In July 2020, Tsukasa Shirakawa argued that Shinzo Abe should serve a fourth term as president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, citing his leadership during the COVID-19 crisis, rapidly changing international conditions, and the difficulty of achieving constitutional reform.
This article examines Abe’s crisis management, the absence of a legally established emergency framework in Japan, and the media campaign surrounding his administration.

July 13, 2020
Japan managed to contain the spread of COVID-19 to a comparatively limited degree despite lacking many of the institutions and legal mechanisms normally required for a national emergency.
That achievement was due in significant measure to the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
The following discussion is based on an article by Tsukasa Shirakawa titled “Why I Support a Fourth Term for Abe,” which I discovered on Daily WiLL Online.
The article was published on July 7, 2020, and updated the following day.
As my previous writings demonstrate, my view was substantially the same as Shirakawa’s.
The question raised by his article was not simply whether one supported or opposed a single politician named Shinzo Abe.
It was a question of which Japanese political leader possessed the ability to confront the COVID-19 pandemic, the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, the expansionism of the Chinese Communist regime, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and the immense challenge of constitutional reform.

Could a “Post-Abe” Leader Have Managed the Crisis?

As news coverage focused less exclusively on COVID-19, Japanese television networks and newspapers began to increase their speculation about the “post-Abe” era.
Would LDP Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai support Shigeru Ishiba?
Did Prime Minister Abe hope that Fumio Kishida would succeed him?
Was Yoshihide Suga the only politician capable of continuing Abe’s policies?
A variety of theories circulated at the time.
Shirakawa argued, however, that only Prime Minister Abe or Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Taro Aso possessed the experience and ability required to respond to the rapidly changing international situation.
Considering their respective ages and future prospects, Shirakawa concluded that the only realistic choice was a fourth term for Abe as president of the Liberal Democratic Party.
Yoshihide Suga, Fumio Kishida, Shigeru Ishiba, and Taro Kono were all discussed as possible successors.
In Shirakawa’s judgment, however, none of them was yet capable of guiding Japan through the international turmoil then unfolding.
Abe faced relentless criticism over his government’s response to COVID-19.
Nevertheless, Shirakawa maintained that no other available leader could have managed the crisis as effectively.
Japan did not confront the pandemic under ideal institutional conditions.
Ideally, conservative policy institutes would have formulated proposals based on medical science, national security, and crisis-management expertise.
The government would then have implemented those proposals under a legally established emergency system.
Japan, however, possessed neither a powerful conservative policy institute nor a sufficiently developed legal framework that enabled the government to act rapidly and decisively during a national emergency.
Despite all these institutional deficiencies, Japan succeeded in limiting the spread of infection to a significant degree.
Shirakawa attributed much of that achievement to Abe’s leadership.

Could Another Politician Have Done the Same?

Many people, including some conservatives, were criticizing Abe.
Shirakawa asked them to exercise their imagination before passing judgment.
What would have happened if former Democratic Party of Japan prime ministers Naoto Kan or Yoshihiko Noda had been in power?
What if the prime minister had been Shigeru Ishiba?
What about Fumio Kishida, Yoshihide Suga, or Taro Kono?
Scientific knowledge of the virus remained limited.
Japan’s legal system imposed many restrictions on government action.
Governments throughout the world were confused and unprepared.
Under those conditions, was there another Japanese politician who could realistically have performed better than Abe?
When the alternatives were examined concretely rather than theoretically, Shirakawa argued, it was difficult to identify anyone who could have managed the crisis as effectively.
His argument was not that every decision made by the Abe administration had been perfect.
His point was that political leadership must be evaluated in comparison with the actual alternatives available during a real crisis.

Why Abe’s Approval Rating Declined

The media campaign against Abe had continued for years.
The Moritomo Gakuen controversy, the Kake Gakuen controversy, and the cherry-blossom viewing party were repeatedly used to attack his administration.
Despite this criticism, the Abe government maintained a substantial level of public support.
During the COVID-19 crisis, however, its approval rating fell sharply.
Shirakawa argued that the decline occurred because criticism was no longer limited to the political left.
Some anti-China conservatives had also begun attacking Abe.
It was predictable that left-wing forces opposed to constitutional reform would attempt to remove Abe from office.
As long as conservatives committed to constitutional reform remained united, attacks from the left alone were unlikely to destroy the government.
Once conservatives became divided, however, the government’s support would inevitably decline.
Creating a division within the conservative camp was therefore the most effective way to bring Abe down.

Was the Criticism over Travel Restrictions Justified?

Some conservatives claimed that Abe had delayed travel restrictions out of excessive consideration for China and had thereby allowed COVID-19 to spread throughout Japan.
Shirakawa rejected this argument.
The virus had probably entered Japan during 2019.
Countries that imposed travel restrictions earlier, including the United States, subsequently experienced enormous outbreaks.
It was therefore unrealistic to assume that travel restrictions alone could have completely prevented the virus from entering Japan.
Shirakawa instead emphasized Abe’s decision to request the nationwide closure of schools despite intense criticism from many directions.
Schools are environments in which large numbers of students and teachers spend extended periods in enclosed spaces.
At a time when the virus, its transmission routes, and effective treatments remained poorly understood, requesting school closures before the start of the new academic term may have contributed significantly to limiting transmission.
Very few journalists or commentators gave Abe credit for that decision.
Instead of carefully evaluating the government’s choices, many critics simply portrayed Abe as excessively friendly toward China.
Shirakawa urged readers to consider who ultimately benefited from such attacks.

Who Could Achieve Constitutional Reform?

It was clear that the political left was using every available means to prevent constitutional reform.
This hostility was not directed only at Abe.
Any prime minister who seriously advocated constitutional reform would immediately face aggressive opposition from much of the media.
No matter who became prime minister, efforts to block constitutional revision would continue.
The central question was whether any politician other than Abe could withstand that storm of criticism while continuing to advance constitutional reform.
Could any of the proposed post-Abe candidates have survived a coordinated media assault?
Would they not have been forced from office as soon as they began to speak seriously about constitutional revision?
Some people argued that constitutional reform was impossible under Abe.
Shirakawa saw the matter differently.
The problem was not that reform was impossible because Abe was prime minister.
The reality was that constitutional reform remained extraordinarily difficult even with Abe as prime minister.
Japan’s Constitution had never been amended since it came into force.
Revision required overcoming determined opposition from left-wing forces and influential media organizations, as well as winning a national referendum.
If any politician possessed a realistic possibility of achieving constitutional reform, Shirakawa argued, it was Abe.
Anyone who genuinely desired constitutional revision therefore had no realistic choice other than supporting a fourth term for him.

The Illusion of the “Abe Friend”

The expression “Abe friend” was often used to describe people who supported the prime minister.
It suggested that Abe had created a circle of allies who exchanged political influence and economic benefits.
Shirakawa argued that this image was the opposite of reality.
Supporting Abe did not guarantee personal profit.
Nor did bureaucratic consideration for his administration necessarily produce rewards.
Shirakawa referred to several individuals who faced severe criticism or attacks after being associated with Abe.
Akira Amari, who played a major role in restoring the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, withdrew from the political forefront after a weekly magazine report.
Noriyuki Yamaguchi continued to be treated in parts of the media as though he were a criminal even after prosecutors twice decided not to indict him.
Eitaro Ogawa criticized the reporting of the Asahi Shimbun and faced a lawsuit demanding substantial damages rather than merely a rebuttal through public debate.
Kotaro Kake and the Moritomo Gakuen couple were also repeatedly presented through the image of being personally connected to Abe.
Each of these cases requires careful individual examination.
Nevertheless, they cannot be explained by the simplistic claim that supporting Abe automatically produced personal benefits.
Many people associated with Abe were instead subjected to intense scrutiny and criticism.

The Essential Character of Shinzo Abe

Abe was not a politician who governed solely through personal command.
His political style was based on listening to many people, reconciling different views, and reaching decisions after consultation.
He was far removed from the image of a dictator.
Nor did he openly reward people simply because they supported him.
In that sense, he was unusually detached from ordinary calculations of personal advantage.
He did not distribute special benefits to supporters.
Yet people continued to support him.
That fact itself demonstrated his unusual qualities as a political leader.
Some people approach politicians because they hope to gain something.
Those who supported Abe, however, often received no financial or social advantage.
In some cases, what they received was merely a word of gratitude from Abe and years of criticism from those who opposed him.
They nevertheless continued to support him because they believed that he was sincerely attempting to do what was right for Japan.
Shirakawa described himself as one of those supporters.

Why a Fourth Term for Abe?

Shirakawa argued that Abe was not sustained by a conventional structure of political interests.
Because his opponents could not easily attack him through clear evidence of corruption, they attempted instead to manufacture an image of political dishonesty.
Criticism of any politician must remain free.
People were entitled to dislike Abe.
But personal dislike did not justify portraying him without evidence as equivalent to corrupt politicians.
A politician concerned only with private interests could not have maintained public support for such a long period.
Shirakawa openly stated that he admired Abe and wanted him to serve a fourth term as president of the Liberal Democratic Party.
The world was then entering the early stage of a fundamental transformation.
Strategic competition between the United States and China was intensifying.
The Chinese Communist regime continued its military and economic expansion.
COVID-19 was reshaping the international order.
This was not a situation that an ordinary or mediocre leader could easily manage.
A fourth term would have imposed an enormous physical and emotional burden on Abe.
He himself might not have wanted it.
Nevertheless, Shirakawa concluded that, for the sake of Japan and the future of Japanese children, there was no alternative to a fourth term for Abe.
That was also my conclusion at the time.