China has used not only Coast Guard vessels but also maritime militia organized around fishing vessels and fishermen as instruments for expanding its maritime interests.
Beginning with a 2020 incident in which China Coast Guard vessels approached and pursued a Japanese fishing boat near the Senkaku Islands, this article examines mass fishing-fleet movements, the end of China’s seasonal fishing moratorium, gray-zone strategy, support for Japanese fishermen, and the urgent need to strengthen island defense.

August 3, 2020
This article follows the preceding chapter on the Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s plan to purchase the Senkaku Islands and their nationalization in 2012.
It examines how Japan should respond to China’s combined use of Coast Guard vessels, fishing fleets and maritime militia in its maritime expansion.
On May 8, 2020, four China Coast Guard vessels entered Japanese territorial waters around Uotsuri Island in the Senkaku Islands.
Two of the vessels attempted to approach and pursue a Japanese fishing boat operating in the area.
Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels moved between them to protect the Japanese boat and ordered the Chinese vessels to leave.
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also lodged a strong protest, demanding that China immediately cease approaching and pursuing the Japanese vessel and withdraw from Japanese territorial waters.
The issue raised in this article was not limited to 2020.
Material updated by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 10, 2026, states that China Coast Guard and other Chinese government vessels continue to enter the contiguous zone surrounding the Senkaku Islands almost every day except during stormy weather and intrude into Japanese territorial waters several times a month.
Key Quotation
“When the time comes, the fishing fleets set out for waters designated by the Communist Party regime. For China, these fishing fleets are the vanguard of maritime aggression and are also known as the maritime militia.”
Full Text
August 3, 2020
When the time comes, the fishing fleets set out for waters designated by the Communist Party regime.
For China, these fishing fleets are the vanguard of maritime aggression and are also known as the maritime militia.
The following is a continuation of the preceding chapter.
Further Encroachment on the Senkaku Islands
In late June of this year, footage was distributed in Japan through online television and other media showing a fishing boat from Ishigaki Island returning after operating in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.
The images were shocking to researchers specializing in maritime security.
A Japanese fishing boat speeds across the water.
A large Chinese patrol vessel pursues it.
A Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel moves between the Japanese fishing boat and the Chinese patrol vessel.
Watching the footage, it appears as though the Japanese fishing boat is fleeing from pursuit by the Chinese vessel.
Furthermore, once the fishing boat and the Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel move away from the Senkaku Islands, the Chinese vessel immediately returns to the waters around the islands and behaves as though it had successfully guarded them.
Ironically, the footage conveys to the world the impression that China is policing the Senkaku Islands.
An act inspired by righteous indignation and undertaken to defend the Senkaku Islands was used as evidence advantageous to China.
After watching the footage, Rui Sasaki of the Sankei Shimbun stated on the YouTube program Channel Seiron that “it looks as though Japan and China are jointly administering the islands.”
At the very least, the situation does not appear to demonstrate that the islands are completely under Japanese administration.
This summer, large numbers of fishing vessels were moored along China’s coastline from Zhejiang Province to Fujian Province.
Fleets that could not fit inside the ports anchored together in inlets and behind islands.
Their number was said to have reached 10,000.
Beginning in May, China imposes a fishing moratorium of approximately three months in the East China Sea and other waters.
Each year, fishing is reopened in August in the South China Sea, East China Sea and other maritime areas according to the applicable regional schedule.
When the time comes, the fishing fleets set out for waters designated by the Communist Party regime.
For China, these fishing fleets are the vanguard of maritime aggression and are also known as the maritime militia.
If more than 1,000 maritime-militia vessels were to enter the East China Sea in August of this year, the region would be thrown into severe disorder.
To prepare for such a situation, the Japanese government must immediately implement measures that clearly demonstrate that the Senkaku Islands are under Japanese administration.
The most effective policy would be to create conditions in which local fishermen can operate regularly and profitably.
Doing so requires the combined knowledge and capabilities not only of the Japan Coast Guard but also of the Fisheries Agency, the Japan Meteorological Agency and other relevant government bodies.
Marine surveys and island surveys are indispensable.
Japan must never forget that island defense lies at the foundation of all these measures.
Demonstrating both domestically and internationally that Japan possesses the ability to defend its islands is essential to preventing territorial aggression.
The establishment of a comprehensive island-defense system is an urgent task.
Notes on Sources and Terminology
The original Japanese text dated August 3, 2020, has been reproduced without alteration.
The government-confirmed incident most closely corresponding to the footage discussed in the article occurred from May 8 to May 10, 2020.
On May 8, four China Coast Guard vessels entered Japanese territorial waters, and two attempted to approach and pursue a Japanese fishing boat.
Japan Coast Guard vessels moved between them and protected the Japanese boat.
The article’s reference to “late June” appears to concern the period in which the footage was distributed online.
The official materials reviewed here do not establish the exact date on which the footage was first broadcast.
The phrase in the original Japanese text literally referring to a Japan Coast Guard vessel moving “between the fishing boat and the Chinese fishing boat” appears, from the context, to be an error for “between the Japanese fishing boat and the Chinese patrol vessel.”
The Japanese original has nevertheless been preserved without correction.
Under the Chinese fishing-moratorium regulations applicable in 2020, the moratorium in parts of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea generally ran from May 1 to September 16, while the more southerly part of the East China Sea was closed until August 16.
Some fishing methods were allowed to resume on August 1.
The precise dates therefore varied by area and fishing method.
Not every Chinese fishing vessel is a maritime-militia vessel.
Japan’s Ministry of Defense nevertheless states that China maintains maritime-militia units based partly on fishermen and island residents and that these units are reported to serve as a vanguard in defending and advancing Chinese maritime interests.
The figures of 10,000 moored vessels and a possible deployment of more than 1,000 maritime-militia vessels were estimates and warnings recorded at the time.
The official sources reviewed here do not independently confirm either the exact number of moored vessels or the existence of a specific plan to dispatch more than 1,000 maritime-militia vessels toward the Senkaku Islands in August 2020.
A large-scale combined deployment has, however, occurred before.
In August 2016, Japan confirmed six China Coast Guard vessels and approximately 230 Chinese fishing vessels in and around the contiguous zone surrounding the Senkaku Islands.
As of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs update of July 10, 2026, Chinese government vessels continue to enter the contiguous zone almost every day except during stormy weather and intrude into Japanese territorial waters several times a month.