This article presents Rui Abiru’s commentary, “The ‘Wait Passively for Death’ Doctrine of Exclusively Defensive Defense.”
It examines the Hatoyama Cabinet’s unified government position of 1956, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s longstanding advocacy of enemy-base strike capability, the exercise of collective self-defense, Japan’s security legislation, and Komeito’s interpretation of exclusively defensive defense.

2020-07-17
The following is taken from a regular column by Rui Abiru, an editorial writer and senior political editor at the Sankei Shimbun, published yesterday under the title, “The ‘Wait Passively for Death’ Doctrine of Exclusively Defensive Defense.”
This article once again demonstrates that Abiru is one of the finest active journalists in Japan.
In February 1956, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama presented the following unified position of the Japanese government:
“When an attack using guided missiles or similar weapons is carried out against our national territory, we cannot believe that the Constitution requires us merely to sit and wait for our own destruction.”
If it is clear that Japan is about to be attacked by missiles, can a policy of doing nothing until they are launched, and then relying solely on interception, truly be called national defense?
This article asks whether the term “exclusively defensive defense” has ceased to describe a realistic policy for protecting the lives of the people and the national territory and has instead become a doctrine of waiting passively for death.
Passages enclosed by asterisks are the author’s own notes and opinions.
The following is the quoted article.
【The “Wait Passively for Death” Doctrine of Exclusively Defensive Defense】
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s announcement at his June 18 press conference that the government would consider acquiring an “enemy-base strike capability,” enabling Japan to attack an enemy missile base and deter a launch, was not a sudden inspiration.
Rather, he presumably intended to use the cancellation of the land-based Aegis Ashore missile-defense system as an opportunity to realize an idea he had held for many years.
The previous day, he had told people around him:
“Because Aegis Ashore has come to this, I intend to discuss the Self-Defense Forces’ strike capability directly and openly.
I want to conduct a thorough discussion of national security.”
Eleven years earlier, in April 2009, after the end of his first administration and while waiting for another opportunity to govern, Abe stated at a meeting held at Liberal Democratic Party headquarters, following North Korea’s launch of a long-range ballistic missile that month:
“For missile defense to function while Japan and the United States deepen their cooperation, we must discuss the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and the possession of an enemy-base strike capability.”
Regarding the exercise of collective self-defense, Abe had already argued in the Diet in April 1999, when he was still a young legislator, that such an ability was necessary and that the prime minister, rather than the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, should take responsibility for presenting the government’s interpretation.
Sixteen years later, in September 2015, he realized that objective by securing the passage of Japan’s security legislation.
This fact demonstrates that Prime Minister Abe was one of the greatest political leaders in Japanese history.
It also demonstrates that he was a “national treasure,” in the sense defined by Saicho, and one of Japan’s most precious assets.
By contrast, the author has severely criticized those who dominate the reporting departments of newspapers such as the Asahi Shimbun and NHK, as well as so-called human-rights lawyers, so-called intellectuals, and so-called citizens’ groups, for repeatedly promoting arguments that damage Japan’s security and national interests.
The author believes that their arguments have ultimately benefited forces in China and on the Korean Peninsula that seek to weaken Japan through plausible falsehoods and profound malevolence.
【Enemy-Base Strike Capability Enters the Debate】
The remaining issue is the acquisition of an enemy-base strike capability.
Abe had also identified the need to consider such a capability in July 2006, when he served as Chief Cabinet Secretary in the administration of Junichiro Koizumi.
In February 2013, shortly after the establishment of the second Abe administration, he stated in the Diet:
“Should we continue relying entirely on the United States for that—an attack against an enemy base?”
He had maintained an awareness of this problem for many years.
What specific capabilities, then, should Japan acquire?
Nobukatsu Kanehara, a former Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary who understood Abe’s thinking, commented in the July 8 edition of the Yomiuri Shimbun:
“As an alternative to Aegis Ashore, Japan should consider increasing the number of medium-range weapons, such as the stand-off missiles being introduced by the Air Self-Defense Force, and strengthening deterrence.
I believe Prime Minister Abe wants to hold that kind of discussion.”
Following the prime minister’s remarks at his press conference, discussions within the Liberal Democratic Party also intensified.
In March 2017, the party had already recommended that the government consider acquiring an enemy-base strike capability.
The government indicated its willingness to proceed with the debate.
Defense Minister Taro Kono stated:
“We intend to conduct a serious discussion within the government while also taking the opinions of the ruling parties into account.”
At a time when the threats posed by China and North Korea have increased beyond comparison with earlier periods, this is an entirely natural development.
There has also been little strong opposition from a public that has become more realistic about national security.
【The Government Position Established in 1956】
A unified government position on this issue was already presented sixty-four years earlier, in February 1956.
Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama stated that possessing an enemy-base strike capability would be constitutional:
“When an attack using guided missiles or similar weapons is carried out against our national territory, we cannot believe that the Constitution requires us merely to sit and wait for our own destruction.”
Nevertheless, Komeito has repeatedly expressed outdated and irrational opinions.
Secretary-General Tetsuo Saito stated:
“From the standpoint of the fundamental concept of exclusively defensive defense, we do not believe it would gain the understanding of the public.”
Exclusively defensive defense necessarily means that, in an emergency, Japanese territory becomes the battlefield.
It is a doctrine of fighting a decisive battle on the Japanese homeland.
Today, when missile technology has advanced far beyond the level that existed during the Hatoyama administration, such a policy amounts precisely to waiting passively for death.
It provides no effective deterrence.
Unless Komeito abandons an approach that disregards the lives and property of the people and dangerously invites aggression from abroad, it should not describe itself as a “party of peace.”
The quotation ends here.
【The Author’s Conclusion】
Exclusively defensive defense does not mean doing nothing until the people are attacked.
Still less does it mean accepting the enemy’s first strike even after preparations for a missile launch have been completed and an attack on Japan has become unavoidable.
The most important responsibility of a state is to protect the lives and property of its people.
Neither the Constitution nor the law exists to deny that fundamental duty of the state.
The unified government position of 1956 clearly expressed this self-evident principle.
If Japan is attacked with guided missiles, the Constitution cannot be interpreted as requiring the nation merely to sit and wait for its own destruction.
The purpose of possessing an enemy-base strike capability is not to invade another country.
It is to create deterrence strong enough to make an adversary abandon an attack on Japan and, when an attack has become unavoidable, to neutralize the means of launch before Japanese citizens are sacrificed.
As missile technology advances and the time between launch and impact becomes extremely short, it becomes increasingly difficult to protect the public entirely through interception.
There is no guarantee that every missile launched against Japan can be intercepted.
Nevertheless, if Japan invokes the words “exclusively defensive defense” and declares that it must never strike an adversary’s launching facilities or command-and-control capabilities, it is accepting in advance that Japanese territory will be attacked and Japanese citizens will be killed.
That is not pacifism.
It is an irresponsible doctrine that imposes sacrifice upon the people.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not suddenly raise either collective self-defense or enemy-base strike capability for the convenience of his administration.
He had argued for their necessity since his years as a young legislator and continued, after becoming prime minister, to think consistently about the security of the nation.
The passage of the security legislation in 2015 realized one part of that longstanding concern.
The acquisition of an enemy-base strike capability remained the unresolved task.
To describe the ability to protect the lives and property of the people as a “path to war,” while describing a refusal to act until the people are attacked as “peace,” is a perversion of language that must no longer be permitted.