Written on August 3, 2020, this article traces China’s maritime strategy to the era of Deng Xiaoping and Liu Huaqing and examines the First and Second Island Chains, the nine-dash line, the militarization of artificial islands, China’s tightening control over Hong Kong, and the danger posed to the East China Sea and Japan.

August 3, 2020
This article continues the preceding chapter, which examined the organization and capabilities of the China Coast Guard.
It argues that China’s maritime expansion is neither temporary nor accidental, but forms part of a long-term national strategy developed during the Deng Xiaoping era.
It considers the First and Second Island Chains, the construction and militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea, China’s rejection of the international arbitral award, the incorporation of disputed areas into the administrative structure of Sansha City, and the tightening of control over Hong Kong as interconnected elements of a single strategy for maritime hegemony.
Key Quotation
“China sought to incorporate these waters into its maritime territory. China, traditionally described as a continental power, had begun advancing into the sea in pursuit of new interests and expanded power.”
Full Text
August 3, 2020
China sought to incorporate these waters into its maritime territory.
China, traditionally described as a continental power, had begun advancing into the sea in pursuit of new interests and expanded power.
The following is a continuation of the preceding chapter.
China’s Unwavering Maritime Strategy
The foundations of China’s present maritime encroachment were laid in 1981, when Deng Xiaoping became Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.
In the following year, under Deng’s leadership, Admiral Liu Huaqing, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, formulated a modernization plan for the People’s Liberation Army, and the necessary organizational structure began to be developed.
This plan continues to be followed to this day.
At the center of this plan was a military strategy based on the concepts of the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain.
These lines were conceived as military boundaries separating China from the United States, which China regarded as its principal adversary.
China sought to incorporate these waters into its maritime territory.
China, traditionally described as a continental power, had begun advancing into the sea in pursuit of new interests and expanded power.
Its first priority was to contain Japan’s maritime strategy, because Japan exercised substantial influence over the waters of Asia.
The First Island Chain is a line extending from Japan’s Nansei Islands through Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia, enclosing the South China Sea.
It represents a plan to turn the East China Sea and the South China Sea into China’s own seas, and the target year for completing control within the First Island Chain was 2010.
Having constructed artificial islands and brought most of the South China Sea under its control, China began devoting its full attention to encroachment in the East China Sea.
It had already begun advancing toward the Second Island Chain, extending from the Ogasawara Islands through Guam, Saipan and the Pacific island nations.
International norms and common sense have no force over China’s maritime encroachment.
In waters over which the Philippines and Vietnam claim jurisdiction, China unilaterally drew its “nine-dash line,” asserted sovereignty and constructed artificial islands on nine reefs and submerged features.
Although artificial islands are not recognized as sovereign territory under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China incorporated them into its claimed territory.
Having been deprived of its waters, the Philippines instituted proceedings in 2013 before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in an attempt to stop China’s unlawful maritime control.
In 2016, the tribunal recognized the unlawfulness of China’s maritime claims and handed the Philippines a victory.
The Chinese government, however, dismissed the ruling as “nothing more than a scrap of paper” and continued its encroachment into the South China Sea.
Construction of military facilities, including runways capable of accommodating military aircraft, was nearly complete on the artificial islands built at Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef, consolidating China’s maritime control.
China’s encroachment into Vietnamese waters has been even more extreme.
Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in waters where Chinese and Vietnamese jurisdictional claims overlap are driven away by the Chinese navy and coast guard.
Vessels that refuse to comply are seized, their crew members are detained, and their communications equipment and machinery are confiscated.
In April of this year, a Vietnamese fishing vessel sank after being rammed by a Chinese patrol vessel.
China gives priority to its own prosperity over international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
For China, international law has no meaning.
Furthermore, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council possessing veto power, China cannot be subjected to sanctions by the Security Council.
The United States, seeking to restrain China’s domination of Asia, has carried out Freedom of Navigation Operations by sailing warships through the South China Sea and has attempted to preserve the maritime order.
China’s effective control, however, has gradually expanded, and it has already brought most of the waters within the nine-dash line surrounding the South China Sea under its control.
China has also incorporated the artificial islands it developed into the administrative districts of Nansha and Xisha under Sansha City, thereby declaring them to be under Chinese administration and turning its claims into an established fact.
The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have called upon China to exercise restraint and have continued negotiations aimed at establishing a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
At this stage, however, there is no longer any room to expect concessions from China.
China’s domination of the South China Sea is also connected to its repression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong.
During the period of British rule, Hong Kong’s container terminal competed with Singapore for the position of the world’s largest.
Its functions have since been transferred to Shanghai and Ningbo on the Chinese mainland, and Hong Kong has fallen to seventh place in the world.
The Hong Kong National Security Law has destroyed the “one country, two systems” framework and silenced the free speech of Hong Kong’s citizens.
Furthermore, Hong Kong’s port will be regarded with suspicion because of its connections with foreign powers and will be placed under the influence of the Chinese government.
As a result, China will seize the initiative over maritime traffic in the South China Sea, leaving the United States with no opportunity to intervene.
The Japanese live according to a belief in the fundamental goodness of others.
They must nevertheless recognize that China acts in a world divorced from international common sense and international law.
The methods China used in its acts of aggression in the South China Sea will also be used in the East China Sea.
Japan must not neglect its preparations.
To be continued.
Notes on Sources and Terminology
The original Japanese text dated August 3, 2020, has been reproduced without alteration.
The expression “the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled” has been retained as it appeared in the original.
Strictly speaking, the Philippines initiated arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the arbitral tribunal issued the award, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration acted as the registry for the proceedings.
The final award was issued on July 12, 2016, and found no legal basis for Chinese claims to historic rights within the nine-dash line beyond the rights provided by the Convention.
Article 60, paragraph 8, of the Convention states that artificial islands do not possess the legal status of islands and have no territorial sea of their own.
The original reference to artificial islands being constructed on “nine” reefs has also been retained.
Official and arbitral materials generally identify seven Chinese artificial-island outposts in the Spratly Islands.
Hong Kong government statistics placed the Port of Hong Kong eighth in the world in container throughput in 2019, rather than seventh.
This numerical correction does not alter the article’s central observation that Hong Kong had fallen substantially from its former position as one of the world’s leading container ports.