In the summer of 2020, as COVID-19 cases began rising again, expansion of PCR testing became a major issue in Japanese television coverage. This article questions whether testing itself was being treated as the solution, and argues instead for focusing on rapid action against infection sources, contact tracing, business closures, and the legal framework needed to implement such measures, citing the Itaewon cluster in Seoul, host clubs in Shinjuku, and the K-1 event in Saitama.

2020-07-29
There is scarcely any phenomenon that demonstrates the foolishness and poor quality of television media more clearly than the spectacle of almost all Japanese television media being overwhelmed by such absurd and childish propaganda.
TV Tokyo’s WBS is a program that, without exaggeration, is as different as heaven and earth from the news programs produced by the people who control NHK’s news division.
The argument began as though conducting PCR tests would somehow prevent infection—the nonsense initiated by South Korea and then echoed by their agents who dominate the television media.
It is common knowledge that the latest increase in infections began with host clubs in Shinjuku.
PCR testing was South Korea’s propaganda tool, which succeeded in diverting the world’s attention from the increase in infections caused, in the author’s view, by unsanitary customs within that country.
There is scarcely any phenomenon that demonstrates the foolishness and poor quality of television media more clearly than the spectacle of almost all Japanese television media being overwhelmed by such absurd and childish propaganda.
When a cluster occurred at bars catering to gay customers in Seoul, how did South Korea stop the increase in infections?
It immediately shut down the establishments concerned and thoroughly traced their visitors.
The authorities also used smartphone data to identify visitors’ movements and disclosed information about those movements to the public.
The author argued that the legal ability to order businesses to close immediately was commonplace throughout the world outside Japan.
Japan was not only unable to do that, but was unable even to disclose the names of establishments in order to prevent the spread of infection.
The issue is not PCR testing.
Japan had a constitutional and legal system that could not prevent the K-1 event at Saitama Super Arena from going ahead with an audience of 6,000 people, an event the original article described as having contributed to the first wave.
For some reason, Tokyo was unable even to disclose the names of adult-entertainment establishments where infections had occurred; and the article went on to criticize the Tokyo governor over an allegation concerning academic credentials.
Improving these matters was the urgent task, not simply expanding PCR testing, the article argued, despite the lessons that South Korea itself had demonstrated.