later strengthened organizations responsible for online propaganda and the guidance of public opinion.
It regarded the internet as a principal battlefield in ideological struggle and developed mechanisms for monitoring online statements, detecting criticism of the government at an early stage, and forming public opinion favourable to the Communist Party.
From the standpoint of the Chinese authorities, discovering and removing the beginnings of anti-government action online before it develops into unrest or terrorism is regarded as a desirable means of maintaining order.
Takayama
Surely such activities are also taking place within Japan.
When someone posts information concerning the arrogance or misconduct of the Chinese Communist Party, comments immediately appear that seem intended to neutralize it.
For example, someone may write that it is time to reduce dependence on supply chains centred on China.
A large number of apparently balanced responses then appear, saying, “Even so, economic relations with China remain necessary.”
Could some of those comments be the work of the Fifty-Cent Party?
Bando
That is possible.
Because the activity takes place on the internet, people can gain access from anywhere in the world.
Training programmes for online commentators are also said to exist.
One reported programme consists of two days of acquiring knowledge and one day of practical exercises, for a total of three days.
Other accounts refer to five-day internal training programmes and supplementary instruction based on the selected course.
A wide variety of subjects is said to be taught.
However, the specific duration and content of those programmes were information introduced by Bando during the dialogue and have not been independently verified in this article.
To be continued.