Security Vulnerabilities Created by Decarbonization Policies — A Dialogue Between Nobukatsu Kanehara and Taishi Sugiyama

2023/3/2
The following is taken from a special feature presenting a dialogue between Nobukatsu Kanehara, former Deputy Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat, and Taishi Sugiyama, Senior Research Fellow at the Canon Institute for Global Studies, which appeared at the beginning of the issue of the monthly magazine Seiron released yesterday.
It is essential reading not only for the Japanese people but also for people around the world.
The developed nations of the world, not just Japan, should feel deep regret over their folly to date.
Security Vulnerabilities Created by Decarbonization Policies
Kanehara
The current war in Ukraine reminds us that we must not focus solely on battles in which regular armies confront each other head-on.
Recently, our national security strategy has begun to refer to “comprehensive national power” and DIME: diplomacy, information, military, and economy.
However, looking back at World War II, failures in supply contributed significantly to the defeat of the Japanese army.
We tend to focus on military matters, but if we lose economically, we also lose the war.
The lesson we should draw from Ukraine this time is that a country like Russia will naturally carry out such attacks.
It is a serious mistake to assume that it will not target civilians.
Sugiyama
Exactly.
The Russian military is attacking energy infrastructure, but it nevertheless appears to be restored relatively quickly, and electricity is somehow being supplied.
The other day, the Sankei Shimbun interviewed an engineer at a Ukrainian power company.
He said that, although more than a hundred people have died at that company alone, they go to the site whenever power infrastructure is destroyed and work to restore it, regardless of the danger and however many days it takes.
There is no guarantee that something similar will not happen in Japan.
In that situation, even after an attack, we must immediately repair the damage and maintain the power grid.
I have heard that many locations in Ukraine had long been fortified in anticipation of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union…
Kanehara
It was a country that had built nuclear shelters.
Sugiyama
So its power infrastructure was also built with war in mind.
We, too, should learn from that.
Kanehara
The countries surrounding Ukraine have also been greatly affected by this war.
Germany, in particular, went to an extreme.
It deepened its dependence on Russia for energy supplies, partly to maintain stable relations with Russia.
But ultimately, when someone like Russian President Vladimir Putin starts a war, that interdependence is used as a weapon.
I feel sorry for German Chancellor Scholz, but from Russia’s perspective, “We can cut off natural gas at any time.”
Germany depended on Russia for approximately half of its natural gas.
The EU also depends on Russia for about forty percent of its natural gas, and the Eastern European countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia were particularly dependent.
If the gas supply to these regions were cut off, they would face a serious situation.
We must consider the possibility that something like this could happen.
It was only under the Shinzo Abe administration that the Japanese government began saying, “Let us address national security as an entire nation.”
It is also only within the past decade or so that the National Security Council, or NSC, was established and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Police Agency began coordinating within a single body.
As for the economic ministries and agencies, their complete lack of understanding of military affairs was also one of the scars left by GHQ.
Things have improved considerably in recent years, but previously, they thought only about economic warfare, and “the enemy was the United States.”
Energy security was left entirely to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy.
Sugiyama
To begin with, complacency born of taking peace for granted has spread throughout Japan, and even the industrial sector does not use the term “national security.”
Consequently, many people speak of a stable energy supply rather than energy security, and they have no concept of a wartime contingency.
They are enthusiastic about identifying the optimal energy mix, strengthening relations with oil-producing countries, and pursuing independent resource development.
However, because of their aversion to military affairs, they have not developed contingency response plans.
Securing Sea Lanes Is an Urgent Task
Kanehara
Exactly.
The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy is giving serious thought to what to do if an emergency occurs in Japan.
However, even after stockpiling oil and gas following the oil crises, it has not yet considered what to do if oil tanks are blown up during a contingency.
Further measures are still needed to ensure the nation’s energy security.
In other countries, nuclear energy is directly connected to national security.
In Japan, we adhere to the NPT, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and discuss the protection of nuclear materials to some extent.
However, there is no connection with military affairs or defense.
Viewed globally, this is an anomaly.
Sugiyama
We have oil stockpiles sufficient for two hundred days, but they are stored in exposed tanks, so a terrorist attack would be easy to carry out if someone intended to do so.
Meanwhile, nuclear power plants are subject to strict counterterrorism requirements, and electricity generation is even halted to meet them.
What kind of balance is that?
It should be extremely difficult for terrorists to destroy a nuclear power plant.
They would have to enter the site, destroy the buildings, and then destroy the containment vessel and the auxiliary power equipment inside it.
It would be far easier to target oil tanks or LNG carriers at the entrance to Tokyo Bay.
Kanehara
We have created a world in which the entire economy, including energy, is separated from military affairs.
We are finally beginning to connect the two, but our highest priority must be energy security.
In the field of energy security, the government is not connected to the international community, and the Energy Agency operates alone.
If war breaks out, we will lose.
Solar power generation also requires stronger coordination with the ministries and agencies responsible for national security.
People are finally beginning to discuss problems with land use and ask why certain areas have so many solar power plants.
On Miyakojima Island in Okinawa Prefecture, before a Self-Defense Forces garrison was built, solar panels associated with a Chinese company were packed so closely together that the garrison’s location had to be moved approximately ten kilometers.
Since the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is now participating in national security discussions, including the prevention of technology leakage, we must also discuss energy security.
I regret that we left this work unfinished during our time in office.
The same applies to securing sea lanes, or maritime transportation routes.
There has been no progress at all.
Suppose China also directs its attacks toward Japan during a Taiwan contingency.
In that case, there is no guarantee that China will attack only US military bases and Self-Defense Forces bases.
War is about striking an opponent’s weakest point, so naturally, it would target oil tanks.
These tanks are exposed under the open sky.
If attacked, half a year’s worth of oil could be blown up.
Furthermore, the East China Sea and the South China Sea would become battlefields, preventing tankers from passing through.
Tankers would have to take a major detour south of the Philippines to reach the Pacific Ocean.
The Self-Defense Forces would not be able to escort them all.
If Chinese drones or submarines sank two or three tankers, there would be an enormous uproar.
Keeping the Japanese economy running requires fifteen tankers in the two-hundred-thousand-ton class to arrive every day, so the sinking of two or three could bring Japan down.
If Xi Jinping realizes that striking this point would cause Japan to collapse, he might do it.
In war, there is no such thing as fighting unfairly.
In the last war, the first thing the US military did after the attack on Pearl Harbor was destroy Japan’s merchant fleet.
There is no guarantee that China will not do the same.
The Japanese government has been unable to address problems of this kind.
Sugiyama
Certainly, if the sea lanes were cut off, the consequences would be severe.
Even parts of Ukraine far from Poland are connected to it by land and can receive supplies.
Japan, however, is surrounded by the sea, so what would happen?
Oil remains vulnerable, even if we can stockpile enough for two hundred days.
Natural gas, meanwhile, can only be stockpiled for a very short period.
Coal stockpiles, too, are currently kept to a minimum of approximately one month’s supply.
At nuclear power plants, once the fuel is loaded, it is normally replaced after about a year, but intensive operation can allow electricity generation for approximately three years.
Fuel can also be stored for long periods before loading.
One advantage of nuclear power is that it can continue supplying electricity even if maritime transportation is disrupted during a contingency.
Europe is connected to Ukraine, but Germany’s transformation of European energy policy was a major failure.
Before the war began, Europe had abundant resources such as coal, but refrained from using them to reduce CO₂ emissions, while Germany had also decided against using nuclear power.
That left only wind power or Russian natural gas to rely on.
Ultimately, wind power might be more reliable.
So natural gas imports were increased with the intention of building an interdependent relationship with Russia, only for that dependence to be weaponized.
Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was probably based on the calculation that Germany, in particular, would not impose substantial economic sanctions.
As a result, the G7 nations are now united in imposing economic sanctions to stop imports of resources from Russia.
However, we should never have allowed Russia to believe that sanctions would be a futile exercise.
In that respect, it was a complete failure.
Europe’s decarbonization policies created a security vulnerability.
This is an extremely important lesson.
To be continued.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *


Please enter the result of the calculation above.

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.