An examination of the July 2020 floods in the Kuma River basin, the Kawabegawa Dam controversy, the Chuo Shinkansen dispute, and emergency shelter management, questioning whether essential infrastructure for protecting human life should be obstructed in the name of environmental protection.

July 8, 2020
【Background】
In July 2020, record-breaking rainfall caused catastrophic damage throughout the Kuma River basin in Kumamoto Prefecture.
According to official records, approximately 1,020 hectares were inundated and about 6,110 homes were affected along the Kuma River.
A subsequent review conducted by the national government, Kumamoto Prefecture and municipalities in the basin estimated that, if the Kawabegawa Dam envisioned under the former plan had existed, the flooded area around Hitoyoshi might have been reduced by approximately 60 percent, while areas submerged to depths greater than three meters might have been reduced by approximately 90 percent.
These figures were produced by a simulation based on specified assumptions, but they demonstrate why flood-control infrastructure must be evaluated through concrete projections of potential damage rather than through ideology or emotion alone.
This article was originally written on July 8, 2020, immediately after the disaster, as a criticism of the political and social decisions surrounding flood-control policy.
The original text also strongly criticized Heita Kawakatsu, then Governor of Shizuoka Prefecture, for his position on the Chuo Shinkansen.
The issues officially presented by Shizuoka Prefecture, however, concerned the possible effects on the water resources of the Oi River and the natural environment of the Southern Alps.
This republication therefore preserves the criticism of Kawakatsu’s policy decisions while avoiding any assertion, unsupported by objective evidence, that his position was directed by or coordinated with China.
【The Essential Passage from the Original Text】
“Those who carried out opposition campaigns under the noble and habitual slogan of ‘environmental protection,’ and thereby destroyed a dam project that was indispensable for flood control—opposition politicians, so-called intellectuals and so-called citizens’ groups.”
【The Noble Language of Environmental Protection and the Unreported Responsibility for Flood Control】
After a major natural disaster, newspapers and television repeatedly report rainfall totals, overflowing rivers, damaged homes and conditions in evacuation shelters.
Yet they rarely investigate who decided to cancel previously planned flood-control projects, what alternatives were adopted, and whether those alternatives were truly sufficient.
This is precisely the question that the media must examine most rigorously.
Protecting the environment is, of course, essential.
Protecting clear rivers, forests, ecosystems and the lives of local residents is a fundamental responsibility of both national and local governments.
Yet simply invoking environmental protection does not automatically make opponents of flood-control infrastructure morally correct.
Dams can affect the natural environment.
At the same time, deciding not to build a dam can create grave risks to human life, homes, industry and entire communities.
The choice is not a simplistic contest between the virtue of protecting nature and the evil of development.
The consequences of construction and the lives and property that may be lost without construction must be examined with equal seriousness.
【Those Who Opposed a Project Must Also Examine the Consequences】
Politicians, academics, citizens’ groups and journalists who opposed the Kawabegawa Dam may have acted according to their sincere convictions at the time.
Once they have influenced public policy, however, they bear a responsibility to examine whether their arguments and judgments were correct when a major disaster subsequently occurs.
They cannot refuse such examination merely by saying that they were protecting the environment.
Both supporters and opponents must reconsider their decisions in light of evidence and measurable results.
The same responsibility applies to government.
Flood management must combine dams with levees, river excavation, retarding basins, forest management, land-use controls, evacuation systems and the relocation of homes from high-risk areas.
The phrase “flood control without dams,” however, must not become a political slogan used to exclude dams before the evidence has even been examined.
Every available measure should be scientifically compared, and the most effective combination should be selected to protect human life.