This article introduces an essay by former Japanese ambassador to the United States Ryozo Kato, published in the Sankei Shimbun on May 19, 2020. It discusses national defense and security after the coronavirus crisis, China’s moves around the Senkaku Islands, the backlash against globalization, Japan’s need for friend-or-foe identification, greater national independence, and strategic planning based on the Japan-U.S. alliance.

2020-05-19
On the other hand, the merciless reality of international society tells us that those responsible for and involved in national administration must not take their eyes off issues of national defense and security.
The following is from an essay by former Japanese ambassador to the United States Ryozo Kato, published in today’s Sankei Shimbun under the title “Study the World Strategy after the Coronavirus Crisis.”
Emphases in the text other than headings are mine.
There is something that the whole world must not forget amid the coronavirus crisis.
It is that not every other country necessarily thinks in the same way as Japan.
To achieve both the overcoming of the coronavirus and the maintenance of the national economy is, needless to say, one of the nation’s most important responsibilities.
On the other hand, the merciless reality of international society tells us that those responsible for and involved in national administration must not take their eyes off issues of national defense and security.
The United States Is Grasping China’s Moves around the Senkakus
For example, China’s movements regarding the Senkakus and the East China Sea remain offensive even now, and the United States is issuing a warning to China that says, “We are watching properly.”
A great power, probably unlike Japan, has multiple brains, stomachs, wallets, and the like, and is able to distinguish, “That is that, and this is this.”
In the worlds of sports and hobbies, it may be possible to cry out, “Looting during a fire is against the rules!” or “Wait!” but even though “international law” has evolved considerably since the 17th century, it is still immature; in the real international society where, even if one says “the rule of law,” players who give priority to force do not listen and penalties are lax, this kind of appeal is not effective.
Now, as the world is struck by the coronavirus crisis, the world that was supposed to have become “globalized” has suddenly been forced to recognize once again the meaning of “borders.”
Every country is desperately trying to put out the flames inside its own borders and has no room to look after others.
The situation seems likely to bring “reflection” on the excesses of “interdependence,” and beyond that, a “backlash.”
Even in familiar examples, competition for masks, ventilators, and other medical equipment has already been seen, and food export restrictions and reviews of supply chains will probably proceed as well.
The economic stagnation that arises in this way is becoming a phase that defines international politics.
In various countries, a tendency toward “exclusionism” and “strong-arm rule” will probably be seen.
Acquire a “Friend-or-Foe Identification Ability”
In Japan’s dealings with the countries of the world, it is once again felt that, rather than trusting in their “fairness and good faith,” it is important to carefully discern each country’s “capabilities,” “intentions,” and “behavior patterns.”
In other words, Japan should acquire a sharp “friend-or-foe identification ability” suited to such an age.
True allies are extremely few, and the number of enemies will also be limited.
Among the countries in the middle, the need will grow even greater for efforts to increase as much as possible, through a process of persuasion, the number of “friendly countries” that will side with us in an emergency.
And although it will be difficult, it is originally extremely important to carefully study concrete strategies from now on, assuming the world that will come after the coronavirus crisis.
During the Second World War, it is said that the United States began studying its occupation policy toward Japan in the spring of 1942, a few months after “Pearl Harbor,” or by the summer at the latest.
The context is different, but there is an example that shows America’s sense of speed.
I heard from a reliable American friend that the examination of military and political strategies toward Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, centered on Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, began not long after 9/11.
They said, however, that their assessment was that the strategy was not ultimately successful.
At present, it is said that in the White House, a team studying economic measures for the next six months, chaired by Senior Adviser Kushner, is at work, but if that is the case, it is part of election measures.
Aside from that, I have not yet heard that anything like a full-scale post-coronavirus strategic review meeting is being held at the government level, but what is the actual situation?
Incidentally, it is well known that during the Cold War, a powerful strategic study toward the Soviet Union, gathering wisdom as symbolized by George Kennan’s X Article, was carried out.
There are various things that the coronavirus crisis has brought to light.
The United States, which consistently displayed enormous leadership in facing difficult situations after the war, has become oriented toward “America First,” and there is little possibility that this will be corrected in the near future.
European integration is suffering after receiving a strong body blow.
The presence of the United Nations, the symbol of “multilateralism,” especially in security affairs, is thin, and even among the international organizations under its umbrella, the WHO, for example, is now having its basic credibility called into question.
Turn This into an Opportunity to Raise Japan’s Degree of Independence
Leaving aside propaganda warfare, China lacks both the “will” and the “ability” to lead the world in this difficult situation, and above all, because of the “self-righteousness” of its actions, it has not obtained the world’s “trust.”
However, whether its national power and economic strength become stronger or weaker from now on, China’s foreign policy will continue to be “aggressive” toward 2030 and beyond, and will never become “benign”; this, I think, is the analysis of many Japanese and American specialists.
There is no doubt that Japan too is in a difficult situation.
However, as I have said many times, it can also be said that now is a good opportunity for Japan to raise its degree of independence based on the Japan-U.S. alliance.
It is not only Japanese people who are watching Japan.
We should also keep in mind that many eyes in Asia, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and elsewhere in the world are fixed on Japan’s actions.
Ryozo Kato.