Published on February 15, 2020.
Based on an article by Mina Mitsui, Paris Bureau Chief of the Sankei Shimbun, this essay presents how expectations for China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Eastern and Central Europe are increasingly turning into disappointment.
Through developments such as support for Tibet and Hong Kong in the Czech Republic, delays and profitability concerns surrounding the Hungary–Serbia railway project, and security anxieties over Huawei, it examines the fundamental divide between China’s financial power and the values of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.

2020-02-15
Eighty-five percent of the cost depends on loans from the Export–Import Bank of China.
In Hungary, passenger demand cannot be expected, and some say that “it would take more than 100 years to make the project profitable.”
The following is from today’s Sankei Shimbun.
Paris Bureau Chief Mina Mitsui is the finest female correspondent of our time.
Eastern Europe’s Fading Enthusiasm for China
The Disappointing “Belt and Road,” and a Divide over Democracy
▼Liberate Tibet
In the Czech Republic, headwinds against China are blowing fiercely.
In the center of Prague, where traces of the Middle Ages remain, there stands a 20-meter wall bearing the words “Liberate Tibet” and “Freedom for Hong Kong.”
During the Eastern European revolutions of 1989, this wall was a “symbol of freedom” on which citizens wrote their anger toward the communist regime.
Triggered by last year’s demonstrations in Hong Kong, it has turned into a place where people demand that China improve its human rights record.
Every day, it is crowded with tourists taking commemorative photographs.
Last March, about 700 local governments, including Prague, raised the Tibetan flag.
This commemorated the 60th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising that led to the Dalai Lama’s exile.
The protest by the Chinese Embassy in Prague ended in failure.
Ivana Karaskova, a researcher at the private think tank Association for International Affairs, says, “The people are overlapping the former Czech Communist Party with the Chinese Communist Party. The domestic mood welcoming Chinese investment has completely changed.”
▼The “Railway” That Does Not Move Forward
In 2012, China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries held their first summit meeting in Warsaw, the capital of Poland.
Under the framework of “16 plus 1 (China),” the meetings became regularized, and plans for the construction of ports, roads, and railways were announced one after another.
However, the plans have not proceeded as Central and Eastern Europe had expected.
Concerns have also emerged over financing.
The centerpiece of the Eastern European version of the “Belt and Road” was the railway modernization plan between Budapest, the capital of Hungary, and Belgrade, the capital of Serbia.
As the core of a “New Silk Road” connecting the Mediterranean port of Piraeus in Greece, whose operating rights are held by China, to Western Europe via the Balkan Peninsula, it was supposed to be completed in 2017.
On the Hungarian side, however, construction has not even begun.
For this plan, a memorandum-signing ceremony was held in 2014 at the third “16 plus 1” summit meeting in Serbia.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang took the hands of the Hungarian and Serbian leaders and proudly declared, “This will become a bridge linking China and Europe. If we further expand high-speed routes, the scale of trade between both sides will increase all at once.”
The total construction cost is estimated at 3.2 billion euros, or about 400 billion yen.
The aim is to connect the 350 kilometers between the two capitals with Chinese-made high-speed rail, cutting the current travel time of eight hours to less than half.
In Hungary, problems quickly arose over orders awarded to Chinese companies.
The European Union pointed out the possibility that the project might violate bidding rules.
Contractor selection was pushed back to last year, and the completion target was revised to 2023.
Eighty-five percent of the cost depends on loans from the Export–Import Bank of China.
In Hungary, passenger demand cannot be expected, and some say that “it would take more than 100 years to make the project profitable.”
Agnes Szunomar, associate professor at Corvinus University of Budapest in Hungary, points out, “The railway is for transporting Chinese cargo, and Hungary will receive little economic benefit. It is nothing more than a political symbol for Prime Minister Orban, who advocates closer ties with China.”
▼It Does Not Create “Employment”
At present, Central and Eastern Europe’s approach to China is driven mainly by expectations.
The Serbian side of the railway project began construction in 2017.
Serbia, which is not a member of the EU, is not bound by EU rules.
In 2014, a 1.5-kilometer bridge over the Danube River was also completed with Chinese loans.
It was the result of rushed construction in which China sent in 200 workers.
Within Serbia, a cool view spread that “the Belt and Road does not lead to local employment.”
According to Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies, of China’s investment in the EU in 2018, Central and Eastern Europe accounted for only 2 percent.
The majority was concentrated in the three countries of Britain, Germany, and France, as well as Northern Europe.
＊This is probably the reason Greta Thunberg appeared.＊
Although exports from Central and Eastern Europe to China increased, imports from China were several times greater.
Karaskova of the Czech Republic says, “The domestic market is full of Chinese products, yet this has not led to the agricultural exports we had expected. No jobs have been created either, and the people have been disappointed because their expectations were betrayed.”
▼Anxiety over “Security”
What further cooled enthusiasm for China was the growing anxiety over security.
In Poland, in January of last year, an executive in charge of sales at the Warsaw branch of Huawei Technologies, the major Chinese telecommunications equipment company, was arrested on suspicion of espionage.
He was a person who had worked for five years, until 2011, at the Chinese Consulate in Gdansk in northern Poland.
On the same day, a former Polish employee who had been in charge of cybersecurity at a Polish intelligence agency was also arrested.
The two were friends.
The government was astonished by the incident and reviewed its dependence on Huawei.
In September, in conjunction with the visit of U.S. Vice President Pence, Poland concluded an agreement on security measures for fifth-generation, or 5G, communications networks.
In the Czech Republic, at the end of 2018, the national intelligence agency defined Chinese espionage as a “threat” in its annual report.
It strongly warned, “China is carrying out intelligence activities in the Czech Republic under the cover of diplomacy. It targets the government and also conducts espionage in the economic and technological fields.”
That year, the Chinese chairman of CEFC China Energy, a major Chinese energy company that had entered the Czech Republic, suddenly disappeared.
It was reported that he had been detained in China on suspicion of bribery.
CEFC had made large-scale investments in banks, airlines, and a football team.
President Zeman appointed this chairman as an adviser and built a close relationship with him, but his pro-China stance suddenly became the target of criticism.
▼Historical “Circumstances”
There are also historical circumstances behind China’s ability to penetrate Central and Eastern Europe.
Political leaders who fought against the repression of the former Soviet Union had strong sympathy for China, which had kept its distance from the Soviet Union within the communist bloc.
Former Polish Prime Minister and former President Tusk was one of them.
Looking back on the time in 2012, when he was prime minister and held the “16 plus 1” summit meeting in Warsaw, he says, “Behind the approach to China, there was a national sentiment favorable to China. China was a star of hope that opposed the Soviet Union.”
During his student days, Tusk was a fighter in Solidarity, the self-governing trade union that led the democratization movement in Poland.
At the meeting, there was also a feeling that “Chinese investment is monopolized by Western Europe. We want some of it to be shared with Eastern Europe as well.”
▼Keeping Step with the EU and the United States
Last year, marking 30 years since the Eastern European revolutions, commemorative events were held one after another in the Czech Republic.
The reason the people raised voices of support for the demonstrations in Hong Kong was that they overlapped with their own former democratization movement.
The strong interest in Tibet derives from the fact that former President Havel, who led the revolution, deepened his friendship with the Dalai Lama as a “friend fighting the communist system.”
The raising of Tibetan flags by local governments has been a tradition since that time.
China has traditionally criticized such movements as “interference in internal affairs.”
Under the Xi regime, its posture has become even more intimidating, and this has instead produced friction.
Karaskova says that she was summoned by the Chinese Embassy in Prague to be “instructed in correct knowledge” and was lectured for nearly an hour.
She says, “I studied in Shanghai and Taiwan. I told them back that I had nothing to be taught by you.”
Central and Eastern Europe, desiring economic development, was astonished by China’s financial power as it rushed forward with infrastructure development.
Expectations for investment remain strong even now, but as the United States and the EU strengthen their vigilance toward China, its stance has become more cautious.
Tusk appeals, “We have learned that with a great power such as China, Poland alone cannot build an equal relationship. We should act in concert with the EU and the United States.”