Originally published on February 15, 2020.
This article introduces a Sankei Shimbun report by Paris Bureau Chief Mina Mitsui and discusses the expectations and disappointments surrounding China in Central and Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Serbia, and Poland.
It examines delays in Belt and Road railway, bridge, and infrastructure projects, Chinese investment that fails to create local employment, Huawei-related espionage concerns, solidarity with Tibet and Hong Kong, and the growing need to coordinate with the EU and the United States.

February 15, 2020
Eighty-five percent of the cost depends on loans from the Export-Import Bank of China.
In Hungary, passenger demand cannot be expected, and some say that “it would take more than 100 years to make the project profitable.”
The following is from today’s Sankei Shimbun.
Paris Bureau Chief Mina Mitsui is the finest female correspondent of our age.
Eastern Europe’s China Fever Fades
The Disappointing “Belt and Road” and the Gap Over Democracy
▼Liberate Tibet
In the Czech Republic, strong headwinds are blowing against China.
In the center of Prague, which still retains the atmosphere of the Middle Ages, stands a 20-meter wall bearing the words “Liberate Tibet” and “Freedom for Hong Kong.”
During the Eastern European revolutions of 1989, the wall was a “symbol of freedom” where citizens wrote their anger toward the Communist Party regime.
Triggered by last year’s demonstrations in Hong Kong, it has turned into a place calling on China to improve human rights.
Every day, it is crowded with tourists taking commemorative photographs.
In March last year, about 700 municipalities, including Prague, raised the Tibetan flag.
They commemorated the 60th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising that led to the Dalai Lama’s exile.
The protest by the Chinese embassy in Prague ended in failure.
Ivana Karásková, a researcher at the Association for International Affairs, a private research institute, says, “The people are overlapping the former Czechoslovak Communist Party with the Chinese Communist Party.
The domestic mood welcoming Chinese investment has changed completely.”
▼The “Railway” That Does Not Advance
China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries held their first summit meeting in Warsaw, the capital of Poland, in 2012.
Under the framework of “16 plus 1,” meaning the 16 countries plus China, the meetings became regular, and construction plans for ports, roads, and railways were announced one after another.
However, the projects are not proceeding as Central and Eastern Europe had expected.
Concerns have also emerged on the financial side.
The centerpiece of the Eastern European version of the Belt and Road Initiative was the railway modernization plan between Budapest, the capital of Hungary, and Belgrade, the capital of Serbia.
It was supposed to be completed in 2017 as the core of a “New Silk Road” connecting the Greek port of Piraeus on the Mediterranean, whose operating rights are held by China, to Western Europe via the Balkan Peninsula.
On the Hungarian side, however, even construction has not yet begun.
For this project, a memorandum-signing ceremony was held in 2014 at the third “16 plus 1” summit meeting in Serbia.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang took the hands of the leaders of Hungary and Serbia and proudly declared, “This will become a bridge linking China and Europe.
If we expand high-speed routes further, the scale of trade between both sides will increase at once.”
The total construction cost is estimated at 3.2 billion euros, or about 400 billion yen.
The plan aims to connect the 350 kilometers between the two capitals with Chinese-made high-speed rail, shortening the current travel time of eight hours to less than half.
In Hungary, problems quickly arose over the awarding of contracts to Chinese companies.
The European Union pointed out the possibility that the project might violate bidding rules.
The selection of contractors was delayed until last year, and the target completion date was revised to 2023.
Eighty-five percent of the cost depends on loans from the Export-Import Bank of China.
In Hungary, passenger demand cannot be expected, and some say that “it would take more than 100 years to make the project profitable.”
Ágnes Szunomár, associate professor at Corvinus University of Budapest, points out, “The railway is for transporting Chinese freight, and Hungary will receive little economic benefit.
It is nothing more than a political symbol for Prime Minister Orbán, who advocates closer ties with China.”
▼It Does Not Create “Employment”
For now, Central and Eastern Europe’s approach toward China is driven mainly by expectations.
Construction on the Serbian side of the railway project began in 2017.
Serbia, which is not an EU member, is not bound by EU rules.
In 2014, a 1.5-kilometer bridge across the Danube River was also completed with Chinese financing.
It was the result of crash construction work for which China sent in 200 workers.
Within Serbia, a cool view spread that “the Belt and Road does not lead to local employment.”
According to Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies, Central and Eastern Europe accounted for 2 percent of China’s investment in the EU in 2018.
Most of it went to Britain, Germany, France, and Northern Europe.
This is probably the reason for the emergence of Greta Thunberg.
Although exports from Central and Eastern Europe to China have increased, imports from China are several times larger.
Karásková of the Czech Republic says, “The domestic market is full of Chinese products, but this has not led to the agricultural exports we expected.
No jobs have been created either, and the people are disappointed because things did not turn out as expected.”
▼Anxiety Over “Security”
What further cooled the enthusiasm for China was the growing anxiety over security.
In Poland, in January last year, a sales executive at the Warsaw branch of Huawei Technologies, the major Chinese telecommunications equipment company, was arrested on suspicion of espionage.
He had worked for five years until 2011 at the Chinese consulate in Gdańsk in northern Poland.
On the same day, a former Polish official who had been in charge of cybersecurity at Poland’s intelligence agency was also arrested.
The two men were friends.
The government was astonished by the incident and reconsidered its dependence on Huawei.
In September, in conjunction with a visit by U.S. Vice President Pence, Poland concluded an agreement on security measures for fifth-generation, or 5G, communications networks.
In the Czech Republic, at the end of 2018, the national intelligence agency described Chinese espionage as a “threat” in its annual report.
It strongly warned, “China is conducting intelligence activities in the Czech Republic under the cover of diplomacy.
It targets the government and also conducts espionage in the economic and technological fields.”
That year, the Chinese chairman of CEFC China Energy, a major Chinese energy company that had expanded into the Czech Republic, suddenly disappeared.
It was reported that he had been detained in China on suspicion of bribery.
CEFC had made large-scale investments in banks, airlines, and a soccer team.
President Zeman appointed this chairman as an adviser and built a honeymoon relationship with him, but his pro-China stance suddenly became a target of criticism.
▼Historical “Circumstances”
There are also historical circumstances behind China’s ability to penetrate Central and Eastern Europe.
Political leaders who fought against oppression by the former Soviet Union felt strong sympathy for China, which had distinguished itself from the Soviet Union within the communist bloc.
Former Polish Prime Minister and former President Tusk is one of them.
Looking back on 2012, when he hosted the “16 plus 1” summit meeting in Warsaw during his time as prime minister, he says, “Behind the move toward China was a national sentiment favorable to China.
China was a star of hope that stood against the Soviet Union.”
When he was a student, Mr. Tusk was a fighter in Solidarity, the self-governing labor union that led Poland’s democratization movement.
There was also a feeling at the meeting that “Chinese investment is monopolized by Western Europe.
We want Eastern Europe to receive a share as well.”
▼Keeping Step With the EU and the United States
Last year, the 30th anniversary of the Eastern European revolutions, commemorative events were held one after another in the Czech Republic.
The reason citizens raised voices of support for the Hong Kong demonstrations was that they overlapped with their own past democratization movement.
The strong interest in Tibet derives from the fact that former President Havel, who led the revolution, deepened his friendship with the Dalai Lama as a “friend fighting against communist regimes.”
The raising of the Tibetan flag by municipalities has been a tradition since that time.
China has traditionally criticized such moves as “interference in internal affairs.”
Under the Xi regime, its attitude has become even more intimidating, and this has instead created friction.
Karásková says that she was summoned by the Chinese embassy in Prague so that they could “guide her to correct knowledge,” and was lectured for nearly an hour.
“I studied in Shanghai and Taiwan.
I told them back that I had nothing to learn from them,” she says.
Central and Eastern Europe, which seeks economic development, was astonished by China’s financial power as it rushed into infrastructure development.
Expectations for investment remain strong, but as the United States and the EU increase their vigilance toward China, the region’s stance has become more cautious.
Mr. Tusk appeals, “We have learned that Poland alone cannot build an equal relationship with a great power like China.
We should keep step with the EU and the United States.”